WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHTS

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WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT

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UNIT II

Machuash-Thomas Hobbes-John Locke - Rouseau

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Volture-Moontesquieu- Thomas Pane -Mary Wollstonecraft-Luigi Faparelli

UNIT IV

Jeremy Bentham-J.S.Mill-David Thoreau -Nietzsche

UNIT V

Karl Marx-Antonto Gramser-Richard Rorty- Martin Luther King Jr

Recommenard Books

1. George H, Sabine. *A History of Political Theory*, Oxford and IIBH Pub Co.Ltd., New Delhi, 2019
2. Phyllis Doyle, *A History of Political Thougar*, Jonathan Cape, London, 1963
3. RC Gupta, *Western Political Thought*, Lakshmi Nara in Agarwal. Agra 2012
4. R.P. Sharma. *Western Political Thought*: *Plate to Hugo*. Sterling Pub Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1984
5. S Vijayaraghavan and R. Jayaram, Political Trought, Sterling Pub Pvt.Ltd., 1994 Sherai Jha, *Western Political Thought: Front Plato to Marx*. Pearson, Delhi, 2010
6. William Ebenstein, *Great Political Thinkers-Plato to the Present* S. Chand (GL) &Co Ltd. New Delhi, 1999

WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT

UNIT – I

SOCRATIC POLITICAL THOUGHT (470 B.C – 399 B.C)

Socratics is best known for his association with the Socratic Method of question and answer. He was considered to be the founding father of western philosophy. The proper place of speech, or reason, in the political community became for the first time a pressing theoretical question and political issue with the life and death of Socrates. Socrates departed from the tradition of philosophy that preceded him by, among other things, his decision to investigate moral and political questions by questioning publicly and privately the opinions of his unphilosophic contemporaries. His public questioning of received opinion about virtue and citizenship led to his prosecution by his home city of Athens on charges of impiety and ultimately to his execution. The defense he gave in the face of these charges, memorialized in the writings of his students Plato and Xenophon, may not have saved his life, but it helped to secure the privileged place of science or philosophy in the ancient regime and thereafter in the Western world.

Socrates' defense speech, as recounted by Plato, makes arguments that would later become elements of standard defenses of freedom of speech. In Plato's telling, Socrates argues that people cannot help believing what they believe and therefore ought to be corrected rather than punished. Accordingly, the only appropriate remedy for false or wicked teachings is true and sound argument. The people of Athens, however, had never given rigorous thought to how to teach citizens how to be good, or why they should be loyal to the city and its traditions. Only by permitting citizens to question these traditions is it possible for anyone to arrive at the knowledge of politics that alone can place such loyalty on solid foundations.

Socrates' Approval of Censorship

Since these arguments seem to point toward the principle of freedom of speech, it is striking that in other dialogues Socrates not only stops short of defending freedom of speech, but even advocates against it. In Plato's *Republic*, Socrates notoriously argues that the social stability necessary for his famous "city in speech" requires telling citizens a "noble lie" about their origins and their political and economic station in the city. The education of the guardian class, moreover, involves a radical censorship program under the strict control of the philosophers who both design the regime and lead it. In Plato's *Laws*, heterodox views about the city and its gods are not corrected through an open discussion of them, but through private meetings with the ominously-titled "nocturnal council." Why does Socrates, who is so keenly aware that the pursuit of knowledge requires openness to opposing views, think it necessary not only to suppress heterodoxy, but even to knowingly promote falsehoods?

Here we must confront a fundamental difference between Socratic political philosophy and the political philosophy of the Enlightenment that informs modern, rights-based government and that led to the adoption of the political principle of free speech. Enlightenment political philosophers entertained far greater hopes than Socrates and his students of making rationality widespread. Socrates' doubts about his ability to educate citizens *en masse* is made somewhat more clear in Xenophon's account of Socrates' trial than in Plato's. Xenophon argues that Socrates not only did not think that an honest account of his merit would save him from execution, but even hoped that it would ensure his execution and save him from the decline of old age. In other words, Socrates did not think that most people could be brought to see things philosophically by public argument; the most philosophers can hope to accomplish is to educate a very few outstanding students to philosophy and perhaps instill some measure of respect for philosophy among the rest. This view is also suggested by the *Republic*, which depicts the rational city as being governed by one or only a few philosopher kings—not as being filled with rational citizens. Even in the rational city, reason belongs only to a privileged few.

Deeper Doubts about Reason and Politics

As serious as these doubts about the possibility of enlightenment may be, Plato's *Apology* may indicate even graver doubts about the possibility of rational politics. For while Socrates does argue there that correction through free inquiry is the only way one could hope to arrive at a true civic education, he does not say that such an education is possible. In fact, Socrates famously argues that what his investigations have established *firmly* is only that *no one*, himself included, possesses the knowledge of virtue that could be the foundation of such an education. There are many ways to interpret Socrates' bold statement of his own ignorance, but what is clear is that while Socrates understood it to be possible to rationally defend the pursuit of moral and political wisdom, he did not think that such wisdom was available at his time. Nor did he seem to think that progress toward that kind of wisdom was possible, except in the limited sense that an awareness of one's ignorance is a kind of progress.

It would seem, then, that Socrates perceived a problem with the opinions or judgments that inform every political community and that this perception led him eventually to conclude that the only sound political principle, or principle of action, is to whole-heartedly pursue wisdom. In other words, one should live a life of philosophy instead of devoting oneself to the improvement of the city. For Socrates, therefore, the judgments of citizens—even elite citizens—cannot possibly rise to the level of knowledge without losing their distinctly political character. An implication of this conclusion is that political disputes about these judgments, insofar as they are *political*, will never be truly free and open—that is to say, they will never be philosophic or scientific. Any law or edict establishing the freedom of speech and unrestricted inquiry will only ever be an artificial and confused image of the true or natural principle of philosophic inquiry.

PLATO WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT

Plato was a Greek philosopher who lived in the 4th century BC. He is one of the most important figures in Western philosophy. He played a significant role in shaping Plato Western political thought. His ideas laid the groundwork for democracy and influenced many philosophers that followed.

Studying the political thought of Plato is valuable for UPSC candidates. It provides insights into the foundations of Western political thought and its relevance to modern governance.

The Plato Western political thought is a topic of the Sociology subject in the Mains Optional Paper.

In this article, we will explore Plato western political thought, including his Theory of Ideas. We will also examine the key features of Western political thought that emerged from his teachings.

Western political thought refers to the ideas and theories about governance that originated in Western civilizations. It encompasses the political philosophies developed in ancient Greece, Rome, and during the Enlightenment period.

Work of plat

Some of the key features of the western political thought include the following:

- Western political thought values the freedom of individuals. This includes freedom of expression, speech, and religion. It recognizes the significance of protecting individual rights and limiting the power of the state.

- Equality and justice are fundamental principles in Western political thought. It emphasizes equal rights and fair treatment for each and every member of the society. This should be irrespective of their social, economic, or political status.
- The rule of law is a basic aspect of Western political thought. It asserts that laws should apply equally to all citizens. This is inclusive of those in positions of power too. The rule of law makes sure that no one is above the law and that justice is administered without any bias.
- In a democracy, the power rests with the people. This is a central feature of Western political thought. It emphasizes the importance of citizens' taking part in decision-making processes. It holds that governments need to be accountable to the people they serve.

Plato Western Political Thought

Plato, born in Athens, Greece around 427 BCE, was a prominent philosopher. His work, "The Republic," remains one of the cornerstones of Western political thought. "The Republic" presents Plato's vision of an ideal state. It explores the characteristics of a just society. In this dialogue, Plato discusses various aspects of politics, ethics, and philosophy. Plato suggests that it is possible to reconcile the conflicting interests of different societal factions. His proposed political order is based on reason and justice. It aims to create a harmonious unity within society. This order allows each part of society to thrive without causing harm to others.

Key Concepts in Plato Western Political Thought

The Theory of Ideas

Plato proposed the Theory of Ideas. The theory is also known as the Theory of Forms. According to this theory, the physical world is just a reflection of a higher realm of unchangeable ideas or forms. These ideas represent the ultimate reality. The material world is just an imperfect imitation of these perfect forms.

The Philosopher-King

Plato believed that the ideal ruler should be a philosopher. He should possess wisdom, knowledge, and a deep understanding of truth. The philosopher-king is driven by a pursuit of knowledge and the common good. This makes them best suited to govern and lead society.

The Ideal State

Plato envisioned an ideal state governed by reason. In this state, individuals are divided into three distinct social classes:

- the rulers,
- the warriors, and
- the producers.

Each class has specific roles and responsibilities. They contribute to the overall harmony of the state.

The Allegory of the Cave

Plato used the allegory of the cave to illustrate his philosophical ideas. It depicts individuals who are trapped in a cave, perceiving only shadows on the wall. According to Plato, individuals can break free from ignorance and gain true knowledge only through philosophical enlightenment.

Plato's Theory of Ideas and Its Impact on Western Political Thought

Explanation of the Theory of Ideas

Plato's Theory of Ideas proposes that the physical world we perceive is a mere reflection. The material world is transient and imperfect. The realm of ideas represents the eternal and unchangeable truth.

Influence on Political Philosophy

Plato's Theory of Ideas had a profound influence on subsequent political philosophers. He emphasized on the pursuit of knowledge, wisdom, and justice in governance. This shaped the development of political thought in the Western tradition.

Connection to Modern Democracy

Plato's ideas laid the foundation for democratic principles in Western political thought. Concepts like equality, justice, and the rule of law are fundamental to modern democracies. These find their roots in Plato's political philosophy.

Plato's ideas have had a profound impact on Western political thought. His theory of ideas has been influential in the development of political thought. They are still debated today, and they continue to be relevant to our own political problems. His work is a valuable resource for anyone who wants to understand the nature of justice, the ideal state, and the role of the philosopher in society.

ARISTOTLE POLITICAL THOUGHT

Aristotle (384 - 322 BC), was a Greek philosopher, logician, and scientist. He was born in northern Greece, and his father was a court physician to the king of Macedon. He was the disciple of Plato and attended his school at the age of 17. He was the teacher of Alexander the great. He came back to Athens, after alexander succeeded his father, and established his school and library at Lyceum.

Works of Aristotle

He was considered as Father of Political Science. Aristotle wrote extensively on subjects like metaphysics, psychology, poetry, biology, moral sciences, politics, etc. The most notable of his works on political science were Politics, Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics. He also made certain notes on numerous constitutions but most of it was lost. The two books on ethics discussed the nature of individual happiness or well being. Poltics described the role of State to ensure individual happiness. It explained the ideal city where happiness could be achieved and the means to do so, in speculative and practical manner.

Aristotle's Political view

He regarded political science to be a master science and state as highest of all communities aiming at highest good. His approach was scientific and practical

a) Study based on facts
b) Evaluating the facts
c) Respecting traditions
d) Comparative analysis

State as a natural institution

Aristotle rejected Sophists view that political society is the product of convention. Man is political and social animal, hence State is natural- as it reflects both the aspects. Three arguments to prove the aforesaid

a) natural instincts argument
b) Teleological argument
c) 'state as an organism'- argument.

Classification of State

Aristotle, classified states on the basis of two principles:-

(1) In whom the sovereign powers are vested?

(2) Whether it is exercised for the good of the community or for the good of the ruler?

If it is good for the community then it is a pure or correct state. If it is good for the ruler it is a deviant state

Aristotle on Property

Aristotle defends system of private property as opposed to Plato's views of community property. Every citizen should possess property of optimum size. Natural and unnatural forms of property. Continuance of fixed amount of property for generations by birth control.

Aristotle on Slavery

Aristotle defended and justified slavery (household). He declared slavery to be an institution of nature. A superior would rule over inferior. A slave belongs to

a free man and as such he exists only for the sake of latter. However, he insists on the humanitarian treatment of the slaves.

Aristotle on Citizenship

Aristotle on Citizenship was not to be determined by residence citizen as a person who has the power to take part in the deliberative or judicial administration. A good citizen would have the intelligence and the ability to rule and be ruled young and the old could not be citizens, for one was immature and the other infirm. Women were also not regarded as citizens.

Aristotle on Distributive justice

Aristotle thought that justice is the core of the state. It is a complete virtue. He also introduced the concept of Distributive justice. 'Just' has two meanings- abiding to legal rules and using fair means. Distributive justice consists of proper allocation to each person according to his worth.

Aristotle on Education

Aristotle believed that education should be designed to train man in a certain type of character suitable to the state. Three stages of schooling: Primary- Ages 7-14 years. Secondary- Ages 14-21 years. Higher education- 21above. Higher education was for males only as Aristotle believed women were not capable of such complex studies.

Aristotle on Women and Family

Aristotle Family is the first unit of state. There is a natural friendship between man and a woman for a human thrives to live in pairs. It was a relation between husband and wife; and parents and children. He believed that marriages without children would dissolve easily, for they create necessary bond. He did not believe in gender equality. He criticized Spartans for giving their women excessive freedom. Women by nature cannot have virtue of courage and also they don't have intellect to participate in administration. Woman should be part of the city but left out of political process. A husband is head of the family and wife must obey to his commands.

Eudaimonia

Eudaimonia means nature of happiness. He identified good as happiness. Happiness represented quest for excellence. A life of sufficiency and self reliance would be a happy one. Two qualities of soul: rational and irrational. •The aim of State is to ensure happiness of community.

Revolution

According to Aristotle, "If any change occurs in the existing system or constitution of the state, it means the revolution. Different types of measure of revolution: A revolution may take the form of a change of constitution of state. The revolution may try to grasp political power without changing the constitution. A revolution may be directed against not the inter system of government, but a particular institution or set of persons in the state.

Causes of revolution General Causes:

Psychological motives or the state of mind. The objectives in mind. The occasions that gave rise to political upheaval and mutual strife.

Other causes:

Dishonour, profit at the expense of public, negligence on part of administrators, Fear of sanctions, Poverty, disproportionate increase in power.

Prevention of Revolution

Maintaining law and order for even smallest of matters. Not taking people for granted. The principle of democratic equality must be followed and liberty of ecpression must be accorded. Holders of offices should not be able to make private gain too much power should not be allowed to one man or one class of men Honours should be awarded to people of worth. Effective education should be proovided.

Rule of law and Constitution

Aristotle had the idea of constitutionally based order. He said rightly constituted law was the final authority. Constitutional Rule had 3 main elements: Common interest General regulations to carry out Government. Subjects were ruled by consent. “A constitution can be described as an organisation of offices in state, by which the method of their distribution is fixed, the sovereign authority is determined and the nature of the end to be pursued by a community.” Constitution has two aspects: Ethical and Institutional Three elements of constitution: • Deliberative, Official and Magisterial

Differences with Plato

Plato was and idealist while Aristotle a realist. The main focus of Plato is a perfect society. Aristotle wanted to improve on the existing one. Aristotle rejected the idea of select persons holding the power. Plato pursued political truth while Aristotle was concerned with the citizen and the design of political institutions.

UNIT – II

POLITICAL THOUGHT OF MACHIAVELLI

Political changes as fundamental and widespread as those described in the preceding pages were bound to have an effect on what men thought about the nature of political authority in general. During the middle ages most of this thinking could be associated in some way or another with the theory of the two swords. One of the primary characteristics of this theory was its tendency to idealize political relationships by describing the state as it ought to be. Political behavior was to be judged on the basis of its conformity to principles of traditional Christian morality.

The national state in western Europe was a new institution, without precedent in the European World. Its rise and almost immediate conflict with the Church challenged political theorists to reexamine the assumptions of a universal church in a universal empire upon which the theory of the two swords was based. These assumptions were so generally accepted that they were not easily abandoned. In the fourteenth century Marsiglio of Padua, for all his disinterest in the two swords, had arrived at his conclusions without denying either the existence of a universal church or the validity of the traditional morality. Other writers who de- fended the concentration of authority in royal hands sometimes stressed the power accorded the prince in Roman law or appealed to the need for a firm hand in maintaining peace and order in the state But these writers remained firmly committed to an ideal of justice in political relationship which had its origin in Greek, Roman, and Christian sources. It remained for a figure of the Italian

Renaissance, Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), to make the decisive break with the past, which indeed Marsiglio had foreshadowed, and divorce politics from morality.

Early life of Machiavelli

The son of a bourgeois family, Machiavelli was born in Florence when that city was still the leading Italian Renais- sance center, while the War of the Roses was raging in England, during the reign of Louis XI in France, and in the same year that Ferdinand and Isabella were united in marriage in Spain. His early impressions of politics were influenced by the wars, intrigues, conspiracies and double-dealing characteristic of many of the political leaders of the day. He entered public life in Florence in 1494, the year in which French troops in- vaded Italy and expelled the Medici from control of the city. Machiavelli rose to a prominent position, the duties of which required him to travel from time to time on various diplomatic missions. In the course of his travels he carefully acquired a knowledge and appreciation of the workings of Italian diplomacy and the way government operated in France and Germany. In 1502 he was sent as envoy to Cesare Borgia (1476-1507), who with the help of his father, Pope Alexander VI, and the French had carved out for himself a duchy in northern Italy. Machiavelli's in- itial hostility toward the new duke of Romagna was soon replaced by admiration for his always direct and often brutal methods. The experience gained in watching this unscrupulous prince in action fixed itself indelibly on the young diplomat's mind.

Back in Florence, Machiavelli persuaded the government to institute a military force composed of citizens instead of mer- cenary troops. This innovation

did not prevent the restoration of the Medici, with the help of Spanish troops, in 1512. Machi- avelli was suspected of plotting against the new government and after a temporary imprisonment he was sent into exile. This enforced withdrawal was an unhappy change for one who for almost two decades Machiavelbin had been in the center of affairs. Machiavelli used his remaining years in writing and in trying to return to polit- ical life in Florence. In the year 1513 he completed the two works which have made his name immortal: Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius and The Prince.

Machiavelliaism

If Machiavelli expected that The Prince, which he dedicated to one of the Medici, would persuade them to restore him to power, he was doomed to disappointment, since they gave him only brief preferment before his death in 1527. However, the views which he expressed reached a wide audience and soon he became the center of a lively controversy which has not yet ended and which gives every promise of continuing into the future. The difference of opinion reduces itself to the ques- tion: Was Machiavelli firmly committed to the opportunistic and cynical methods which have given rise to the term "Machia- vellianism," or has he been grossly misunderstood? Was he more seriously concerned with the ultimate establishment of repub- lican institutions? Perhaps it would be correct to say that The Prince, which was his more famous work and upon which Machiavellianism is primarily based, was more concerned with methods because its author had an immediate and practical pur- pose in mind. However, there is good evidence that the Dis- courses grew out of the same line of thought that produced The Prince

Machiavelli perceived clearly that the political evolution of Europe was toward centralization of power and an inchoate sense of national unity. He saw that Italy was running counter to this trend. It was divided against itself, it was invaded time and time again, and it seemed to have no will to resist either of these calamities. While perhaps not clearly, Machia- velli thought of Italy as a political unit, as it had once been. His patriotism was one of the guiding forces in his life. In the Discourses, he looked back into the history of the Roman Republic in search of those qualities which had once made Italy great. He believed that he found them in the intelligence and devotion to duty of the ruling classes, in the patriotism of the citizen-soldier, and in the civic religion which bound both ruler and citizen together. Machiavelli lauds such a republic, in which popular institutions would check one another, where liberty would reign, and where property would be secure.

Human nature

In attempting to explain why the Roman Republic had fallen, Machiavelli arrived at an evaluation of human nature. He be- lieved that men were basically fearful, selfish, aggressive, and motivated by a love of power. This evaluation was not un- Christian, but whereas the Christian held that human nature could be directed to a higher, transcendent end, Machiavelli seems to have abandoned this for a different end. Cynically, he accepted human nature as he took it to be. All human institutions are bound to collapse, because they are the work of hopelessly cor- rupt men. His philosophy of history was more nearly Greek than Christian. Believing that the pattern of history was cyclical, he had to conclude that the circumstances which made the Roman Republic possible were bound to pass and that similar circum- stances would again reappear. Since to a certain extent the

affairs of men are subject to fortune, there are only limited changes which courageous men can effect in this pattern.

It is at this point that some of the most bitter criticism has been directed against Machiavelli. He seems to have be- lieved that in sixteenth century Italy the virtues which he associated with the Roman Republic were simply unrealistic. was convinced that the many examples of good faith bringing He failure and bad faith bringing success which he himself had ex- perienced as a diplomat could not be explained away. He sought to direct human actions to the highest practical end which he knew. This was the good of the community and by community he meant Italy. He was prepared to say that a good end, such as order in a united Italy, was worth the price. The price was spelled out in The Prince, as the selection which follows illus- trates

At the conclusion of this work the hard-boiled political realist launches into an emotional appeal to Italian patriotism which is quite out of keeping with everything which precedes it. This appeal was unsuccessful in spreading Machiavelli's own patriotism or in inducing any prince to attempt his methods for uniting the peninsula. It is instructive to speculate on how lasting an Italian state would have been at this time without the national sentiment which Machiavelli surely knew scarcely existed.

THOMAS HOBBES AND THE POLITICAL THOUGHT

Thomas Hobbes presents himself as the first true political philosopher, the first to offer exact knowledge of justice, sovereignty, and citizenship. Hobbes claims, moreover, that his systematic political science will revolutionize political practice, enabling us to build more stable, peaceful, and productive societies. In order to achieve these results, though, Hobbes must promote a view of the proper scope of politics that is narrower than that of the ancients. By focusing political energies on the preservation of life and its comforts, Hobbes helps to institute the proposal made earlier by Machiavelli: that politics should satisfy certain basic, morally neutral needs rather than aim to organize us around contentious principles. Hobbes emphasizes several ideas that have become central to modern politics and modern political science. He argues that human beings are not naturally social or political, that the state of nature is a state of war, and that we must self-consciously create a government that is based on mutual consent and that presupposes a fundamental equality among its members. These ideas are most comprehensively set forth in the *Leviathan* (1651), which text serves as the basis for this introduction to Hobbes's thought.

Hobbes's Political Science

Hobbes's claim to found the first true political science should be understood against the background of the political thinkers he seeks to supplant, chiefly. Hobbes is dissatisfied with the wisdom Aristotle claims to gain from considering multiple opinions about the good, remarking that hundreds of years of philosophical conversation have made no discernible progress on this question.

Hobbes aims rather to elaborate a definitive and unambiguous science of the political good. Indeed, he argues that reading Aristotle serves no purpose but to justify the ambitions of rebellious young men.

Hobbes gives an account of political order that portrays it as a self-conscious construction, an artifice we craft to remove ourselves from a pre-political state of nature. In order to achieve the exact knowledge for which he aims, Hobbes must limit his scientific claims to the implications that can be deduced from this decision to institute a political order, or "commonwealth." His political science proper therefore constitutes only the section of the *Leviathan* that concerns the "consequences" that follow from this choice, namely, the rights and duties of the sovereign and of the subjects that are necessary to maintain this basic political agreement. This choice, however, follows upon our passions and our speech, especially our calling "good" the object of our desires, and pleasure the appearance of it.

The State of Nature

Hobbes begins his discussion with a description of human passions and speech, our basic motions. Following this, Hobbes develops his account of the state of nature from the claim that human beings are naturally equal. By this he means that each individual possesses the natural right to preserve himself, and furthermore the natural right to claim all things, or seek all power, that he judges necessary to this end. Moreover, Hobbes writes, in the state of nature we are, for practical purposes, equal in physical and mental capacity, since no one is strong or

smart enough to defend himself with certainty against the threats that arise from the efforts of other individuals to preserve themselves.

According to Hobbes, this rough equality of ability leads each person to have an equal hope of acquiring good things for himself. As individuals strive to accumulate goods, they compete with each other, and consequently create an atmosphere of distrust. The attempt to acquire things, and to preserve them from the encroachments of others, causes us to try to dominate and control those around us. Furthermore, Hobbes observes, some people care particularly to be known as that sort who can dominate—they are vainglorious or prideful individuals who are unhappy if they are not recognized as superior.

These three things—competition, distrust, and the desire for glory—throw humankind into a state of war, which is for Hobbes the natural condition of human life, the situation that exists whenever natural passions are unrestrained. This state of war should be distinguished from wars as we usually experience them, for in the natural state of war every individual faces every other individual as an enemy; it is the "war of every man against every man." The total absence of collaboration makes us miserable, and renders life "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."

Hobbes's description of the state of nature proposes that what human beings want above all is to preserve their lives and their goods, and what they fear above all is violence at the hands of others. This desire to preserve ourselves against the threat of violent death is the core of Hobbesian psychology. Hobbes suggests that his account will be ratified by honest introspection—after all, why else would we lock our doors at night?

The Social Contract

Once the misery of the natural condition becomes clear, it is evident that something must be done to change it. The first step is for individuals to decide to seek peace and to make the arrangements necessary to attain and preserve it. It becomes clear that the only way to have peace is for each individual to give up his natural right to acquire and preserve everything in whatever manner he sees fit. As Hobbes stipulates, this must be a collective endeavor, since it only makes sense for an individual to give up his right to attack others if everyone else agrees to do the same. He calls this collective renunciation of each individual's right to all things the "social contract." The social contract inverts the state of nature while also building upon some key passions responsible for the state of nature: it amounts to a more intelligent way to preserve oneself and safely acquire goods.

Hobbes presents the social contract in the context of elaborating his "laws of nature," which are the steps we must take to leave the state of nature. In calling these rules "laws of nature," Hobbes significantly changes the traditional concept of natural law, in which nature offers moral guidance for human behavior. By contrast, Hobbes's laws of nature are not obligatory in his state of nature, since, as he makes clear, seeking peace and keeping contracts in the state of nature would be self-destructive and absurd. In other words, acting against the laws of nature cannot simply be called unnatural or unjust—for Hobbes, nothing is naturally just, unjust, or blameworthy. Justice only exists as a convention, in the context of a civil society.

The Leviathan, or the Sovereign

Particularly because there is no natural sanction for justice, we need to institute some guarantee that everyone involved in the social contract will keep his word. Hobbes argues that individuals require a "visible power to keep them in awe," to remind them of the purpose of the social contract and to force them, for fear of punishment, to keep their promises. This power must also be sufficient to keep in check the yearning for superiority of those who desire honor or glory. Hobbes calls the power necessary to transform the desire for a social contract into a commonwealth the sovereign, the Leviathan, or the "king of the proud." The sovereign power is created when each individual surrenders his private strength to a single entity, which thereby acquires the means to keep everyone in obedience. Every individual must also surrender his private opinion about public issues to the sovereign—for to have sufficient power to safeguard the contract, the sovereign must have the authority to decide what is necessary to keep it, and what constitutes a transgression of it.

The relation of the sovereign to the subject is not a contract. Rather, as Hobbes makes clear, the individual must understand his will to be identical with the sovereign will, since one who desires peace must logically will whatever is necessary for peace to be maintained. The "real unity" that the subjects and the sovereign comprise is dramatically expressed in the picture found on the cover of the *Leviathan,* in which one finds a huge figure literally composed of small individuals. Although it is commonly assumed that the Leviathan is a king, Hobbes makes clear that the sovereign power can be composed of one person, several, or many—in other words, the Leviathan can equally well describe a monarchy, an

aristocracy, or a democracy. The only requirement that Hobbes sets for sovereignty is that the entity has absolute power to defend the social contract and decide what is necessary for its defense.

Religion in the Commonwealth

One power that Hobbes insists the sovereign must possess is the authority to determine the public observance of religion. In Hobbes's opinion, religion can be one of the chief threats to public peace, since it can validate authorities other than those designated by the sovereign. Hobbes is concerned both with Church authorities who make spiritual or moral claims with political intent, and also with the appeal to private conscience, which Hobbes argues is essentially the claim that an individual opinion should take priority over the common agreement represented by the political sovereign.

Hobbes attempts to counter the religious threat to public peace by drawing a strict distinction between private belief and public worship, and then attempting to render private belief politically ineffectual while submitting the form of public worship to the decision of the sovereign. Hobbes tries to make private belief politically neutral by encouraging skepticism: his account of the human mind makes us doubtful of what we know, and his reading of Scripture emphasizes the passages that insist on the mysteriousness of God's will. Hobbes ultimately pares back Christianity to the personal belief that "Jesus is the Christ," who will come—in some future time—to reign on earth. In the meantime, Hobbes insists, we should follow Romans 13 in recognizing that all authority comes from God, and obey the civil sovereign. Hobbes likens the obedience a subject owes the sovereign to that

of a monk to the pope. Yet there is a glaring difference: in the Hobbesian commonwealth, subjects owe only outward obedience to the commands of the sovereign. Subjects must be allowed to believe whatever they want (in part because persecution would unnecessarily disturb public peace), as long as they do not try to influence public argument with their personal beliefs.

Hobbes, Liberalism, and Modern Politics

Hobbes's emphasis on the absolute power of the Leviathan sovereign seems to put his political thought at odds with liberal theory, in which politics is devoted to the protection of individual rights. Hobbes nonetheless laid the foundation for the liberal view. His concept of the state of nature grounds politics in the individual's desire to preserve his life and his goods, and stipulates that the role of government is to serve these ends. Happiness or "felicity" is continual success in obtaining what we desire. For Hobbes, the individual has no natural duties toward others or to the common good; obligations are taken up only as necessary means to one's own ends. Furthermore, Hobbes makes clear that the individual retains his natural right to preserve himself even after entering the commonwealth—he has no obligation to submit himself to capital punishment or likely death in war. While Hobbes has a much more limited understanding of individual rights than liberal theorists, his political science launches the argument that the individual has an inviolable right by nature, and also suggests that politics exists to help further the individual's pursuit of his own happiness. Hobbes begins the liberal notion of representative government: government represents but does not rule us; its duty is to make our lives and acquisitions safe, not to form our souls.

Not long after Hobbes's death, used many of the elements of Hobbes's thought to develop the first full account of modern political liberalism. Although Locke takes pains to distance himself from Hobbes, Hobbes's influence can be seen in Locke's account of the state of nature, in his argument that the origin of all legitimate government lies in the consent of the governed, and in his view that the political community should aim to serve basic, common needs (Locke makes the preservation of property central). Through Locke, Hobbes indirectly influenced the founders of the United States, who, in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, proclaim a new kind of politics based on equality and consent, in which government serves relatively limited and popular aims.

Hobbes's political ideas aroused much controversy in his time, and they continue to be contentious. Some disagree with Hobbes's claim that politics should be viewed primarily as an instrument to serve self-interest, and side with Aristotle in thinking that politics serves both basic needs and higher ends. On this view, Hobbes's attempt to divert public debate from tackling controversial but fundamental questions hampers our pursuit of wisdom, happiness, and excellence. Others argue that Hobbes's systematic focus on achievable goals has made possible the security and prosperity that those in modern Western nations enjoy, and furthermore that these conditions give us the leisure and peace to pursue knowledge and excellence in private life. In either case, Hobbes's contribution to the framework of the modern world makes a study of his work important to understanding our political horizons.

POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN LOCKE

John Locke was among the most famous philosophers and political theorists of the 17th century. He is often regarded as the founder of a school of thought known as British Empiricism, and he made foundational contributions to modern theories of limited, liberal government. He was also influential in the areas of theology, religious toleration, and educational theory. In his most important work, the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke set out to offer an analysis of the human mind and its acquisition of knowledge. He offered an empiricist theory according to which we acquire ideas through our experience of the world. The mind is then able to examine, compare, and combine these ideas in numerous different ways. Knowledge consists of a special kind of relationship between different ideas. Locke's emphasis on the philosophical examination of the human mind as a preliminary to the philosophical investigation of the world and its contents represented a new approach to philosophy, one which quickly gained a number of converts, especially in Great Britain. In addition to this broader project, the Essay contains a series of more focused discussions on important, and widely divergent, philosophical themes. In politics, Locke is best known as a proponent of limited government. He uses a theory of natural rights to argue that governments have obligations to their citizens, have only limited powers over their citizens, and can ultimately be overthrown by citizens under certain circumstances. He also provided powerful arguments in favor of religious toleration.

Life and Works

John Locke was born in 1632 in Wrington, a small village in southwestern England. His father, also named John, was a legal clerk and served with the Parliamentary forces in the English Civil War. His family was well-to-do, but not of particularly high social or economic standing. Locke spent his childhood in the West Country and as a teenager was sent to Westminster School in London.

Locke was successful at Westminster and earned a place at Christ Church, Oxford. He was to remain in Oxford from 1652 until 1667. Although he had little appreciation for the traditional scholastic philosophy he learned there, Locke was successful as a student and after completing his undergraduate degree he held a series of administrative and academic posts in the college. Some of Locke's duties included instruction of undergraduates. One of his earliest substantive works, the Essays on the Law of Nature, was developed in the course of his teaching duties. Much of Locke's intellectual effort and energy during his time at Oxford, especially during his later years there, was devoted to the study of medicine and natural philosophy (what we would now call science). Locke read widely in these fields, participated in various experiments, and became acquainted with Robert Boyle and many other notable natural philosophers. He also undertook the normal course of education and training to become a physician.

Following the Glorious Revolution of 1688-1689 Locke was able to return to England. He published both the Essay and the Two Treatises (the second anonymously) shortly after his return. He initially stayed in London but soon moved to the home of Francis and Damaris Masham in the small village of Oates,

Essex. Damaris Masham, who was the daughter of a notable philosopher named Ralph Cudworth, had become acquainted with Locke several years before. The two formed a very close friendship which lasted until Locke's death. During this period Locke kept busy working on politics, toleration, philosophy, economics, and educational theory.

In his later years Locke devoted much of his attention to theology. His major work in this field was The Reasonableness of Christianity, published (again anonymously) in 1695. This work was controversial because Locke argued that many beliefs traditionally believed to be mandatory for Christians were unnecessary. Locke argued for a highly ecumenical form of Christianity. Closer to the time of his death Locke wrote a work on the Pauline Epistles. The work was unfinished, but published posthumously. A short work on miracles also dates from this time and was published posthumously.

Locke's ideas

Locke's insight was that before we can analyze the world and our access to it we have to know something about ourselves. We need to know how we acquire knowledge. We also need to know which areas of inquiry we are well suited to and which are epistemically closed to us, that is, which areas are such that we could not know them even in principle. We further need to know what knowledge consists in. In keeping with these questions, at the very outset of the Essay Locke writes that it is his "Purpose enquire into the Original, Certainty, and Extent of humane Knowledge; together, with the Grounds and Degrees of Belief, Opinion, and Assent." Locke thinks that it is only once we understand our cognitive capabilities

that we can suitably direct our researches into the world. This may have been what Locke had in mind when he claimed that part of his ambition in the Essay was to be an "Under-Laborer" who cleared the ground and laid the foundations for the work of famous scientists like Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton.

The Critique of Nativism

The first of the Essay's four books is devoted to a critique of nativism, the doctrine that some ideas are innate in the human mind, rather than received in experience. It is unclear precisely who Locke's targets in this book are, though Locke does cite Herbert of Cherbury and other likely candidates include René Descartes, the Cambridge Platonists, and a number of lesser known Anglican theologians. Finding specific targets, however, might not be that important given that much of what Locke seeks to do in Book I is motivate and make plausible the alternative account of idea acquisition that he offers in Book II.

The nativist view which Locke attacks in Book I holds that human beings have mental content which is innate in the mind. This means that there are certain ideas (units of mental content) which were neither acquired via experience nor constructed by the mind out of ideas received in experience. The most popular version of this position holds that there are certain ideas which God planted in all minds at the moment of their creation.

There is one misunderstanding which it is important to avoid when considering Locke's anti-nativism. The misunderstanding is, in part, suggested by Locke's claim that the mind is like a tabula rasa (a blank slate) prior to sense experience. This makes it sound as though the mind is nothing prior to the advent

of ideas. In fact, Locke's position is much more nuanced. He makes it clear that the mind has any number of inherent capacities, predispositions, and inclinations prior to receiving any ideas from sensation. His anti-nativist point is just that none of these is triggered or exercised until the mind receives ideas from sensation.

Idea Acquisition

In Book II Locke offers his alternative theory of how the human mind comes to be furnished with the ideas it has. Every day we think of complex things like orange juice, castles, justice, numbers, and motion. Locke's claim is that the ultimate origin of all of these ideas lies in experience: "Experience: In that, all our Knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our Observation employ'd either about external, sensible Objects; or about the internal Operations of our Minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that, which supplies our Understandings with all the material of thinking. These two are the Fountains of Knowledge, from whence all the Ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring."

Locke's view is that experience (sensation and reflection) issues us with simple ideas. These are the minimal units of mental content; each simple idea is "in itself uncompounded, [and] contains in it nothing but one uniform Appearance, or Conception in the mind, and is not distinguishable into different Ideas." But many of my ideas are not simple ideas. My idea of a glass of orange juice or my idea of the New York subway system, for example, could not be classed a simple ideas. Locke calls ideas like these complex ideas. His view is that complex ideas are the product of combining our simple ideas together in various ways. For example, my complex idea of a glass of orange juice consists of various simple ideas (the color

orange, the feeling of coolness, a certain sweet taste, a certain acidic taste, and so forth) combined together into one object. Thus, Locke believes our ideas are compositional. Simple ideas combine to form complex ideas. And these complex ideas can be combined to form even more complex ideas.

Our complex ideas are classified into three different groups: substances, modes, and relations. Ideas of substances are ideas of things which are thought to exist independently. Ordinary objects like desks, sheep, and mountains fall into this group. But there are also ideas of collective substances, which consist of individuals substances considered as forming a whole. A group of individual buildings might be considered a town. And a group of individual men and women might be considered together as an army. In addition to describing the way we think about individual substances, Locke also has an interesting discussion of substance-in-general.

Throughout his discussion of the different kinds of complex ideas Locke is keen to emphasize that all of our ideas can ultimately be broken down into simple ideas received in sensation and reflection. Put differently, Locke is keenly aware that the success of his empiricist theory of mind depends on its ability to account for all the contents of our minds. Whether or not Locke is successful is a matter of dispute. On some occasions the analysis he gives of how a very complex idea could be constructed using only simple ideas is vague and requires the reader to fill in some gaps. And commentators have also suggested that some of the simple ideas Locke invokes, for example the simple ideas of power and unity, do not seem to be obvious components of our phenomenological experience.

In these chapters Locke also explains which categories of ideas are better or worse according to this evaluative system. Simple ideas do very well. Because objects directly produce them in the mind they tend to be clear, distinct, and so forth. Ideas of modes and relations also tend to do very well, but for a different reason. Locke thinks that the archetypes of these ideas are in the mind rather than in the world. As such, it is easy for these ideas to be good because the mind has a clear sense of what the ideas should be like as it constructs them. By contrast, ideas of substances tend to fare very poorly. The archetypes for these ideas are external world objects. Because our perceptual access to these objects is limited in a number of ways and because these objects are so intricate, ideas of substances tend to be confused, inadequate, false, and so forth.

Language:

Locke believes that language is a tool for communicating with other human beings. Specifically, Locke thinks that we want to communicate about our ideas, the contents of our minds. From here it is a short step to the view that: "Words in their primary or immediate Signification, stand for nothing, but the Ideas in the Mind of him that uses them." When an agent utters the word "gold" she is referring to her idea of a shiny, yellowish, malleable substance of great value. When she utters the word "carrot" she is referring to her idea of a long, skinny, orange vegetable which grows underground. Locke is, of course, aware that the names we choose for these ideas are arbitrary and merely a matter of social convention.

Locke thinks that a result of all this is that people are seriously misusing language and that many debates and discussions in important fields like science,

politics, and philosophy are confused or consist of merely verbal disputes. Locke provides a number of examples of language causing problems: Cartesians using "body" and "extension" interchangeably, even though the two ideas are distinct; physiologists who agree on all the facts yet have a long dispute because they have different understandings of the word "liquor"; Scholastic philosophers using the term "prime matter" when they are unable to actually frame an idea of such a thing, and so forth.

The Account of Knowledge

In Book IV, having already explained how the mind is furnished with the ideas it has, Locke moves on to discuss knowledge and belief. A good place to start is with a quote from the beginning of Book IV: "Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas. Where this Perception is, there is Knowledge, and where it is not, there, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of Knowledge." Locke spends the first part of Book IV clarifying and exploring this conception of knowledge. The second part focuses on how we should apportion belief in cases where we lack knowledge.

The third degree of knowledge is called sensitive knowledge and has been the source of considerable debate and confusion among Locke commentators. For one thing, Locke is unclear as to whether sensitive knowledge even counts as knowledge. He writes that intuitive and demonstrative knowledge are, properly speaking, the only forms of knowledge, but that "There is, indeed, another Perception of the Mind…which going beyond bare probability, and yet not

reaching perfectly to either of the foregoing degrees of certainty, passes under the name of Knowledge." Sensitive knowledge has to do with the relationship between our ideas and the objects in the external world that produce them. Locke claims that we can be certain that when we perceive something, an orange, for example, there is an object in the external world which is responsible for these sensations. Part of Locke's claim is that there is a serious qualitative difference between biting into an orange and remembering biting into an orange. There is something in the phenomenological experience of the former which assures us of a corresponding object in the external world.

Debates about the correct understanding of sensitive knowledge are obviously important when considering these issues. At first blush, the relation involved in sensitive knowledge seems to be a relation between an idea and a physical object in the world. But, if this reading is correct, then it becomes difficult to understand the many passages in which Locke insists that knowledge is a relation that holds only between ideas. Also relevant are debates about how to correctly understand Lockean ideas. Recall from above that although many understand ideas as mental objects, some understand them as mental acts. While most of the text seems to favor the first interpretation, it seems that the second interpretation has a significant advantage when responding to these skeptical worries. The reason is that the connection between ideas and external world objects is built right into the definition of an idea. An idea just is a perception of an external world object.

Mechanical Philosophy

Around the time of the Essay the mechanical philosophy was emerging as the predominant theory about the physical world. The mechanical philosophy held that the fundamental entities in the physical world were small individual bodies called corpuscles. Each corpuscle was solid, extended, and had a certain shape. These corpuscles could combine together to form ordinary objects like rocks, tables, and plants. The mechanical philosophy argued that all features of bodies and all natural phenomena could be explained by appeal to these corpuscles and their basic properties (in particular, size, shape, and motion).

Locke was exposed to the mechanical philosophy while at Oxford and became acquainted with the writings of its most prominent advocates. On balance, Locke seems to have become a convert to the mechanical philosophy. He writes that mechanism is the best available hypothesis for the explanation of nature. We have already seen some of the explanatory work done by mechanism in the Essay. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities was a hallmark of the mechanical philosophy and neatly dovetailed with mechanist accounts of perception. Locke reaffirms his commitment to this account of perception at a number of other points in the Essay. And when discussing material objects Locke is very often happy to allow that they are composed of material corpuscles. What is peculiar, however, is that while the Essay does seem to have a number of passages in which Locke supports mechanical explanations and speaks highly of mechanism, it also contains some highly critical remarks about mechanism and discussions of the limits of the mechanical philosophy.

Volition and Agency

In Book 2, Chapter 21 of the Essay Locke explores the topic of the will. One of the things which separates people from rocks and billiard balls is our ability to make decisions and control our actions. We feel that we are free in certain respects and that we have the power to choose certain thoughts and actions. Locke calls this power the will. But there are tricky questions about what this power consists in and about what it takes to freely (or voluntarily) choose something. 2.21 contains a delicate and sustained discussion of these tricky questions.

Locke first begins with questions of freedom and then proceeds to a discussion of the will. On Locke's analysis, we are free to do those things which we both will to do and are physically capable of doing. For example, if I wish to jump into a lake and have no physical maladies which prevent it, then I am free to jump into the lake. By contrast, if I do not wish to jump into the lake, but a friend pushes me in, I did not act freely when I entered the water. Or, if I wish to jump into the lake, but have a spinal injury and cannot move my body, then I do not act freely when I stay on the shore. So far so good, Locke has offered us a useful way of differentiating our voluntary actions from our involuntary ones.

Personal identity

Locke believes that this account of personal identity as continuity of consciousness obviates the need for an account of personal identity given in terms of substances. A traditional view held that there was a metaphysical entity, the soul, which guaranteed personal identity through time; wherever there was the same soul, the same person would be there as well. Locke offers a number of

thought experiments to cast doubt on this belief and show that his account is superior. For example, if a soul was wiped clean of all its previous experiences and given new ones (as might be the case if reincarnation were true), the same soul would not justify the claim that all of those who had had it were the same person. Or, we could imagine two souls who had their conscious experiences completely swapped. In this case, we would want to say that the person went with the conscious experiences and did not remain with the soul.

Real and Nominal Essences

Locke's distinction between the real essence of a substance and the nominal essence of a substance is one of the most fascinating components of the Essay. Scholastic philosophers had held that the main goal of metaphysics and science was to learn about the essences of things: the key metaphysical components of things which explained all of their interesting features. Locke thought this project was misguided. That sort of knowledge, knowledge of the real essences of beings, was unavailable to human beings. This led Locke to suggest an alternative way to understand and investigate nature; he recommends focusing on the nominal essences of things.

When Locke introduces the term real essence he uses it to refer to the "real constitution of any Thing, which is the foundation of all those Properties, that are combined in, and are constantly found to co-exist with [an object]" For the Scholastics this real essence would be an object's substantial form. For proponents of the mechanical philosophy it would be the number and arrangement of the material corpuscles which composed the body. Locke sometimes endorses this

latter understanding of real essence. But he insists that these real essences are entirely unknown and undiscoverable by us. The nominal essences, by contrast, are known and are the best way we have to understand individual substances. Nominal essences are just collections of all the observed features an individual thing has. So the nominal essence of a piece of gold would include the ideas of yellowness, a certain weight, malleability, dissolvability in certain chemicals, and so on.

Religious Epistemology

The epistemology of religion (claims about our understanding of God and our duties with respect to him) were tremendously contentious during Locke's lifetime. The English Civil War, fought during Locke's youth, was in large part a disagreement over the right way to understand the Christian religion and the requirements of religious faith. Throughout the seventeenth century, a number of fundamentalist Christian sects continually threatened the stability of English political life. And the status of Catholic and Jewish people in England was a vexed one.

Political Philosophy

Locke lived during a very eventful time in English politics. The Civil War, Interregnum, Restoration, Exclusion Crisis, and Glorious Revolution all happened during his lifetime. For much of his life Locke held administrative positions in government and paid very careful attention to contemporary debates in political theory. So it is perhaps unsurprising that he wrote a number of works on political issues. In this field, Locke is best known for his arguments in favor of religious

toleration and limited government. Today these ideas are commonplace and widely accepted. But in Locke's time they were highly innovative, even radical.

The Two Treatises

Locke's Two Treatises of Government were published in 1689. It was originally thought that they were intended to defend the Glorious Revolution and William's seizure of the throne. We now know, however, that they were in fact composed much earlier. Nonetheless, they do lay out a view of government amenable to many of William's supporters.

The First Treatise is now of primarily historical interest. It takes the form of a detailed critique of a work called Patriacha by Robert Filmer. Filmer had argued, in a rather unsophisticated way, in favor of divine right monarchy. On his view, the power of kings ultimately originated in the dominion which God gave to Adam and which had passed down in an unbroken chain through the ages. Locke disputes this picture on a number of historical grounds. Perhaps more importantly, Locke also distinguishes between a number of different types of dominion or governing power which Filmer had run together.

After clearing some ground in the First Treatise, Locke offers a positive view of the nature of government in the much better known Second Treatise. Part of Locke's strategy in this work was to offer a different account of the origins of government. While Filmer had suggested that humans had always been subject to political power, Locke argues for the opposite. According to him, humans were initially in a state of nature. The state of nature was apolitical in the sense that there were no governments and each individual retained all of his or her natural rights.

People possessed these natural rights (including the right to attempt to preserve one's life, to seize unclaimed valuables, and so forth) because they were given by God to all of his people.

The state of nature was inherently unstable. Individuals would be under constant threat of physical harm. And they would be unable to pursue any goals that required stability and widespread cooperation with other humans. Locke's claim is that government arose in this context. Individuals, seeing the benefits which could be gained, decided to relinquish some of their rights to a central authority while retaining other rights. This took the form of a contract. In agreement for relinquishing certain rights, individuals would receive protection from physical harm, security for their possessions, and the ability to interact and cooperate with other humans in a stable environment.

Property

Locke's Second Treatise on government contains an influential account of the nature of private property. According to Locke, God gave humans the world and its contents to have in common. The world was to provide humans with what was necessary for the continuation and enjoyment of life. But Locke also believed it was possible for individuals to appropriate individual parts of the world and justly hold them for their own exclusive use. Put differently, Locke believed that we have a right to acquire private property.

Locke's claim is that we acquire property by mixing our labor with some natural resource. For example, if I discover some grapes growing on a vine, through my labor in picking and collecting these grapes I acquire an ownership

right over them. If I find an empty field and then use my labor to plow the field then plant and raise crops, I will be the proper owner of those crops. If I chop down trees in an unclaimed forest and use the wood to fashion a table, then that table will be mine. Locke places two important limitations on the way in which property can be acquired by mixing one's labor with natural resources. First, there is what has come to be known as the Waste Proviso. One must not take so much property that some of it goes to waste. I should not appropriate gallons and gallons of grapes if I am only able to eat a few and the rest end up rotting. If the goods of the Earth were given to us by God, it would be inappropriate to allow some of this gift to go to waste. Second, there is the Enough-And-As-Good Proviso. This says that in appropriating resources I am required to leave enough and as good for others to appropriate. If the world was left to us in common by God, it would be wrong of me to appropriate more than my fair share and fail to leave sufficient resources for others.

After currency is introduced and after governments are established the nature of property obviously changes a great deal. Using metal, which can be made into coins and which does not perish the way foodstuffs and other goods do, individuals are able to accumulate much more wealth than would be possible otherwise. So the proviso concerning waste seems to drop away. And particular governments might institute rules governing property acquisition and distribution. Locke was aware of this and devoted a great deal of thought to the nature of property and the proper distribution of property within a commonwealth. His writings on economics, monetary policy, charity, and social welfare systems are evidence of this. But Locke's views on property inside of a commonwealth have

received far less attention than his views on the original acquisition of property in the state of nature.

Toleration

Locke had been systematically thinking about issues relating to religious toleration since his early years in London and even though he only published his Epistola de Tolerantia (A Letter Concerning Toleration) in 1689 he had finished writing it several years before. The question of whether or not a state should attempt to prescribe one particular religion within the state, what means states might use to do so, and what the correct attitude should be toward those who resist conversion to the official state religion had been central to European politics ever since the Protestant Reformation. Locke's time in England, France, and the Netherlands had given him experiences of three very different approaches to these questions. These experiences had convinced him that, for the most part, individuals should be allowed to practice their religion without interference from the state. Indeed, part of the impetus for the publication of Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration came from Louis XIV's revocation of the Edict of Nantes, which took away the already limited rights of Protestants in France and exposed them to state persecution.

It is possible to see Locke's arguments in favor of toleration as relating both to the epistemological views of the Essay and the political views of the Two Treatises. Relating to Locke's epistemological views, recall from above that Locke thought the scope of human knowledge was extremely restricted. We might not be particularly good at determining what the correct religion is. There is no reason to

think that those holding political power will be any better at discovering the true religion than anyone else, so they should not attempt to enforce their views on others. Instead, each individual should be allowed to pursue true beliefs as best as they are able. Little harm results from allowing others to have their own religious beliefs. Indeed, it might be beneficial to allow a plurality of beliefs because one group might end up with the correct beliefs and win others over to their side.

Relating to Locke's political views, as expressed in the Two Treatises, Locke endorses toleration on the grounds that the enforcement of religious conformity is outside the proper scope of government. People consent to governments for the purpose of establishing social order and the rule of law. Governments should refrain from enforcing religious conformity because doing so is unnecessary and irrelevant for these ends. Indeed, attempting to enforce conformity may positively harm these ends as it will likely lead to resistance from members of prohibited religions. Locke also suggests that governments should tolerate the religious beliefs of individual citizens because enforcing religious belief is actually impossible. Acceptance of a certain religion is an inward act, a function of one's beliefs. But governments are designed to control people's actions. So governments are, in many ways, ill-equipped to enforce the adoption of a particular religion because individual people have an almost perfect control of their own thoughts.

While Locke's views on toleration were very progressive for the time and while his views do have an affinity with our contemporary consensus on the value of religious toleration it is important to recognize that Locke did place some severe limits on toleration. He did not think that we should tolerate the intolerant, those

who would seek to forcibly impose their religious views on others. Similarly, any religious group who posed a threat to political stability or public safety should not be tolerated. Importantly, Locke included Roman Catholics in this group. On his view, Catholics had a fundamental allegiance to the Pope, a foreign prince who did not recognize the sovereignty of English law. This made Catholics a threat to civil government and peace. Finally, Locke also believed that atheists should not be tolerated. Because they did not believe they would be rewarded or punished for their actions in an afterlife, Locke did not think they could be trusted to behave morally or maintain their contractual obligations.

Education

Locke was regarded by many in his time as an expert on educational matters. He taught many students at Oxford and also served as a private tutor. Locke's correspondence shows that he was constantly asked to recommend tutors and offer pedagogical advice. Locke's expertise led to his most important work on the subject: Some Thoughts Concerning Education. The work had its origins in a series of letters Locke wrote to Edward Clarke offering advice on the education of Clarke's children and was first published in 1693.

Locke's views on education were, for the time, quite forward-looking. Classical languages, usually learned through tedious exercises involving rote memorization, and corporeal punishment were two predominant features of the seventeenth century English educational system. Locke saw little use for either. Instead, he emphasized the importance of teaching practical knowledge. He recognized that children learn best when they are engaged with the subject matter.

Locke also foreshadowed some contemporary pedagogical views by suggesting that children should be allowed some self-direction in their course of study and should have the ability to pursue their interests.

Locke believed it was important to take great care in educating the young. He recognized that habits and prejudices formed in youth could be very hard to break in later life. Thus, much of Some Thoughts Concerning Education focuses on morality and the best ways to inculcate virtue and industry. Locke rejected authoritarian approaches. Instead, he favored methods that would help children to understand the difference between right and wrong and to cultivate a moral sense of their own.

Locke's Influence

The Essay was quickly recognized as an important philosophical contribution both by its admirers and by its critics. Before long it had been incorporated into the curriculum at Oxford and Cambridge and its translation into both Latin and French garnered it an audience on the Continent as well. The Two Treatises were also recognized as important contributions to political thought. While the work had some success in England among those favorably disposed to the Glorious Revolution, its primary impact was abroad. During the American Revolution (and to a lesser extent, during the French Revolution) Locke's views were often appealed to by those seeking to establish more representative forms of government.

Related to this last point, Locke came to be seen, alongside his friend Newton, as an embodiment of Enlightenment values and ideals. Newtonian science

would lay bare the workings of nature and lead to important technological advances. Lockean philosophy would lay bare the workings of men's minds and lead to important reforms in law and government. Voltaire played an instrumental role in shaping this legacy for Locke and worked hard to publicize Locke's views on reason, toleration, and limited government. Locke also came to be seen as an inspiration for the Deist movement. Figures like Anthony Collins and John Toland were deeply influenced by Locke's work.

Locke is often recognized as the founder of British Empiricism and it is true that Locke laid the foundation for much of English-language philosophy in the 18th and early 19th centuries. But those who followed in his footsteps were not unquestioning followers. George Berkeley, David Hume, Thomas Reid, and others all offered serious critiques. In recent decades, readers have attempted to offer more charitable reconstructions of Locke's philosophy. Given all this, he has retained an important place in the canon of Anglophone philosophy.

ROUSSEAU'S POLITICAL THOUGHT

Born a citizen of the independent republic of Geneva, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) lived most of his life in exile from his native city, but his admiration for its republican traditions deeply informed his political thought. A writer of surpassing eloquence, his penchant for employing paradoxical and striking rhetorical formulations has led some to dismiss his political writings as unsystematic or even incoherent. That he was idolized by leaders of the French Revolution has led others to read his works as laying the intellectual foundations for the reign of terror and for modern totalitarianism. More recent scholarship, however, has substantially refuted those critiques and revealed Rousseau to be a political theorist of the first rank, alongside such figures as Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Kant, and Hegel.

In his early works, Rousseau denounced the hypocrisy and artificiality of Parisian society in the name of conscience and virtue, and he reimagined the state of nature more radically than Hobbes and Locke, seeking to prove that man is naturally good and that social inequality and evil are profoundly artificial. Having diagnosed the evils of modern society, he proposed two distinct sorts of remedies or palliatives: proposals for the reform of individual character and a theory of legitimate political authority. In fact, readers have found in his work two sorts of ideal character: persons who embody an austere, self-commanding virtue and those who retain their innate goodness. His political ideal combines the enthusiasm for civic virtue characteristic of ancient political thought with the moderns' insistence on the centrality of human freedom, calling for the establishment of a republic based on a social contract in which each citizen agrees with all the rest to be bound

by the community's general will. In the idea of the general will, the centerpiece of his political theory, Rousseau finds the solution to the problem of reconciling authority and freedom: where the laws are the citizens' general will, the law-abiding citizen obeys only his own will and not the command of any other person, and so is free. This conception of freedom as submission to a law that one gives to oneself anticipates Kant's conception of freedom as autonomy, and one prominent strand of Rousseau's influence leads through Kant toward modern liberalism, but another leads toward Romanticism and the celebration of such ideals as sincerity and authenticity.

Contemporary scholars generally accept that Rousseau's political works form a coherently unified whole, although there remains considerable disagreement about the fundamental principle underlying that unity. Cassirer 1989 was one of the first to make a compelling case for the internal consistency of Rousseau's thought and is the locus classicus for the Kantian interpretation of Rousseau; the introduction by Peter Gay usefully situates Cassirer's essay in the context of the early literature on Rousseau. Jouvenel 2006 explains Rousseau's individualism and collectivism as two aspects of a consistent response to the problems of modern society. Strauss 1947, by contrast, presents Rousseau as a philosopher concerned, like Plato and Aristotle, with the disproportion between a political order grounded on opinion and the philosophical or scientific quest for true knowledge. Masters 1968 reads the works comprising Rousseau's "system" in the order Rousseau ultimately came to recommend: starting with Emile, then the Discourse on Inequality, followed by the First Discourse and the Social Contract. Shklar 1985 takes a thematic approach and provides a broad overview to

several of Rousseau's fundamental concerns, attending particularly to Rousseau's interest in the inner moral life and to his uses of metaphor and imagery. Melzer 1990 adopts a more systematic and analytical method than the others, carefully reconstructing Rousseau's arguments for the principle that human beings are naturally good and then showing how that principle forms the foundation for the political teachings of the Social Contract and Political Economy. Wokler 1995 provides a straightforward introduction to Rousseau's life and whole body of work that will be particularly useful to readers approaching Rousseau for the first time. The interpretation of Rousseau set forth in Starobinski 1988 is both brilliant and unsettling, as Rousseau's philosophical commitments are revealed as beset by paradox and as arising as efforts to resolve his own, deep psychological needs.

English translation of "Das Problem Jean Jacques Rousseau," first published in the Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie in 1932. An early advocate for the thesis that Rousseau's works constitute a coherent whole, this seminal work interprets Rousseau as a precursor of Kant, who locates freedom in obedience to a law that subjects will for themselves.

Originally published as "Essai sur la politique de Rousseau," in Bertrand de Jouvenel, Rousseau, Contrat Social (1947). Rousseau's celebration of individual liberty and exhortations to conform to societal demands are shown to be two parts of a consistent response to the problems of society, diagnosed in his early works.

A sensitive reconstruction of Rousseau's philosophical system, according to the plan Rousseau himself suggested, beginning with Emile, then turning to the two discourses and only then considering the Social Contract. Especially valuable

for its extensive treatment of Emile and for noting the distinction in Rousseau's political theory between principles of right and maxims of politics.

A detailed argument for locating the foundation of Rousseau's thought in the principle of natural goodness. Identifying evil with the soul's division against itself, Rousseau's constructive teachings aim at preserving psychic unity: the regime of the Social Contract makes possible the artificially unified life of the citizen; in Emile and in Rousseau's own autobiographical writings, one finds different versions of a more natural unity of the individual soul.

A brilliant and psychologizing interpretation of Rousseau, as an unsparing and deeply pessimistic critic of modernity, who proposes mutually incompatible and unrealizable proposals for moral and political reform.

Contains the work originally published in French as Jean-Jacques Rousseau: La transparence et l'obstacle (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), plus several essays. A pathbreaking and powerfully influential psychoanalytical interpretation of the development of Rousseau's thought, with particular attention to the discourses, Julie, Emile, and Rousseau's autobiographical writings.

Explores Rousseau's thought through the lens of the Discourse on the Sciences and Arts, and presents Rousseau as a philosopher who perceives a fundamental incompatibility between the requirements of political society and those of philosophy and the natural sciences. Reprinted in Cranston and Peters 1972 and Scott 2006, vol. 2 (both cited under Anthologies).

UNIT – III

VOLTAIRE'S POLITICAL THOUGHT

François-Marie Arouet, known by his literary pseudonym Voltaire, was a French Enlightenment writer, historian, and philosopher famous for his wit, his attacks on the established Catholic Church, and his advocacy of freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and separation of church and state.

He was born in Paris in 1694 and educated by the Jesuits at the Collège Louis-le-Grand (1704-1711). By the time he left school, Voltaire had decided he wanted to be a writer, against the wishes of his father, who wanted him to become a lawyer. Under his father's pressure, he studied law but he continued to write, producing essays and historical studies. In 1713, his father obtained a job for him as a secretary to a French ambassador in the Netherlands, but Voltaire was forced to return to France after a scandalous affair. From early on, he had trouble with the authorities over his critiques of the government. These activities were to result in two imprisonments and a temporary exile to England. One satirical verse, in which Voltaire accused Philippe II, Duke of Orléans,of incest with his own daughter, led to an eleven-month imprisonment in the Bastille (after which he adopted the name Voltaire). He mainly argued for religious tolerance and freedom of thought. He campaigned to eradicate priestly and aristocratic-monarchical authority, and supported a constitutional monarchy that protects people's rights.

Voltaire was a versatile writer, producing works in almost every literary form, including plays, poems, novels, essays, and historical and scientific works. He wrote more than 20,000 letters and more than 2,000 books and pamphlets. He

was an outspoken advocate of several liberties, despite the risk this placed him in under the strict censorship laws of the time. As a satirical polemicist, he frequently made use of his works to criticize intolerance, religious dogma, and the French institutions of his day.

Political and Philosophical Views

Voltaire's political and philosophical views can be found in nearly all of his prose writings, even in what would be typically categorized as fiction. Most of his prose, including such genres as romance, drama, or satire, was written as polemics with the goal of conveying radical political and philosophical messages. His works, especially private letters, frequently contain the word "l'infâme" and the expression "écrasez l'infâme," or "crush the infamous." The phrase refers to abuses of the people by royalty and the clergy that Voltaire saw around him, and the superstition and intolerance that the clergy bred within the people. Voltaire's first major philosophical work in his battle against "l'infâme" was The Treatise on Tolerance (1763), in which he calls for tolerance between religions and targets religious fanaticism, especially that of the Jesuits, indicting all superstitions surrounding religions. The book was quickly banned. Only a year later, he published The Philosophical Dictionary—an encyclopedic dictionary with alphabetically arranged articles that criticize the Roman Catholic Church and other institutions. In it, Voltaire is concerned with the injustices of the Catholic Church, which he sees as intolerant and fanatical. At the same time, he espouses deism, tolerance, and freedom of the press. The Dictionary was Voltaire's lifelong project, modified and expanded with each edition. It represents the culmination of his views on Christianity, God, morality, and other subjects.

Voltaire as Historian

Voltaire had an enormous influence on the development of historiography through his demonstration of fresh new ways to look at the past. His best-known historiography works are The Age of Louis XIV (1751) and The Essay on the Customs and the Spirit of the Nations (1756). Voltaire broke from the tradition of narrating diplomatic and military events, and emphasized customs, social history, and achievements in the arts and sciences. The Essay traced the progress of world civilization in a universal context, thereby rejecting both nationalism and the traditional Christian frame of reference. Voltaire was also the first scholar to make a serious attempt to write the history of the world, eliminating theological frameworks and emphasizing economics, culture, and political history. He treated Europe as a whole, rather than a collection of nations. He was the first to emphasize the debt of medieval culture to Middle Eastern civilization, and consistently exposed the intolerance and frauds of the church over the ages.

Views on The Society

In his criticism of the French society and existing social structures, Voltaire hardly spared anyone. He perceived the French bourgeoisie to be too small and ineffective, the aristocracy to be parasitic and corrupt, the commoners as ignorant and superstitious, and the church as a static and oppressive force useful only on occasion as a counterbalance to the rapacity of kings, although all too often, even more rapacious itself. Voltaire distrusted democracy, which he saw as propagating the idiocy of the masses. He long thought only an enlightened monarch could bring about change, given the social structures of the time and the extremely high rates

of illiteracy, and that it was in the king's rational interest to improve the education and welfare of his subjects. But his disappointments and disillusions with Frederick the Great changed his philosophy and soon gave birth to one of his most enduring works, his novella Candide, or Optimism (1759), which ends with a new conclusion: "It is up to us to cultivate our garden."

He is remembered and honored in France as a courageous polemicist who indefatigably fought for civil rights (as the right to a fair trial and freedom of religion), and who denounced the hypocrisies and injustices of the Ancien Régime. The Ancien Régime involved an unfair balance of power and taxes between the three Estates: clergy and nobles on one side, the commoners and middle class, who were burdened with most of the taxes, on the other.

MONTESQUIEU AND HIS POLITICAL THOUGHT

Baron de Montesquieu, usually referred to as simply Montesquieu, was a French lawyer, man of letters, and one of the most influential political philosophers of the Age of Enlightenment. He was born in France in 1689. After losing both parents at an early age, he became a ward of his uncle, the Baron de Montesquieu. He became a counselor of the Bordeaux Parliament in 1714. A year later, he married Jeanne de Lartigue, a Protestant, who bore him three children. Montesquieu's early life occurred at a time of significant governmental change. England had declared itself a constitutional monarchy in the wake of its Glorious Revolution (1688-89), and had joined with Scotland in the Union of 1707 to form the Kingdom of Great Britain. In France, the long-reigning Louis XIV died in 1715, and was succeeded by five year-old Louis XV. These national transformations had a great impact on Montesquieu, who would refer to them repeatedly in his work. Montesquieu withdrew from the practice of law to devote himself to study and writing.

Besides writing works on society and politics, Montesquieu traveled for a number of years through Europe, including Austria and Hungary, spending a year in Italy and 18 months in England, where he became a freemason before resettling in France. He was troubled by poor eyesight and was completely blind by the time he died from a high fever in 1755.

Montesquieu is famous for his articulation of the theory of separation of powers, which is implemented in many constitutions throughout the world. He is

also known for doing more than any other author to secure the place of the word "despotism" in the political lexicon.

The Spirit of Laws

The Spirit of the Laws is a treatise on political theory first published anonymously by Montesquieu in 1748. The book was originally published anonymously partly because Montesquieu's works were subject to censorship, but its influence outside France grew with rapid translation into other languages. In 1750, Thomas Nugent published the first English translation. In 1751, the Catholic Church added it to its Index Librorum Prohibitorum (list of prohibited books). Yet Montesquieu's political treatise had an enormous influence on the work of many others, most notably the founding fathers of the United States Constitution, and Alexis de Tocqueville, who applied Montesquieu's methods to a study of American society in Democracy in America.

Montesquieu spent around 21 years researching and writing The Spirit of the Laws, covering many things, including the law, social life, and the study of anthropology, and providing more than 3,000 commendations. In this political treatise, Montesquieu pleaded in favor of a constitutional system of government and the separation of powers, the ending of slavery, the preservation of civil liberties and the law, and the idea that political institutions should reflect the social and geographical aspects of each community.

Montesquieu defines three main political systems: republican, monarchical, and despotic. As he defines them, republican political systems vary depending on how broadly they extend citizenship rights—those that extend citizenship relatively

broadly are termed democratic republics, while those that restrict citizenship more narrowly are termed aristocratic republics. The distinction between monarchy and despotism hinges on whether or not a fixed set of laws exists that can restrain the authority of the ruler. If so, the regime counts as a monarchy. If not, it counts as despotism.

A second major theme in The Spirit of Laws concerns political liberty and the best means of preserving it. Montesquieu's political liberty is what we might call today personal security, especially insofar as this is provided for through a system of dependable and moderate laws. He distinguishes this view of liberty from two other, misleading views of political liberty. The first is the view that liberty consists in collective self-government (i.e., that liberty and democracy are the same). The second is the view that liberty consists of being able to do whatever one wants without constraint. Political liberty is not possible in a despotic political system, but it is possible, though not guaranteed, in republics and monarchies. Generally speaking, establishing political liberty requires two things: the separation of the powers of government, and the appropriate framing of civil and criminal laws so as to ensure personal security.

Separation of Powers and Appropriate Laws

Building on and revising a discussion in John Locke's Second Treatise of Government, Montesquieu argues that the executive, legislative, and judicial functions of government (the so-called tripartite system) should be assigned to different bodies, so that attempts by one branch of government to infringe on political liberty might be restrained by the other branches (checks and balances).

Montesquieu based this model on the Constitution of the Roman Republic and the British constitutional system. He took the view that the Roman Republic had powers separated so that no one could usurp complete power. In the British constitutional system, Montesquieu discerned a separation of powers among the monarch, Parliament, and the courts of law.He also notes that liberty cannot be secure where there is no separation of powers, even in a republic. Montesquieu also intends what modern legal scholars might call the rights to "robust procedural due process," including the right to a fair trial, the presumption of innocence, and the proportionality in the severity of punishment. Pursuant to this requirement to frame civil and criminal laws appropriately to ensure political liberty, Montesquieu also argues against slavery and for the freedom of thought, speech, and assembly.

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS PAINE

Constructing knowledge through institutions, people and culture is the generally accepted method of social research. The study of prominent personalities and their works helps contextualize the historical period itself. Methodologically, this genre of literature draws deeply on a hermeneutic approach and archival materials. Diachronic historicism, as it is known, helps communicate between the past and present by reading time, space and literature together. Following this methodology in The Political Philosophy of Thomas Paine, Jack Fruchtman takes up the responsibility of constructing the relevance of the eighteenth century in the history of the United States through an examination of Thomas Paine and his major works.

As Fruchtman shows in the introduction, Thomas Paine was, more than anything else, a thinker of immense creativity whose visionary ideology was marred with contradictions. Simultaneously, he was an arm of the liberal camp and a spokesperson of religious fantasy with conservative economic policies. Born in 1737 as an Englishman in Thetford, in the English county of Norfolk, Paine rose to prominence with his multifaceted activities as author, pamphleteer, radical, inventor and intellectual. His capacious intellect spans political science, secularism, religion, state, empire and colonialism with much food for thought.

The book demonstrates that Thomas Paine (1753-1825) was one of the rare intellectual-activists constantly engaged with what later seemed to be contradictory viewpoints and wobbly stands. Scholars tend to differ in their view of Paine and

his ideology but accept that his ideas and foresight forged America as a nation of great potential.

Overall, the book is an example of balanced criticism and praise. Structurally, it is divided into six chapters that propose challenging arguments, not unlike the many recent biographies of the lives of leading figures of the United State's formative era. A wider readership and interest in this type of study have produced studies on the lives of George Washington, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson and have brought this scholarship into the public arena. This peculiar phenomenon of love for the founding-fathers, known as "Founders Chic" receives much attention from contemporary American society, providing the immediate social framework for the book.

Paine's conflicting political ideologies were the product of his reactions and responses to his immediate surroundings. The life of Paine bore the signs of an insecure, broken, solitary, and rootless background. These circumstances forced him to become a wanderer, influencing his life and ideologies to a great extend, compelling him to always seek alternatives. Paine's engagement with the political atmosphere started in 1768 in the Sussex town of Lewes, where his flair for debate won the hearts of many commentators. These pursuits garnered for him fame among debating clubs in the United States where he received fair criticism that shaped young Paine's political choices. His style is reminiscent of Marxist methodology, and by calling attention to this aspect of his ideas, the book may be considered a contribution to the debates on political activism. Thus Paine became synonymous with nation building.

Moral foundation of paine

The moral foundation of Paine's ideology was his belief in the existence of God as the powerful source of creation. The debates on Paine's idea of God constitute the focal point of the second chapter. Paine is examined as a devoted theist, a premise aimed at examining his journey from Quakerism to Deism. Paine's Quakerism was fueled through his anger against the rule of hierarchies in the established religions. This disagreement with the hegemony of established religious institutions brought Paine close to radical-atheist positions, which can be seen in his argument that the Pope was the anti-Christ, and that Jesus Christ was an ordinary human being without any superhuman traits. The development of eighteenth-century scientific rationality is examined in the light of Paine's idea that human beings constitute the only creature of God because they have been equipped to produce like God himself. The influence of mounting scientific reason undergirded his argument that knowledge of the unnatural could be attained through science and reason.

Chapter three examines Paine's thought through his major work, Common Sense. Paine is presented as an individual who succeeded in moving beyond the dichotomies of blind faith and fanaticism, and as a secular individual, he was devoted to the creation of a secular state in United States. While the chaotic era of American civil war is examined as a product of distinct angularities, the book argues that Common Sense was the first printed book that truly addressed American freedom. Paine sought a peaceful civilization devoid of monarchs. Common Sense was the most radical book of the eighteenth century for it spoke against monarchy, hereditary succession, aristocratic rank and privilege.

Secularism and Thomas Paine

One of the most distinguishing aspects of Thomas Paine's treatise on the state was his emphasis on the secular state devoid of any monarchical despots. Chapter four examines Paine's ideas on state, secularism and revolution. For him secularism was not the negation of religion but the absorption of religious sentiment in a different context. This context, according to him, was the freedom of the individual to choose his religious faith, thereby limiting state intervention in individual freedom. Fruchtman argues that Paine's skepticism to state originated from his experience with the authoritarian monarchs and bureaucrats. This very skepticism enabled Paine to assert that once America became a free nation, it could create a constitution that would preserve "above all things the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience." As a revolutionary thinker belonging to the eighteenth century, his thoughts were shaped by other enlightenment thinkers. Moreover, Paine could easily recognize the impact of French and American revolutions, but at the same time he also urged that "a constitution is the property of a nation and not of those who exercise the government". He was influenced by Rousseau's teachings about the role of individuals in deciding the politics of a country and drew heavily on the notion of popular sovereignty. This idea of the common man distinguished Paine from his contemporaries. He also argued that common man has the ability to take political decisions, and thereby ensured the way for socially and publicly debated policies in the state.

In Paine's imagination, a strong commercial republic supported by a standing army constituted of citizen militia offered a model for the future of

America. Based on this idea of nation as premise, chapter five deals with the theoretical environments of Paine's conception of the nation in the making. Moreover, a comparative examination of Paine's theory with Hamilton is conducted, with areas of convergence and divergence being strictly followed. Furthermore, the chapter demonstrates that both Hamilton and Paine were ardent opponents of slavery and Paine's opposition was constituted by his belief in human rights and love for humanity. While this chapter extensively uses the comparative method, the politics and ideas of both Paine and Hamilton are examined critically with emphasis on Rousseau's influence on Paine.

Proceeding further from these ideological examinations, chapter six presents a small hypothetical study on the political environment during Paine's final years. Interestingly, chapter six opens the debate by indicating that Paine, the one time spokesperson of revolution, disavowed all revolutionary politics under the shadow of the guillotine in France when he was arrested and put in prison in 1793. After spending ten months in prison, the chapter shows that a matured Paine came out, someone who was never ready to listen to or make ultra-radical claims. As promised by the author in the introduction, the book presents Thomas Paine's life and ideas in a rational framework with a logically coherent methodology. As Fruchtman concludes, in the final years of his life, Paine became paranoid about those who he thought were undermining the American republic. The political events in the final years of Paine's life, as the chapter shows, disturbed him very much, and he struggled to balance his criticism of people who made different political choices. As these issues and writings suggest, he was an active and

engaged man committed to the cause of America, who spent his final years enmeshed in political debate and conflict.

The Political Philosophy of Thomas Paine, is a lucid, theoretically sound attempt to contextualize Thomas Paine and his works. As we have observed, the methodology of diachronic historicism is beautifully applied in this book, which critically examines the works of Paine. The book will also contribute to the understanding of the American Civil War and the development of a secular polity in the Western world. It will appeal to scholars, researchers, students and the general public interested in the history of eighteenth century America.

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT

Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797), a famous and prolific writer whose work was translated into several languages during her lifetime, reflected on the philosophical and political issues connected with the topics current at that time. Her ideas focus on important themes such as how a community organizes itself and what is wrong with the general positions of women in society. Today, her writing serves as an example of a proto-feminist approach which articulates this special problem of the sexes as an elementary moment in political philosophy. Nonetheless, although these issues have continued to be relevant, Wollstonecraft's position is debated within feminist theory. Her writings satisfy the claims of the feminist approach insofar as they contain a decisive critique of patriarchal dominion which points to political misogyny, presented in just as decisive a critique of Rousseau's double morals in his political representational claims and the educational and political model he had drafted for women. Rousseau's model excluded women from egalitarian participation, which was defended by Wollstonecraft in a general and radical claim for the participation of everyone, male or female.

What makes Wollstonecraft so controversial among feminist thinkers is, above all, her critique of women's weaknesses and their acceptance of their own slavery, seemingly begging for food instead of for freedom. Women, she wrote, subject themselves to domination, "creeping in the dust" and relinquishing their dignity. Consequently, Wollstonecraft's sisters in gender, emphasizing the need for unity among the suppressed sex, called Wollstonecraft herself a misogynist. This feminist critique pointed out the masculinity of (her) reasoning. One of their main

arguments was that with reference to the ideal of reasonability, Wollstonecraft had denied or neglected the female perspective, the importance of otherness, in feminist political and social reasoning. Under this polemic arc, the authors of this collection have gathered material to sketch the current discussion on topics of feminist political and social philosophy.

With this background in mind, the contributions endeavor to engage with this outstanding writer. Wollstonecraft's thoughts are redefined in today's language, reflecting today's questions. The authors present a wide variety of perspectives on a group of texts which emerged at a time when questions that still occupy us today were articulated for the first time. Today these questions are subjected to a multi-faceted interpretation which arises from the problems we face today. The essays do not praise Wollstonecraft as the forerunner of proto-feminist ideas, nor do they interpret her as a self-confirmation of modern convictions. In general, a prudent approach to explaining and understanding Wollstonecraft's daring ideas is offered.

In reading Wollstonecraft today, and taking her thoughts into account from today's perspective, one is struck by the power of this philosopher. Leaving aside biased interpretations of female or male dichotomies, stigmatized political demands, or the extensively discussed reason-emotion dualism, we find a differentiated and deliberate presentation of Wollstonecraft's thoughts, which for that reason seem much more familiar to the philosopher of the 21st century. Beyond the one- dimensional justification of a feminist, or rationalist and therefore misogynist, philosopher of the 18th century, we discover a discussion beyond the pro or contra of sexist-driven politics.

Vindication of the Rights of Women

Wollstonecraft's A Vindication of the Rights of Women (1792) is a standard text for feminist political philosophy and has become important and influential in this field. Wollstonecraft is a political philosopher who carried on discussions with contemporaries such as Edmund Burke, Thomas Paine and Catharine Macaulay at their levels. Wollstonecraft's writings were widely available then and still are today, a tradition nearly uninterrupted. Today her writings are also accessible as printed material and online. There is no doubt that this satisfies one of the main conditions for integrating her ideas into the canon of philosophy. Due to this easy and varied availability, the contributors do not quote from the same sources, which seems acceptable.

The collection is basically divided into three conceptual approaches. The editors start by presenting a somewhat chronological attempt at historic positioning -- papers occupied with Wollstonecraft's own references to historic political philosophy. Wollstonecraft's thoughts on classical authors are included. Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics frame this kind of deliberate reinterpretation and repositioning of Wollstonecraft's thoughts. Sylvana Tomaselli investigates the analysis of inequalities with regard to love, esteem and respect, referring hereby to the 18th century debates on platonic topics dealt with in the works of Burke and Price, and reviewed by Wollstonecraft in her journalistic analyses. This contextual re-positioning results in what has been called a more deliberate and differentiated approach, which does not allow the propagation of general claims such as the radical abolishment of inequality, as "she did not in fact seem to believe the eradication of the consequences of innate differences possible," as Tomaselli

states. Astonishing statements, among them that Wollstonecraft had never claimed "women were equal or unequal to men" are found and explained (p. 21). As inequality could only be identified with regard to the task of being a woman, Tomaselli tries to explain and to break through the dichotomist clusters of political and gender classification. Nancy Kendrick follows with an article rereading Wollstonecraft's interpretation of how a marriage should be conceptualized in a sphere of equality or complementarity, reflecting Aristotle's ideas on marriage and friendship.

Finally, in the third article taking this historical approach, Martina Reuter definitely denies that the dichotomous clustering between reason and passion, mind and emotion, could contribute to an original understanding of Wollstonecraft's intentions. According to Reuther, Wollstonecraft's interpretation of passion and its strong dependency on reason demonstrates how she conceptualizes the dependency of reason on nature. This interpretation may be seen as a fundamental key to a new way of reading Wollstonecraft today -- as a kind of relational thinker, here traced back in her origins to one of her most admired idols, Catharine Macaulay, and to Macaulay's reference to the Stoics.

The second part offers re-interpretations of social and political demands and expands on Wollstonecraft's ideas, which were constrained between individual liberty and egalitarian values. Catriona Mackenzie rebuts the earlier feminist critique of Wollstonecraft's "masculine" claim on autonomy and considers it a necessary precondition to a self-determined and meaningful life. Wollstonecraft's interpretation of women as both despots and slaves "allowed her to look beyond slavery as a relation of total powerlessness on one side and total power on the

other, and to open up the space for complicated questions of complicity, resistance, and agency". The author shows that a one-dimensional understanding of Wollstonecraft cannot do justice to her dynamic and particularized point of view. Beyond all defensible critique of a patriarchal suppression, Wollstonecraft focuses on the ideal of the individualist as a central democratic endowment for citizenship. Rights and duties, sketched out by Wollstonecraft and compared to Burke, Rousseau, Bentham, Kant and others, allow the reader to experience her thoughts through the canonical classics in the discussion of rights for women, children and animals.

The colletion concludes with essays on republicanism, a topic widely discussed by women philosophers of the early modern period. From the early 18th century with Mary Astell until the end of the century, whether in England with Catharine Macaulay, or in France, where Olympe de Gouges and Sophie de Grouchy publically took part in the discussion, the prolific outcome of women's contributions to this topic has become widely acknowledged. In fact, Karen Green has pointed out that the political democratic movement cannot be satisfactorily understood unless the writings of women are taken into account. Women's protest about having been systematically excluded from the benefits of citizenship and deprived of their voices is a core theme of that period, shared by women as well as male intellectuals.

Philip Pettit continues with ideas on the question of domination in marriage using Ibsen's play, A Doll's House. Susan James delivers a fruitful comparison of Wollstonecraft's concept of rights in her Vindication of the Rights of Men and the Vindication of the Rights of Women, two main volumes published within two

years of each other. Answering the general claim that the second book does not treat the concept of rights at all, James offers a conceptual interpretation of what Wollstonecraft determines rights to mean in the specific context of women's divestment in the political area. The reader's perspective on Wollstonecraft is broadened by the introduction of the role of natural rights and natural law as functional elements of Wollstonecraft's republican idea of liberty. Lena Halldenius concludes this part by insisting that political representation is not symbolic but the claim for a "direct share in government".

Particularly in the closing contributions of the editors, but also in the general framework of the book, the philosophy of Wollstonecraft is presented in the context of current discussions, from a feminist as well as from a general political perspective. The collection abandons the schemata of fruitless one-dimensional interpretations that position Wollstonecraft as either a proto-feminist or a rationalist misogynist. Her feminist ideas are embedded in a broader reflection that begins by retracing her sources back to the classics, and follows by positioning her thoughts with the republican ideas of natural laws, pointing to the relevance of her ideas in identifying questions about particular rights and duties in a socially and politically diverse society. Moreover, the collection shows the necessity of an exegesis of the philosophy of women. It confirms Wollstonecraft as an inspirational writer of the Enlightenment period whose ideas sketch out future concepts, the relevance of which scholars are only beginning to discover. The importance of her writing on the perspectives of women's issues in the broader republican and democratic context, the question of representation and egalitarian

participation, are becoming increasingly necessary for feminism, and therefore for the political discussion as a whole.

LUIGI TAPARELLI 1793-1862

Luigi Taparelli SJ was an Italian Jesuit scholar of the Society of Jesus and counter-revolutionary who coined the term social justice and elaborated the principles of subsidiarity, as part of his natural law theory of just social order. He was the brother of the Italian statesman Massimo d'Azeglio.

His father, Cesare, was at one time ambassador of Victor Emmanuel I of Sardinia to the Holy See, and his brother, Massimo, was one of the Italian ministers of State. He was educated under the Piarists at Siena and in the Atheneo of Turin. He attended the military School of St Cyr at Paris for some months, but he was not destined to be a soldier. He entered the Society of Jesus at Rome, 12 Nov., 1814. He was the first rector of the Roman College after its restoration to the Jesuits by Leo XII. He taught philosophy for sixteen years at Palermo.

Taparelli cofounded the journal Civiltà Cattolica in 1850 and wrote for it for twelve years. He was particularly concerned with the problems arising from the industrial revolution. He was a proponent of reviving the philosophical school of Thomism, and his social teachings influenced Pope Leo XIII's 1891 encyclical, Rerum novarum (On the Condition of the Working Classes).

In 1825, he became convinced that the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas needed to be revived, thinking that the subjective philosophy of René Descartes leads to dramatic errors in morality and politics. He reasoned that whereas different opinions on the natural sciences have no effect on nature, unclear metaphysical ideas about humanity and society can lead to social chaos.

The Catholic Church had not yet developed a clear philosophical view regarding the great social changes that were appearing in the early nineteenth century in Europe, which led to much confusion among the ecclesiastical hierarchy and laity. In response to this problem, Taparelli applied the methods of Thomism to these social problems in a coherent manner.

After the social revolutions of 1848, the church decided to enter the conflict raging between the laissez-faire liberal capitalists and the socialists. Up until then, the church relied primarily on evangelical charitable activities. In 1850, Taparelli, until then a liberal and revolutionary, was granted permission by Pope Pius IX to co-found Civiltà Cattolica with Carlo Maria Curci. In particular, he attacked the tendency to separate morality from positive law, and also the "heterodox spirit" of unconstrained freedom of conscience which destroyed the unity of society.

His major ideas include social justice and subsidiarity. He viewed society as not a monolithic group of individuals, but of various levels of sub-societies, with individuals being members of these. Each level of society has both rights and duties which should be recognized and supported. All levels of society should cooperate rationally and not resort to competition and conflict.

Works of Luigi Taparelli

His chief work, “Saggio teoretico di diritto naturale appogiato sul fatto”, i. e. “A Theoretical Essay on Natural Right from an Historical Standpoint” (2 vols., 7th ed., Rome, 1883), was in a way the beginning of modern sociology. It was translated into German (Ratisbon, 1845) and twice into French (Tournai, 1851; Paris, 1896). Herein was developed the position, at once widely accepted in

conservative circles on the Continent, that the normal origin of civil government was by extension of paternal power through the patriarchal head of a group of families. This essay was later abridged into "An Elementary Course in Natural Right" (6th ed., Naples, 1860; also in French, Tournai, 1864; and in Spanish, Paris, 1875), which was in use as a text-book in the University of Modena. Next in importance is his "Esame critico degli ordini rappresentativi nella società moderna", i. e. "Critical Examination of Representative Government in Modern Society" (2 vols., Rome, 1854; in Spanish, Madrid, 1867). Besides his striking monographs on "Nationality" (Rome, 1847), "Sovereignty of the People" (Palermo, 1848; Florence, 1849), and "The Grounds of War" (Genoa, 1847) he left a long list of articles in the Civiltà Cattolica chiefly on subjects in political economy and social rights, as well as an equally long list of book reviews on kindred topics, which were acute and penetrating essays.

UNIT IV

JEREMY BENTHAM'S POLITICAL THOUGHT

Jeremy Bentham is a leading theorist in Anglo-American philosophy of law and one of the founders of the ethical theory called utilitarianism, which is a principle requiring that that which favours that largest number of people by bringing the greatest happiness is the right action to pursue. Jeremy Bentham was an English Philosopher and was born, in Houndsditch, on 15 February 1745 and lived till the June 6 year 1832. He entered Westminster School at 7 and Queen's College, Oxford at 12 and was admitted to Lincoln's Inn to study law. Although he was the son and grandson of attorneys he however did not practice law. His love and exposure to the works of the main thinkers of the European Enlightenment (through works of Beccaria, Helvetius, Diderot, D'Alembert, and Voltarie) and the works of Locke and Hume led him to choose to become a reformer rather than practice the law. However, even though he did not practice law, he was into philosophy of law, and he spent a lot of time to criticising existing laws and various accounts of natural law and strongly advocating legal reforms.

Jeremy Bentham lived at a time of major social, political and economic change. And thus reflecting in his works are: issues about the Industrial revolutions, which was accompanied by massive economic and social shifts, the rise of the middle class, and revolutions in France. Jeremy Bentham was given to intensive study and often spends as much as eight to twelve hours a day reading and writing. Although his influence while alive was not much truth is that he was

influential to followers like John Stuart Mill, and John Austin and other consequentialists.

While there is a lot of misinterpretation and contestation of Bentham's Political Ideas, yet Bentham is an important liberal thinker with a commitment to the role of government in defending personal security and well-being and at the same time with a strong scepticism about government as a vehicle of harm as well as good. He was a thinker that was given to proposing various practical ideas aimed at reforming social instititutions.

Main Works of J. Bentham

- *A Fragment of Government*
- *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*

Central position of his political thought

The notion of pleasure and pain occupies a central position in the political thought of Jeremy Bentham that he believes that pleasure and pain can be measured and used to judge or determine which action should be taken and which should be avoided. For him, pleasure and pain are objective states and can be measured in terms of their intensity, duration, certainty, proximity, fecundity, and purity which will make it possible for an objective determination of an activity or state and for a comparison with others.

Central also to his political thought is thebelieve that the individual is supreme. "The individual human being is conceived as the source of values and as himself the supreme values." meaning the individual is the ultimate values. As a

result of this belief, Bentham is of the view that the nature of the human person can be described without recourse to his social relationship with others. To him, the idea of relation, and of community are fictitious ideas .

Three items have consequently been identified as the basis of Bentham's moral philosophy and political thought and they are:

1. the greatest happiness principle

2. universal egoism

3. artificial identification of one's interests with those of others.

Human Nature

Jeremy Bentham is a psychological hedonist. Hedonism is the position that pleasure is the moral justification for pursuing any action. There are two forms: Ethical Hedonism and Psychological Hedonism. Ethical Hedonism is the position that the only action that is morally justified is that action that brings about pleasure; while any action that produces pain should be avoided. On the other hand, psychological Hedonism is a descriptive theory which seeks to explain how humans behave. It is the position that human being have a nature such that they are always pursuing pleasure in all that they do.

Bentham believes that just as we can explain nature through Physics laws so can human nature be understood through the reference to two primary motives of pleasure and pain. According to Bentham, "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the

one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we don, in all we say, in all we think…" Thus, from this position it is obvious that Bentham is of that humans are capable of no action except they take into consideration they pain or the pleasure that it will bring to them.

Apart from being regarded as a psychological hedonist however. J. Bentham may also be regarded as a psychological egoist. Psychological egoism is the position that human beings are by nature beings that pursue their own interests. For him, "Self-regarding interest is predominant over social interest, each person's own individual interest over the interests of all other persons taken together." Thus in his belief, human being are by nature who pursue their own interests. This fundamental and reason is even subject to this law of nature for humans.

Utilitarianism

One theory which Bentham champions is the theory of Utilitarianism. This is the theory that holds that "good is the largest amount of utility or happiness, and that means the sum total of the happiness of all people concerned, and the right, or fundamental duty, is to create as much of the good as is possible whenever we act". In other words, an action is morally right if it promotes the greatest number of pleasure or happiness for the greatest number of people. By utility, Bentham was not merely referring to the extent to which things are useful but the their ability to produce the greatest amount of happiness, which is about the presence of pleasure and absence of pain.

Although Bentham believes that the individual is the most important in the society, he believes that individuals will pursue general happiness because the interest of others in inextricably tied with theirs. The principle of utility presupposes that one man is worth just the same as another man, and thus in calculating utility no man's interest will supersede anyone's in order to use the calculus

The legal system

Bentham is classified as one of those known as "the philosophic radicals." a central position of this group is the belief that many of the social problems of late eighteen and early nineteenth century England were due to and antiquated legal system and to the control of the economy by a hereditary landed gentry opposed to modern capitalist institutions. For Bentham, the principles that control morals also control politics and law and this makes political reforms to require a clear understanding of human nature. Bentham criticised Sir William Blackstone's defence of tradition in law and argued for the rational revision of the process of determining responsibility and punishment and a more extensive freedom of contract. If this is done, he believes it will be in favour of the community and the individual.

JOHN STUART MILL (1806-1873)

John Stuart Mill was an English philosopher, political economist, politician and civil servant. One of the most influential thinkers in the history of classical liberalism, he contributed widely to social theory, political theory, and political economy. Dubbed "the most influential English-speaking philosopher of the nineteenth century" by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, he conceived of liberty as justifying the freedom of the individual in opposition to unlimited state and social control. Mill was a proponent of utilitarianism, an ethical theory developed by his predecessor Jeremy Bentham. He contributed to the investigation of scientific methodology, though his knowledge of the topic was based on the writings of others, notably William Whewell, John Herschel, and Auguste Comte, and research carried out for Mill by Alexander Bain. He engaged in written debate with Whewell. A member of the Liberal Party and author of the early feminist work The Subjection of Women, Mill was also the second member of Parliament to call for women's suffrage after Henry Hunt in 1832.

John Stuart Mill was born at 13 Rodney Street in Pentonville, then on the edge of the capital and now in central London, the eldest son of Harriet Barrow and the Scottish philosopher, historian, and economist James Mill. John Stuart was educated by his father, with the advice and assistance of Jeremy Bentham and Francis Place. He was given an extremely rigorous upbringing, and was deliberately shielded from association with children his own age other than his siblings. His father, a follower of Bentham and an adherent of associationism, had as his explicit aim to create a genius intellect that would carry on the cause of utilitarianism and its implementation after he and Bentham had died.

Mill was a notably precocious child. He describes his education in his autobiography. At the age of three he was taught Greek. By the age of eight, he had read Aesop's Fables, Xenophon's Anabasis, and the whole of Herodotus, and was acquainted with Lucian, Diogenes Laërtius, Isocrates and six dialogues of Plato. He had also read a great deal of history in English and had been taught arithmetic, physics and astronomy.

At the age of eight, Mill began studying Latin, the works of Euclid, and algebra, and was appointed schoolmaster to the younger children of the family. His main reading was still history, but he went through all the commonly taught Latin and Greek authors and by the age of ten could read Plato and Demosthenes with ease. His father also thought that it was important for Mill to study and compose poetry. One of his earliest poetic compositions was a continuation of the Iliad. In his spare time he also enjoyed reading about natural sciences and popular novels, such as Don Quixote and Robinson Crusoe.

History of British India

His father's work, The History of British India, was published in 1818; immediately thereafter, at about the age of twelve, Mill began a thorough study of the scholastic logic, at the same time reading Aristotle's logical treatises in the original language. In the following year he was introduced to political economy and studied Adam Smith and David Ricardo with his father, ultimately completing their classical economic view of factors of production. Mill's comptes rendus of his daily economy lessons helped his father in writing Elements of Political Economy in 1821, a textbook to promote the ideas of Ricardian

economics; however, the book lacked popular support. Ricardo, who was a close friend of his father, used to invite the young Mill to his house for a walk to talk about political economy.

At the age of fourteen, Mill stayed a year in France with the family of Sir Samuel Bentham, brother of Jeremy Bentham and in the company of George Ensor, then pursuing his polemic against the political economy of Thomas Malthus. The mountain scenery he saw led to a lifelong taste for mountain landscapes. The lively and friendly way of life of the French also left a deep impression on him. In Montpellier, he attended the winter courses on chemistry, zoology, logic of the Faculté des Sciences, as well as taking a course in higher mathematics. While coming and going from France, he stayed in Paris for a few days in the house of the renowned economist Jean-Baptiste Say, a friend of Mill's father. There he met many leaders of the Liberal party, as well as other notable Parisians, including Henri Saint-Simon.

Mill went through months of sadness and contemplated suicide at twenty years of age. According to the opening paragraphs of Chapter V of his autobiography, he had asked himself whether the creation of a just society, his life's objective, would actually make him happy. His heart answered "no", and unsurprisingly he lost the happiness of striving towards this objective. Eventually, the poetry of William Wordsworth showed him that beauty generates compassion for others and stimulates joy. With renewed vigour, he continued to work towards a just society, but with more relish for the journey. He considered this one of the most pivotal shifts in his thinking. In fact, many of the differences between him and his father stemmed from this expanded source of joy.

Mill met Thomas Carlyle during one of the latter's visits to London in the early 1830s, and the two quickly became companions and correspondents. Mill offered to print Carlyle's works at his own expense and encouraged Carlyle to write his French Revolution, supplying him with materials in order to do so. In March 1835, while the manuscript of the completed first volume was in Mill's possession, Mill's housemaid unwittingly used it as tinder, destroying all "except some three or four bits of leaves". Mortified, Mill offered Carlyle £200 (£17,742.16 in 2021) as compensation (Carlyle would only accept £100). Ideological differences would put an end to the friendship during the 1840s, though Carlyle's early influence on Mill would colour his later thought.

Mill had been engaged in a pen-friendship with Auguste Comte, the founder of positivism and sociology, since Mill first contacted Comte in November 1841. Comte's sociologie was more an early philosophy of science than modern sociology is. Comte's positivism motivated Mill to eventually reject Bentham's psychological egoism and what he regarded as Bentham's cold, abstract view of human nature focused on legislation and politics, instead coming to favour Comte's more sociable view of human nature focused on historical facts and directed more towards human individuals in all their complexities.

As a nonconformist who refused to subscribe to the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England, Mill was not eligible to study at the University of Oxford or the University of Cambridge. Instead he followed his father to work for the East India Company, and attended University College, London, to hear the lectures of John Austin, the first Professor of Jurisprudence. He was elected a foreign honorary member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1856.

J.S. Mills Career

Mill's career as a colonial administrator at the East India Company spanned from when he was 17 years old in 1823 until 1858, when the company's territories in India were directly annexed by the Crown, establishing direct Crown control over India. In 1836, he was promoted to the company's political department, where he was responsible for correspondence pertaining to the company's relations with the princely states, and, in 1856, was finally promoted to the position of Examiner of Indian Correspondence. In On Liberty, A Few Words on Non-Intervention, and other works, he opined that "To characterize any conduct whatever towards a barbarous people as a violation of the law of nations, only shows that he who so speaks has never considered the subject." (However, Mill immediately added that "A violation of the great principles of morality it may easily be.") Mill viewed places such as India as having once been progressive in their outlook, but had now become stagnant in their development; he opined that this meant these regions had to be ruled via a form of "benevolent despotism...provided the end is improvement". When the Crown proposed to take direct control over the territories of the East India Company, Mill was tasked with defending Company rule and penned Memorandum on the Improvements in the Administration of India during the Last Thirty Years, among other petitions. He was offered a seat on the Council of India, the body created to advise the new Secretary of State for India, but declined, citing disapproval of the new system of administration in India.

On 21 April 1851, Mill married Harriet Taylor after 21 years of intimate friendship. Taylor was married when they met, and their relationship was close but generally believed to be chaste during the years before her first husband died in

1849. The couple waited two years before marrying in 1851. Accomplished in her own right, Taylor was a significant influence on Mill's work and ideas during both friendship and marriage. His relationship with Taylor reinforced Mill's advocacy of women's rights. He said that in his stand against domestic violence, and for women's rights he was "chiefly an amanuensis to my wife". He called her mind a "perfect instrument", and said she was "the most eminently qualified of all those known to the author". He cites her influence in his final revision of On Liberty, which was published shortly after her death. Taylor died in 1858 after developing severe lung congestion, after only seven years of marriage to Mill.

Between the years 1865 and 1868 Mill served as Lord Rector of the University of St Andrews. At his inaugural address, delivered to the University on 1 February 1867, he made the now-famous (but often wrongly attributed) remark that "Bad men need nothing more to compass their ends, than that good men should look on and do nothing". That Mill included that sentence in the address is a matter of historical record, but it by no means follows that it expressed a wholly original insight. During the same period, 1865–68, he was also a Member of Parliament (MP) for City of Westminster. He was sitting for the Liberal Party. During his time as an MP, Mill advocated easing the burdens on Ireland. In 1866, he became the first person in the history of Parliament to call for women to be given the right to vote, vigorously defending this position in subsequent debate. He also became a strong advocate of such social reforms as labour unions and farm cooperatives. In Considerations on Representative Government, he called for various reforms of Parliament and voting, especially proportional representation, the single transferable vote, and the extension of suffrage. In April 1868, he

favoured in a Commons debate the retention of capital punishment for such crimes as aggravated murder; he termed its abolition "an effeminacy in the general mind of the country".

He was elected as a member to the American Philosophical Society in 1867. He was godfather to the philosopher Bertrand Russell. In his views on religion, Mill was an agnostic and a sceptic. Mill died in 1873, thirteen days before his 67th birthday, of erysipelas in Avignon, France, where his body was buried alongside his wife's.

Works and theories

A System of Logic

Mill joined the debate over scientific method which followed on from John Herschel's 1830 publication of A Preliminary Discourse on the study of Natural Philosophy, which incorporated inductive reasoning from the known to the unknown, discovering general laws in specific facts and verifying these laws empirically. William Whewell expanded on this in his 1837 History of the Inductive Sciences, from the Earliest to the Present Time, followed in 1840 by The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded Upon their History, presenting induction as the mind superimposing concepts on facts. Laws were self-evident truths, which could be known without need for empirical verification.

Mill countered this in 1843 in A System of Logic (fully titled A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence, and the Methods of Scientific Investigation). In "Mill's Methods" (of induction), as in Herschel's, laws were discovered through observation and

induction, and required empirical verification. Matilal remarks that Dignāga analysis is much like John Stuart Mill's Joint Method of Agreement and Difference, which is inductive. He suggested that it was very likely that during his stay in India he came across the tradition of logic, in which scholars started taking interest after 1824, though it is unknown whether it influenced his work.

Theory of liberty

Mill's On Liberty (1859) addresses the nature and limits of the power that can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual. Mill's idea is that only if a democratic society follows the Principle of Liberty can its political and social institutions fulfill their role of shaping national character so that its citizens can realise the permanent interests of people as progressive beings (Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy).

Mill states the Principle of Liberty as: "the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection". "The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant." One way to read Mill's Principle of Liberty as a principle of public reason is to see it excluding certain kinds of reasons from being taken into account in legislation, or in guiding the moral coercion of public opinion. (Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy). These reasons include those founded in other persons good; reasons of excellence and ideals of human perfection; reasons of dislike or disgust, or of preference.

Mill states that "harms" which may be prevented include acts of omission as well as acts of commission. Thus, failing to rescue a drowning child counts as a harmful act, as does failing to pay taxes, or failing to appear as a witness in court. All such harmful omissions may be regulated, according to Mill. By contrast, it does not count as harming someone if—without force or fraud—the affected individual consents to assume the risk: thus one may permissibly offer unsafe employment to others, provided there is no deception involved. The question of what counts as a self-regarding action and what actions, whether of omission or commission, constitute harmful actions subject to regulation, continues to exercise interpreters of Mill. He did not consider giving offence to constitute "harm"; an action could not be restricted because it violated the conventions or morals of a given society.

Social liberty and tyranny of majority

Mill believed that "the struggle between Liberty and Authority is the most conspicuous feature in the portions of history." For him, liberty in antiquity was a "contest…between subjects, or some classes of subjects, and the government." Mill defined social liberty as protection from "the tyranny of political rulers". He introduced a number of different concepts of the form tyranny can take, referred to as social tyranny, and tyranny of the majority. Social liberty for Mill meant putting limits on the ruler's power so that he would not be able to use that power to further his own wishes and thus make decisions that could harm society. In other words, people should have the right to have a say in the government's decisions. He said that social liberty was "the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual." It was attempted in two

ways: first, by obtaining recognition of certain immunities (called political liberties or rights); and second, by establishment of a system of "constitutional checks".

However, in Mill's view, limiting the power of government was not enough: Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself.

Liberty

Mill's view on liberty, which was influenced by Joseph Priestley and Josiah Warren, is that individuals ought to be free to do as they wished unless they caused harm to others. Individuals are rational enough to make decisions about their well-being. Government should interfere when it is for the protection of society. Mill explained:

The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would

be wise, or even right.… The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns him, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.

Freedom of speech

On Liberty involves an impassioned defense of free speech. Mill argues that free discourse is a necessary condition for intellectual and social progress. We can never be sure, he contends, that a silenced opinion does not contain some element of the truth. He also argues that allowing people to air false opinions is productive for two reasons. First, individuals are more likely to abandon erroneous beliefs if they are engaged in an open exchange of ideas. Second, by forcing other individuals to re-examine and re-affirm their beliefs in the process of debate, these beliefs are kept from declining into mere dogma. It is not enough for Mill that one simply has an unexamined belief that happens to be true; one must understand why the belief in question is the true one. Along those same lines Mill wrote, "unmeasured vituperation, employed on the side of prevailing opinion, really does deter people from expressing contrary opinions, and from listening to those who express them."

Mill outlines the benefits of "searching for and discovering the truth" as a way to further knowledge. He argued that even if an opinion is false, the truth can be better understood by refuting the error. And as most opinions are neither completely true nor completely false, he points out that allowing free expression allows the airing of competing views as a way to preserve partial truth in various

opinions. Worried about minority views being suppressed, he argued in support of freedom of speech on political grounds, stating that it is a critical component for a representative government to have to empower debate over public policy. He also eloquently argued that freedom of expression allows for personal growth and self-realization. He said that freedom of speech was a vital way to develop talents and realise a person's potential and creativity. He repeatedly said that eccentricity was preferable to uniformity and stagnation.

Harm principle

The belief that freedom of speech would advance society presupposed a society sufficiently culturally and institutionally advanced to be capable of progressive improvement. If any argument is really wrong or harmful, the public will judge it as wrong or harmful, and then those arguments cannot be sustained and will be excluded. Mill argued that even any arguments which are used in justifying murder or rebellion against the government should not be politically suppressed or socially persecuted. According to him, if rebellion is really necessary, people should rebel; if murder is truly proper, it should be allowed. However, the way to express those arguments should be a public speech or writing, not in a way that causes actual harm to others. Such is the harm principle: "That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others."

At the beginning of the 20th century, Associate justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. made the standard of "clear and present danger" based on Mill's idea. In the majority opinion, Holmes writes:

The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.

Holmes suggested that falsely shouting out "Fire!" in a dark theatre, which evokes panic and provokes injury, would be such a case of speech that creates an illegal danger. But if the situation allows people to reason by themselves and decide to accept it or not, any argument or theology should not be blocked.

Mill's argument is now generally accepted by many democratic countries, and they have laws at least guided by the harm principle. For example, in American law some exceptions limit free speech such as obscenity, defamation, breach of peace, and "fighting words".

Freedom of the press

In on Liberty, Mill thought it was necessary for him to restate the case for press freedom. He considered that argument already won. Almost no politician or commentator in mid-19th-century Britain wanted a return to Tudor and Stuart-type press censorship. However, Mill warned new forms of censorship could emerge in the future. Indeed, in 2013 the Cameron Tory government considered setting up a so-called independent official regulator of the UK press. This prompted demands for better basic legal protection of press freedom. A new British Bill of Rights could include a US-type constitutional ban on governmental infringement of press freedom and block other official attempts to control freedom of opinion and expression.

Colonialism

Mill, an employee of the East India Company from 1823 to 1858, argued in support of what he called a "benevolent despotism" with regard to the administration of overseas colonies. Mill argued:

Mill expressed general support for Company rule in India, but expressed reservations on specific Company policies in India which he disagreed with.

Slavery and racial equality

In 1850, Mill sent an anonymous letter (which came to be known under the title "The Negro Question"), in rebuttal to Thomas Carlyle's letter to Fraser's Magazine for Town and Country in which Carlyle argued for slavery. Mill supported abolishing slavery in the United States, expressing his opposition to slavery in his essay of 1869, The Subjection of Women:

Unlike many of his peers, Mill supported the Union in the American Civil War, seeing it as a necessary evil that would deliver a vital “salutary shock” to the national conscience and help preserve liberal ideals while eradicating the "stain" of slavery in the United States. Mill expressed his views in an article for Fraser's Magazine, arguing against the defenders of the Confederate States of America.

Mill and Women's rights

Mill's view of history was that right up until his time "the whole of the female" and "the great majority of the male sex" were simply "slaves". He countered arguments to the contrary, arguing that relations between sexes simply amounted to "the legal subordination of one sex to the other – [which] is wrong

itself, and now one of the chief hindrances to human improvement; and that it ought to be replaced by a principle of perfect equality". Here, then, we have an instance of Mill's use of "slavery" in a sense which, compared to its fundamental meaning of absolute unfreedom of person, is an extended and arguably a rhetorical rather than a literal sense.

With this, Mill can be considered among the earliest male proponents of gender equality, having been recruited by American feminist John Neal during his stay in London circa 1825–1827. His book The Subjection of Women (1861, publ.1869) is one of the earliest written on this subject by a male author. In The Subjection of Women, Mill attempts to make a case for perfect equality.

In his proposal for a universal education system sponsored by the state, Mill expands benefits for many marginalized groups, especially for women. For Mill, a universal education held the potential to create new abilities and novel types of behavior of which the current receiving generation and their descendants could both benefit from. Such a pathway to opportunity would enable women to gain "industrial and social independence" that would allow them the same movement in their agency and citizenship as men. Mill's view of opportunity stands out in its reach, but even more so for the population he foresees who could benefit from it. Mill was hopeful of the autonomy such an education could allow for its recipients and especially for women. Through the consequential sophistication and knowledge attained, individuals are able to properly act in ways that recedes away from those leading towards overpopulation. This stands directly in contrast with the view held by many of Mill's contemporaries and predecessors who viewed such inclusive programs to be counter intuitive. Aiming such help at marginalized

groups, such as the poor and working class, would only serve to reward them with the opportunity to move to a higher status, thus encouraging greater fertility which at its extreme could lead to overproduction.

He talks about the role of women in marriage and how it must be changed. Mill comments on three major facets of women's lives that he felt are hindering them:

1. society and gender construction;
2. education; and
3. marriage.

He argues that the oppression of women was one of the few remaining relics from ancient times, a set of prejudices that severely impeded the progress of humanity. As a Member of Parliament, Mill introduced an unsuccessful amendment to the Reform Bill to substitute the word "person" in place of "man".

Utilitarianism

The canonical statement of Mill's utilitarianism can be found in his book, Utilitarianism. Although this philosophy has a long tradition, Mill's account is primarily influenced by Jeremy Bentham and Mill's father James Mill.

John Stuart Mill believed in the philosophy of utilitarianism, which he would describe as the principle that holds "that actions are right in the proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness". By happiness he means, "intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure". It is clear that we do not all

value virtues as a path to happiness and that we sometimes only value them for selfish reasons. However, Mill asserts that upon reflection, even when we value virtues for selfish reasons we are in fact cherishing them as a part of our happiness.

Bentham's famous formulation of utilitarianism is known as the greatest-happiness principle. It holds that one must always act so as to produce the greatest aggregate happiness among all sentient beings, within reason. In a similar vein, Mill's method of determining the best utility is that a moral agent, when given the choice between two or more actions, ought to choose the action that contributes most to (maximizes) the total happiness in the world. Happiness, in this context, is understood as the production of pleasure or privation of pain. Given that determining the action that produces the most utility is not always so clear cut, Mill suggests that the utilitarian moral agent, when attempting to rank the utility of different actions, should refer to the general experience of persons. That is, if people generally experience more happiness following action X than they do action Y, the utilitarian should conclude that action X produces more utility than action Y, and so is to be preferred.

Utilitarianism is a consequentialist ethical theory, meaning that it holds that acts are justified insofar as they produce a desirable outcome. The overarching goal of utilitarianism—the ideal consequence—is to achieve the "greatest good for the greatest number as the end result of human action." In Utilitarianism, Mill states that "happiness is the sole end of human action". This statement aroused some controversy, which is why Mill took it a step further, explaining how the very nature of humans wanting happiness, and who "take it to be reasonable under free consideration", demands that happiness is indeed desirable. In other words, free

will leads everyone to make actions inclined on their own happiness, unless reasoned that it would improve the happiness of others, in which case, the greatest utility is still being achieved. To that extent, the utilitarianism that Mill is describing is a default lifestyle that he believes is what people who have not studied a specific opposing field of ethics would naturally and subconsciously use when faced with a decision.

Utilitarianism is thought of by some of its activists to be a more developed and overarching ethical theory of Immanuel Kant's belief in goodwill, and not just some default cognitive process of humans. Where Kant (1724–1804) would argue that reason can only be used properly by goodwill, Mill would say that the only way to universally create fair laws and systems would be to step back to the consequences, whereby Kant's ethical theories become based around the ultimate good—utility. By this logic the only valid way to discern what is the proper reason would be to view the consequences of any action and weigh the good and the bad, even if on the surface, the ethical reasoning seems to indicate a different train of thought.

Higher and lower pleasures

Mill's major contribution to utilitarianism is his argument for the qualitative separation of pleasures. Bentham treats all forms of happiness as equal, whereas Mill argues that intellectual and moral pleasures (higher pleasures) are superior to more physical forms of pleasure (lower pleasures). He distinguishes between happiness and contentment, claiming that the former is of higher value than the latter, a belief wittily encapsulated in the statement that, "it is better to be a

human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question."

This made Mill believe that "our only ultimate end" is happiness. One unique part of his utilitarian view, that is not seen in others, is the idea of higher and lower pleasures.

He defines higher pleasures as mental, moral, and aesthetic pleasures, and lower pleasures as being more sensational. He believed that higher pleasures should be seen as preferable to lower pleasures since they have a greater quality in virtue. He holds that pleasures gained in activity are of a higher quality than those gained passively.

Mill defines the difference between higher and lower forms of pleasure with the principle that those who have experienced both tend to prefer one over the other. This is, perhaps, in direct contrast with Bentham's statement that "Quantity of pleasure being equal, push-pin is as good as poetry", that, if a simple child's game like hopscotch causes more pleasure to more people than a night at the opera house, it is more incumbent upon a society to devote more resources to propagating hopscotch than running opera houses. Mill's argument is that the "simple pleasures" tend to be preferred by people who have no experience with high art, and are therefore not in a proper position to judge. He also argues that people who, for example, are noble or practise philosophy, benefit society more than those who engage in individualist practices for pleasure, which are

lower forms of happiness. It is not the agent's own greatest happiness that matters "but the greatest amount of happiness altogether".

Mill separated his explanation of Utilitarianism into five different sections:

1. General Remarks;
2. What Utilitarianism Is;
3. Of the Ultimate Sanction of the Principle of Utility;
4. Of What Sort of Proof the Principle of Utility is Susceptible;
5. and Of the Connection between Justice and Utility.

In the General Remarks portion of his essay, he speaks how next to no progress has been made when it comes to judging what is right and what is wrong of morality and if there is such a thing as moral instinct (which he argues that there may not be). However, he agrees that in general "Our moral faculty, according to all those of its interpreters who are entitled to the name of thinkers, supplies us only with the general principles of moral judgments".

He focuses no longer on background information but utilitarianism itself. He quotes utilitarianism as "The greatest happiness principle", defining this theory by saying that pleasure and no pain are the only inherently good things in the world and expands on it by saying that "actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure." He views it not as an animalistic concept because he sees seeking out pleasure as a way of using our higher facilities. He also says in

this chapter that the happiness principle is based not exclusively on the individual but mainly on the community.

Mill also defends the idea of a "strong utilitarian conscience (i.e. a strong feeling of obligation to the general happiness)". He argued that humans have a desire to be happy and that that desire causes us to want to be in unity with other humans. This causes us to care about the happiness of others, as well as the happiness of complete strangers. But this desire also causes us to experience pain when we perceive harm to other people. He believes in internal sanctions that make us experience guilt and appropriate our actions. These internal sanctions make us want to do good because we do not want to feel guilty for our actions. Happiness is our ultimate end because it is our duty. He argues that we do not need to be constantly motivated by the concern of people's happiness because most of the actions done by people are done out of good intention, and the good of the world is made up of the good of the people.

Happiness

The qualitative account of happiness that Mill advocates thus sheds light on his account presented in On Liberty. As he suggests in that text, utility is to be conceived in relation to humanity "as a progressive being", which includes the development and exercise of rational capacities as we strive to achieve a "higher mode of existence". The rejection of censorship and paternalism is intended to provide the necessary social conditions for the achievement of knowledge and the greatest ability for the greatest number to develop and exercise their deliberative and rational capacities.

Mill redefines the definition of happiness as "the ultimate end, for the sake of which all other things are desirable (whether we are considering our own good or that of other people) is an existence as free as possible from pain and as rich as possible in enjoyments". He firmly believed that moral rules and obligations could be referenced to promoting happiness, which connects to having a noble character. While Mill is not a standard act utilitarian or rule utilitarian, he is a minimizing utilitarian, which "affirms that it would be desirable to maximize happiness for the greatest number, but not that we are morally required to do so".

Achieving happiness

Mill believed that for the majority of people (those with but a moderate degree of sensibility and of capacity for enjoyment) happiness is best achieved en passant, rather than striving for it directly. This meant no self-consciousness, scrutiny, self-interrogation, dwelling on, thinking about, imagining or questioning on one's happiness. Then, if otherwise fortunately circumstanced, one would "inhale happiness with the air you breathe".

Economic philosophy

Mill's early economic philosophy was one of free markets. However, he accepted interventions in the economy, such as a tax on alcohol, if there were sufficient utilitarian grounds. He also accepted the principle of legislative intervention for the purpose of animal welfare. He originally believed that "equality of taxation" meant "equality of sacrifice" and that progressive taxation penalized those who worked harder and saved more and was therefore "a mild form of robbery".

Given an equal tax rate regardless of income, Mill agreed that inheritance should be taxed. A utilitarian society would agree that everyone should be equal one way or another. Therefore, receiving inheritance would put one ahead of society unless taxed on the inheritance. Those who donate should consider and choose carefully where their money goes—some charities are more deserving than others. Considering public charities boards such as a government will disburse the money equally. However, a private charity board like a church would disburse the monies fairly to those who are in more need than others.

Later he altered his views toward a more socialist bent, adding chapters to his Principles of Political Economy in defence of a socialist outlook, and defending some socialist causes. Within this revised work he also made the radical proposal that the whole wage system be abolished in favour of a co-operative wage system. Nonetheless, some of his views on the idea of flat taxation remained, albeit altered in the third edition of the Principles of Political Economy to reflect a concern for differentiating restrictions on "unearned" incomes, which he favoured, and those on "earned" incomes, which he did not favour.

In his autobiography, Mill stated that in relation to his later views on political economy, his "ideal of ultimate improvement... would class [him] decidedly under the general designation of Socialists". His views shifted partly due to reading the works of utopian socialists, but also from the influence of Harriet Taylor. In his work Socialism, Mill argued that the prevalence of poverty in contemporary industrial capitalist societies was "pro tanto a failure of the social arrangements", and that attempts to condone this state of affairs as being the result

of individual failings did not represent a justification of them but instead were "an irresistible claim upon every human being for protection against suffering".

Mill's Principles, first published in 1848, was one of the most widely read of all books on economics in the period. As Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations had during an earlier period, Principles came to dominate economics teaching. In the case of Oxford University it was the standard text until 1919, when it was replaced by Marshall's Principles of Economics.

Criticism

Karl Marx, in his critique of political economy, mentioned Mill in the Grundrisse. Marx contended that Mill's thinking posited the categories of capital in an ahistorical fashion.

Economic democracy

Mill's main objection to Marxism focused on what he saw its destruction of competition. He wrote, "I utterly dissent from the most conspicuous and vehement part of their teaching—their declamations against competition." Though he was an egalitarian, Mill argued more for equal opportunity and placed meritocracy above all other ideals in this regard. He further argued that a socialist society would only be attainable through the provision of basic education for all, promoting economic democracy instead of capitalism, in the manner of substituting capitalist businesses with worker cooperatives. He says:

The form of association, however, which if mankind continue to improve, must be expected in the end to predominate, is not that which can exist between a

capitalist as chief, and work-people without a voice in the management, but the association of the labourers themselves on terms of equality, collectively owning the capital with which they carry on their operations, and working under managers elected and removable by themselves.

Political democracy

Mill's major work on political democracy, Considerations on Representative Government, defends two fundamental principles: extensive participation by citizens and enlightened competence of rulers. The two values are obviously in tension, and some readers have concluded that he is an elitist democrat, while others count him as an earlier participatory democrat. In one section, he appears to defend plural voting, in which more competent citizens are given extra votes (a view he later repudiated). However, in another chapter he argues cogently for the value of participation by all citizens. He believed that the incompetence of the masses could eventually be overcome if they were given a chance to take part in politics, especially at the local level.

Mill is one of the few political philosophers ever to serve in government as an elected official. In his three years in Parliament, he was more willing to compromise than the "radical" principles expressed in his writing would lead one to expect.

Mill was a major proponent of the diffusion and use of public education to the working class. He saw the value of the individual person, and believed that "man had the inherent capability of guiding his own destiny-but only if his faculties were developed and fulfilled", which could be achieved through

education. He regarded education as a pathway to improve human nature which to him meant "to encourage, among other characteristics, diversity and originality, the energy of character, initiative, autonomy, intellectual cultivation, aesthetic sensibility, non-self-regarding interests, prudence, responsibility, and self-control". Education allowed for humans to develop into full informed citizens that had the tools to improve their condition and make fully informed electoral decisions. The power of education lay in its ability to serve as a great equalizer among the classes allowing the working class the ability to control their own destiny and compete with the upper classes. Mill recognised the paramount importance of public education in avoiding the tyranny of the majority by ensuring that all the voters and political participants were fully developed individuals. It was through education, he believed, that an individual could become a full participant within representative democracy.

In regards to higher education, Mill defended liberal education against contemporary arguments for models of higher education focused on religion or science. His 1867 St. Andrews Address called on elites educated in reformed universities to work towards education policy committed to liberal principles.

Theories of wealth and income distribution

In Principles of Political Economy, Mill offered an analysis of two economic phenomena often linked together: the laws of production and wealth and the modes of its distribution. Regarding the former, he believed that it was not possible to alter to laws of production, "the ultimate properties of matter and mind... only to employ these properties to bring about events we are interested". The modes

of distribution of wealth is a matter of human institutions solely, starting with what Mill believed to be the primary and fundamental institution: Individual Property. He believed that all individuals must start on equal terms, with division of the instruments of production fairly among all members of society. Once each member has an equal amount of individual property, they must be left to their own exertion not to be interfered with by the state. Regarding inequality of wealth, Mill believed that it was the role of the government to establish both social and economic policies that promote the equality of opportunity.

The government, according to Mill, should implement three tax policies to help alleviate poverty:

1. fairly assessed income tax;
2. an inheritance tax; and
3. a policy to restrict sumptuary consumption.

Inheritance of capital and wealth plays a large role in development of inequality, because it provides greater opportunity for those receiving the inheritance. Mill's solution to inequality of wealth brought about by inheritance was to implement a greater tax on inheritances, because he believed the most important authoritative function of the government is taxation, and taxation judiciously implemented could promote equality.

The environment

Mill demonstrated an early insight into the value of the natural world. In Book IV, chapter VI of Principles of Political Economy: "Of the Stationary State", Mill recognised wealth beyond the material and argued that the logical

conclusion of unlimited growth was destruction of the environment and a reduced quality of life. He concluded that a stationary state could be preferable to unending economic growth:

HENRY DAVID THOREAU(1817-1862)

Henry David Thoreau (July 12, 1817 – May 6, 1862) was an American naturalist, essayist, poet, and philosopher. A leading transcendentalist, he is best known for his book Walden, a reflection upon simple living in natural surroundings, and his essay "Civil Disobedience" (originally published as "Resistance to Civil Government"), an argument in favor of citizen disobedience against an unjust state.

Thoreau's books, articles, essays, journals, and poetry amount to more than 20 volumes. Among his lasting contributions are his writings on natural history and philosophy, in which he anticipated the methods and findings of ecology and environmental history, two sources of modern-day environmentalism. His literary style interweaves close observation of nature, personal experience, pointed rhetoric, symbolic meanings, and historical lore, while displaying a poetic sensibility, philosophical austerity, and attention to practical detail. He was also deeply interested in the idea of survival in the face of hostile elements, historical change, and natural decay; at the same time he advocated abandoning waste and illusion in order to discover life's true essential needs.

Thoreau was a lifelong abolitionist, delivering lectures that attacked the fugitive slave law while praising the writings of Wendell Phillips and defending the abolitionist John Brown. Thoreau's philosophy of civil disobedience later influenced the political thoughts and actions of notable figures such as Leo Tolstoy, Mahatma Gandhi, and Martin Luther King Jr.

Thoreau is sometimes referred to as an anarchist. In "Civil Disobedience", Thoreau wrote: "I heartily accept the motto,—'That government is best which governs least;' and I should like to see it acted up to more rapidly and systematically. Carried out, it finally amounts to this, which also I believe,—'That government is best which governs not at all;' and when men are prepared for it, that will be the kind of government which they will have.... But, to speak practically and as a citizen, unlike those who call themselves no-government men, I ask for, not at once no government, but at once a better government."

Early life and education, 1817–1837

Henry David Thoreau was born David Henry Thoreau in Concord, Massachusetts, into the "modest New England family" of John Thoreau, a pencil maker, and Cynthia Dunbar. His father was of French Protestant descent.[18] His paternal grandfather had been born on the UK crown dependency island of Jersey. His maternal grandfather, Asa Dunbar, led Harvard's 1766 student "Butter Rebellion", the first recorded student protest in the American colonies. David Henry was named after his recently deceased paternal uncle, David Thoreau. He began to call himself Henry David after he finished college; he never petitioned to make a legal name change.

He had two older siblings, Helen and John Jr., and a younger sister, Sophia Thoreau. None of the children married. Helen (1812–1849) died at age 37, from tuberculosis. John Jr. (1814–1842) died at age 27, of tetanus after cutting himself while shaving. Henry David (1817–1862) died at age 44, of tuberculosis. Sophia (1819–1876) survived him by 14 years, dying at age 56, of tuberculosis.

He studied at Harvard College between 1833 and 1837. He lived in Hollis Hall and took courses in rhetoric, classics, philosophy, mathematics, and science. He was a member of the Institute of 1770 (now the Hasty Pudding Club). According to legend, Thoreau refused to pay the five-dollar fee (approximately equivalent to $147 in 2022) for a Harvard master's diploma, which he described thus: Harvard College offered it to graduates "who proved their physical worth by being alive three years after graduating, and their saving, earning, or inheriting quality or condition by having Five Dollars to give the college". He commented, "Let every sheep keep its own skin", a reference to the tradition of using sheepskin vellum for diplomas.

Thoreau's birthplace still exists on Virginia Road in Concord. The house has been restored by the Thoreau Farm Trust, a nonprofit organization, and is now open to the public.

Return to Concord, 1837–1844

The traditional professions open to college graduates—law, the church, business, medicine—did not interest Thoreau,:25 so in 1835 he took a leave of absence from Harvard, during which he taught at a school in Canton, Massachusetts, living for two years at an earlier version of today's Colonial Inn in Concord. His grandfather owned the earliest of the three buildings that were later combined. After he graduated in 1837, Thoreau joined the faculty of the Concord public school, but he resigned after a few weeks rather than administer corporal punishment.:25 He and his brother John then opened the Concord Academy, a grammar school in Concord, in 1838.:25 They introduced several progressive

concepts, including nature walks and visits to local shops and businesses. The school closed when John became fatally ill from tetanus in 1842 after cutting himself while shaving. He died in Henry's arms.

Upon graduation Thoreau returned home to Concord, where he met Ralph Waldo Emerson through a mutual friend. Emerson, who was 14 years his senior, took a paternal and at times patron-like interest in Thoreau, advising the young man and introducing him to a circle of local writers and thinkers, including Ellery Channing, Margaret Fuller, Bronson Alcott, and Nathaniel Hawthorne and his son Julian Hawthorne, who was a boy at the time.

Emerson urged Thoreau to contribute essays and poems to a quarterly periodical, The Dial, and lobbied the editor, Margaret Fuller, to publish those writings. Thoreau's first essay published in The Dial was "Aulus Persius Flaccus", an essay on the Roman poet and satirist, in July 1840. It consisted of revised passages from his journal, which he had begun keeping at Emerson's suggestion. The first journal entry, on October 22, 1837, reads, "'What are you doing now?' he asked. 'Do you keep a journal?' So I make my first entry to-day."

Thoreau was a philosopher of nature and its relation to the human condition. In his early years he followed transcendentalism, a loose and eclectic idealist philosophy advocated by Emerson, Fuller, and Alcott. They held that an ideal spiritual state transcends, or goes beyond, the physical and empirical, and that one achieves that insight via personal intuition rather than religious doctrine. In their view, Nature is the outward sign of inward spirit, expressing the

"radical correspondence of visible things and human thoughts", as Emerson wrote in Nature (1836).

On April 18, 1841, Thoreau moved in with the Emersons. There, from 1841 to 1844, he served as the children's tutor; he was also an editorial assistant, repairman and gardener. For a few months in 1843, he moved to the home of William Emerson on Staten Island, and tutored the family's sons while seeking contacts among literary men and journalists in the city who might help publish his writings, including his future literary representative Horace Greeley.

Thoreau returned to Concord and worked in his family's pencil factory, which he would continue to do alongside his writing and other work for most of his adult life. He resurrected the process of making good pencils with inferior graphite by using clay as a binder. The process of mixing graphite and clay, known as the Conté process, had been first patented by Nicolas-Jacques Conté in 1795. Thoreau made profitable use of a graphite source found in New Hampshire that had been purchased in 1821 by his uncle, Charles Dunbar. The company's other source of graphite had been Tantiusques, a mine operated by Native Americans in Sturbridge, Massachusetts. Later, Thoreau converted the pencil factory to produce plumbago, a name for graphite at the time, which was used in the electrotyping process.

Once back in Concord, Thoreau went through a restless period. In April 1844 he and his friend Edward Hoar accidentally set a fire that consumed 300 acres (120 hectares) of Walden Woods.

"Civil Disobedience" and the Walden years, 1845–1850

I went to the woods because I wished to live deliberately, to front only the essential facts of life, and see if I could not learn what it had to teach, and not, when I came to die, discover that I had not lived. I did not wish to live what was not life, living is so dear; nor did I wish to practise resignation, unless it was quite necessary. I wanted to live deep and suck out all the marrow of life, to live so sturdily and Spartan-like as to put to rout all that was not life, to cut a broad swath and shave close, to drive life into a corner, and reduce it to its lowest terms, and, if it proved to be mean, why then to get the whole and genuine meanness of it, and publish its meanness to the world; or if it were sublime, to know it by experience, and be able to give a true account of it in my next excursion.

Thoreau revised the lecture into an essay titled "Resistance to Civil Government" (also known as "Civil Disobedience"). It was published by Elizabeth Peabody in the Aesthetic Papers in May 1849. Thoreau had taken up a version of Percy Shelley's principle in the political poem "The Mask of Anarchy" (1819), which begins with the powerful images of the unjust forms of authority of his time and then imagines the stirrings of a radically new form of social action.

At Walden Pond, Thoreau completed a first draft of A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers, an elegy to his brother John, describing their trip to the White Mountains in 1839. Thoreau did not find a publisher for the book and instead printed 1,000 copies at his own expense; fewer than 300 were sold.:234 He self-published on the advice of Emerson, using Emerson's publisher, Munroe, who did little to publicize the book.

In August 1846, Thoreau briefly left Walden to make a trip to Mount Katahdin in Maine, a journey later recorded in "Ktaadn", the first part of The Maine Woods.

Thoreau left Walden Pond on September 6, 1847.:244 At Emerson's request, he immediately moved back to the Emerson house to help Emerson's wife, Lidian, manage the household while her husband was on an extended trip to Europe. Over several years, as he worked to pay off his debts, he continuously revised the manuscript of what he eventually published as Walden, or Life in the Woods in 1854, recounting the two years, two months, and two days he had spent at Walden Pond. The book compresses that time into a single calendar year, using the passage of the four seasons to symbolize human development. Part memoir and part spiritual quest, Walden at first won few admirers, but later critics have regarded it as a classic American work that explores natural simplicity, harmony, and beauty as models for just social and cultural conditions.

Later years, 1851–1862

In 1851, Thoreau became increasingly fascinated with natural history and narratives of travel and expedition. He read avidly on botany and often wrote observations on this topic into his journal. He admired William Bartram and Charles Darwin's Voyage of the Beagle. He kept detailed observations on Concord's nature lore, recording everything from how the fruit ripened over time to the fluctuating depths of Walden Pond and the days certain birds migrated. The point of this task was to "anticipate" the seasons of nature, in his word.

He became a land surveyor and continued to write increasingly detailed observations on the natural history of the town, covering an area of 26 square miles (67 square kilometers), in his journal, a two-million-word document he kept for 24 years. He also kept a series of notebooks, and these observations became the source of his late writings on natural history, such as "Autumnal Tints", "The Succession of Trees", and "Wild Apples", an essay lamenting the destruction of the local wild apple species.

With the rise of environmental history and ecocriticism as academic disciplines, several new readings of Thoreau began to emerge, showing him to have been both a philosopher and an analyst of ecological patterns in fields and woodlots. For instance, "The Succession of Forest Trees", shows that he used experimentation and analysis to explain how forests regenerate after fire or human destruction, through the dispersal of seeds by winds or animals. In this lecture, first presented to a cattle show in Concord, and considered his greatest contribution to ecology, Thoreau explained why one species of tree can grow in a place where a different tree did previously. He observed that squirrels often carry nuts far from the tree from which they fell to create stashes. These seeds are likely to germinate and grow should the squirrel die or abandon the stash. He credited the squirrel for performing a "great service ... in the economy of the universe."

Nature and human existence

Most of the luxuries and many of the so-called comforts of life are not only not indispensable, but positive hindrances to the elevation of mankind.

—Thoreau

Thoreau was an early advocate of recreational hiking and canoeing, of conserving natural resources on private land, and of preserving wilderness as public land. He was himself a highly skilled canoeist; Nathaniel Hawthorne, after a ride with him, noted that "Mr. Thoreau managed the boat so perfectly, either with two paddles or with one, that it seemed instinct with his own will, and to require no physical effort to guide it."

He was not a strict vegetarian, though he said he preferred that diet and advocated it as a means of self-improvement. He wrote in Walden, "The practical objection to animal food in my case was its uncleanness; and besides, when I had caught and cleaned and cooked and eaten my fish, they seemed not to have fed me essentially. It was insignificant and unnecessary, and cost more than it came to. A little bread or a few potatoes would have done as well, with less trouble and filth."

Politics

Thoreau was fervently against slavery and actively supported the abolitionist movement. He participated as a conductor in the Underground Railroad, delivered lectures that attacked the Fugitive Slave Law, and in opposition to the popular opinion of the time, supported radical abolitionist militia leader John Brown and his party. Two weeks after the ill-fated raid on Harpers Ferry and in the weeks leading up to Brown's execution, Thoreau delivered a speech to the citizens of Concord, Massachusetts, in which he compared the American government to Pontius Pilate and likened Brown's execution to the crucifixion of Jesus Christ:

Some eighteen hundred years ago Christ was crucified; this morning, perchance, Captain Brown was hung. These are the two ends of a chain which is not without its links. He is not Old Brown any longer; he is an angel of light.

In The Last Days of John Brown, Thoreau described the words and deeds of John Brown as noble and an example of heroism. In addition, he lamented the newspaper editors who dismissed Brown and his scheme as "crazy".

Thoreau was a proponent of limited government and individualism. Although he was hopeful that mankind could potentially have, through self-betterment, the kind of government which "governs not at all", he distanced himself from contemporary "no-government men" (anarchists), writing: "I ask for, not at once no government, but at once a better government."

Thoreau deemed the evolution from absolute monarchy to limited monarchy to democracy as "a progress toward true respect for the individual" and theorized about further improvements "towards recognizing and organizing the rights of man". Echoing this belief, he went on to write: "There will never be a really free and enlightened State until the State comes to recognize the individual as a higher and independent power, from which all its power and authority are derived, and treats him accordingly."

It is on this basis that Thoreau could so strongly inveigh against the British administration and Catholicism in A Yankee in Canada. Despotic authority, Thoreau argued, had crushed the people's sense of ingenuity and enterprise; the Canadian habitants had been reduced, in his view, to a perpetual childlike state.

Ignoring the recent rebellions, he argued that there would be no revolution in the St. Lawrence River valley.

Although Thoreau believed resistance to unjustly exercised authority could be both violent (exemplified in his support for John Brown) and nonviolent (his own example of tax resistance displayed in Resistance to Civil Government), he regarded pacifist nonresistance as temptation to passivity, writing: "Let not our Peace be proclaimed by the rust on our swords, or our inability to draw them from their scabbards; but let her at least have so much work on her hands as to keep those swords bright and sharp." Furthermore, in a formal lyceum debate in 1841, he debated the subject "Is it ever proper to offer forcible resistance?", arguing the affirmative.

Likewise, his condemnation of the Mexican–American War did not stem from pacifism, but rather because he considered Mexico "unjustly overrun and conquered by a foreign army" as a means to expand the slave territory.

Intellectual interests, influences, and affinities

Indian sacred texts and philosophy

Thoreau was influenced by Indian spiritual thought. In Walden, there are many overt references to the sacred texts of India. For example, in the first chapter ("Economy"), he writes: "How much more admirable the Bhagvat-Geeta than all the ruins of the East!" American Philosophy: An Encyclopedia classes him as one of several figures who "took a more pantheist or pandeist approach by rejecting views of God as separate from the world", also a characteristic of Hinduism.

Furthermore, in "The Pond in Winter", he equates Walden Pond with the sacred Ganges river, writing:

In the morning I bathe my intellect in the stupendous and cosmogonal philosophy of the Bhagvat Geeta since whose composition years of the gods have elapsed, and in comparison with which our modern world and its literature seem puny and trivial; and I doubt if that philosophy is not to be referred to a previous state of existence, so remote is its sublimity from our conceptions. I lay down the book and go to my well for water, and lo! there I meet the servant of the Brahmin, priest of Brahma and Vishnu and Indra, who still sits in his temple on the Ganges reading the Vedas, or dwells at the root of a tree with his crust and water jug. I meet his servant come to draw water for his master, and our buckets as it were grate together in the same well. The pure Walden water is mingled with the sacred water of the Ganges.

Thoreau was aware his Ganges imagery could have been factual. He wrote about ice harvesting at Walden Pond. And he knew that New England's ice merchants were shipping ice to foreign ports, including Calcutta.

In an 1849 letter to his friend H.G.O. Blake, he wrote about yoga and its meaning to him:

Free in this world as the birds in the air, disengaged from every kind of chains, those who practice yoga gather in Brahma the certain fruits of their works. Depend upon it that, rude and careless as I am, I would fain practice the yoga faithfully. The yogi, absorbed in contemplation, contributes in his degree to creation; he breathes a divine perfume, he hears wonderful things. Divine forms

traverse him without tearing him, and united to the nature which is proper to him, he goes, he acts as animating original matter. To some extent, and at rare intervals, even I am a yogi.

Biology

Thoreau read contemporary works in the new science of biology, including the works of Alexander von Humboldt, Charles Darwin, and Asa Gray (Charles Darwin's staunchest American ally). Thoreau was deeply influenced by Humboldt, especially his work Cosmos.

In 1859, Thoreau purchased and read Darwin's On the Origin of Species. Unlike many natural historians at the time, including Louis Agassiz who publicly opposed Darwinism in favor of a static view of nature, Thoreau was immediately enthusiastic about the theory of evolution by natural selection and endorsed it, stating:

The development theory implies a greater vital force in Nature, because it is more flexible and accommodating, and equivalent to a sort of constant new creation.

Influence

Thoreau's careful observations and devastating conclusions have rippled into time, becoming stronger as the weaknesses Thoreau noted have become more pronounced ... Events that seem to be completely unrelated to his stay at Walden Pond have been influenced by it, including the national park system, the British labor movement, the creation of India, the civil rights movement, the hippie

revolution, the environmental movement, and the wilderness movement. Today, Thoreau's words are quoted with feeling by liberals, socialists, anarchists, libertarians, and conservatives alike.

Thoreau's political writings had little impact during his lifetime, as "his contemporaries did not see him as a theorist or as a radical", viewing him instead as a naturalist. They either dismissed or ignored his political essays, including Civil Disobedience. The only two complete books (as opposed to essays) published in his lifetime, Walden and A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers (1849), both dealt with nature, in which he "loved to wander". His obituary was lumped in with others rather than as a separate article in an 1862 yearbook. Critics and the public continued either to disdain or to ignore Thoreau for years, but the publication of extracts from his journal in the 1880s by his friend H.G.O. Blake, and of a definitive set of Thoreau's works by the Riverside Press between 1893 and 1906, led to the rise of what literary historian F. L. Pattee called a "Thoreau cult."

Thoreau's writings went on to influence many public figures. Political leaders and reformers like Mohandas Gandhi, U.S. President John F. Kennedy, American civil rights activist Martin Luther King Jr., U.S. Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, and Russian author Leo Tolstoy all spoke of being strongly affected by Thoreau's work, particularly Civil Disobedience, as did "right-wing theorist Frank Chodorov [who] devoted an entire issue of his monthly, Analysis, to an appreciation of Thoreau".

Thoreau also influenced many artists and authors including Edward Abbey, Willa Cather, Marcel Proust, William Butler Yeats, Sinclair Lewis, Ernest Hemingway, Upton Sinclair, E. B. White, Lewis Mumford, Frank Lloyd Wright, Alexander Posey, and Gustav Stickley. Thoreau also influenced naturalists like John Burroughs, John Muir, E. O. Wilson, Edwin Way Teale, Joseph Wood Krutch, B. F. Skinner, David Brower, and Loren Eiseley, whom Publishers Weekly called "the modern Thoreau".

Thoreau's friend William Ellery Channing published his first biography, Thoreau the Poet-Naturalist, in 1873. English writer Henry Stephens Salt wrote a biography of Thoreau in 1890, which popularized Thoreau's ideas in Britain: George Bernard Shaw, Edward Carpenter, and Robert Blatchford were among those who became Thoreau enthusiasts as a result of Salt's advocacy. Mohandas Gandhi first read Walden in 1906 while working as a civil rights activist in Johannesburg, South Africa. He first read Civil Disobedience "while he sat in a South African prison for the crime of nonviolently protesting discrimination against the Indian population in the Transvaal. The essay galvanized Gandhi, who wrote and published a synopsis of Thoreau's argument, calling its 'incisive logic ... unanswerable' and referring to Thoreau as 'one of the greatest and most moral men America has produced'." He told American reporter Webb Miller, "[Thoreau's] ideas influenced me greatly. I adopted some of them and recommended the study of Thoreau to all of my friends who were helping me in the cause of Indian Independence. Why I actually took the name of my movement from Thoreau's essay 'On the Duty of Civil Disobedience', written about 80years ago."

Martin Luther King Jr. noted in his autobiography that his first encounter with the idea of nonviolent resistance was reading "On Civil Disobedience" in 1944 while attending Morehouse College. He wrote in his autobiography that it was, Here, in this courageous New Englander's refusal to pay his taxes and his choice of jail rather than support a war that would spread slavery's territory into Mexico, I made my first contact with the theory of nonviolent resistance. Fascinated by the idea of refusing to cooperate with an evil system, I was so deeply moved that I reread the work several times. I became convinced that noncooperation with evil is as much a moral obligation as is cooperation with good. No other person has been more eloquent and passionate in getting this idea across than Henry David Thoreau. As a result of his writings and personal witness, we are the heirs of a legacy of creative protest. The teachings of Thoreau came alive in our civil rights movement; indeed, they are more alive than ever before. Whether expressed in a sit-in at lunch counters; a freedom ride into Mississippi; a peaceful protest in Albany, Georgia; a bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama; these are outgrowths of Thoreau's insistence that evil must be resisted and that no moral man can patiently adjust to injustice.

NIETZSCHE'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Nietzsche's *moral philosophy* is primarily critical in orientation: he attacks morality both for its commitment to untenable descriptive (metaphysical and empirical) claims about human agency, as well as for the deleterious impact of its distinctive norms and values on the flourishing of the highest types of human beings (Nietzsche's "higher men"). His positive ethical views are best understood as combining (i) a kind of consequentialist perfectionism as Nietzsche's implicit theory of the good, with (ii) a conception of human perfection involving both formal and substantive elements. Because Nietzsche, however, is an *anti-realist* about value, he takes neither his positive vision, nor those aspects of his critique that depend upon it, to have any special epistemic status, a fact which helps explain his rhetoric and the circumspect character of his "esoteric" moralizing. Although Nietzsche's *illiberal* attitudes (for example, about human equality) are apparent, there are no grounds for ascribing to him a political philosophy, since he has no systematic (or even partly systematic) views about the nature of state and society. As an esoteric moralist, Nietzsche aims at freeing higher human beings from their false consciousness about morality (their false belief that this morality is *good for them*), not at a transformation of society at large.

His works were based upon ideas of good and evil and the end of religion in the modern world. His philosophy is mainly referred to as existentialism a famous 20^{th} century philosophy focusing on main existential situation.

He questioned the basis of good and evil. He is a critique of religion and morality. He is arguably most for his criticism of traditional European moral

commitments together with their foundations in Christianlity. He is most offen associated with nihilism. There is no objective order or structure in the world except what we give it

Nietesche teacher

He bring true to oneself requires a deep understanding of one's own nature and innermost desires. He believed that individuals should strive to overcome their own limitations and weaknesses, pursue their own passions and goals and embrace their unique identifies.

Scope of the Critique: Morality in the Pejorative Sense

Nietzsche is not a critic of *all* "morality." He explicitly embraces, for example, the idea of a "higher morality" which would inform the lives of "higher men" (Schacht 1983: 466–469), and, in so doing, he employs the same German word — *Moral*, sometimes *Moralität* — for both what he attacks and what he praises. Moreover, Nietzsche aims to offer a revaluation of existing values in a manner that appears, itself, to involve appeal to broadly "moral" standards of some sort.

Yet Nietzsche also does not confine his criticisms of morality to some one religiously, philosophically, socially or historically circumscribed example. Thus, it will not suffice to say that he simply attacks Christian or Kantian or European or utilitarian morality — though he certainly at times attacks all of these. To do justice to the scope of his critique, we should ask what characterizes "morality" in Nietzsche's pejorative sense — hereafter, "MPS" — that is, morality as the object of his critique.

Critique of the Descriptive Component of MPS

MPS for Nietzsche depends for its intelligible application to human agents on three descriptive theses about human agency

(1) Human agents possess a will capable of free choice ("Free Will Thesis").

(2) The self is sufficiently transparent that agents' actions can be distinguished on the basis of their respective motives ("Transparency of the Self Thesis").

(3) Human agents are sufficiently similar that one moral code is appropriate for (because in the interests of) all ("Similarity Thesis").

These three theses must be true in order for the normative judgments of MPS to be intelligible because the normative judgments of MPS are marked for Nietzsche by three corresponding traits; namely, that they:

(1′) Hold agents responsible for their actions.

(2′) Evaluate and "rank" the motives for which agents act.

(3′) Presuppose that "morality" has universal applicability (MPS "says stubbornly and inexorably, 'I am morality itself, and nothing besides is morality'".

Thus, the falsity of the picture of human beings would affect the intelligibility of moral judgments in the following three ways:

(1″) If agents lacked "free will" they could not be held responsible for their actions.

(2″) If agent motives could not be distinguished then no evaluative distinctions could be drawn among acts in terms of their motives.

(3″) If humans were, in fact, different in some overlooked but relevant respect, then it would, at least, not be *prima facie* apparent that one morality should have universal application.

Nietzsche sums up the idea well in the preface to *On the Genealogy of Morality* (hereafter simply "*Genealogy*" or "GM"): "our thoughts, values, every 'yes,' 'no,' 'if' and 'but' grow from us with the same inevitability as fruits borne on the tree — all related and each with an affinity to each, and evidence of one will, one health, one earth, one sun" (GM P:2). Nietzsche seeks to understand in naturalistic terms the *type* of "person" who would necessarily bear such ideas and values, just as one might come to understand things about a type of *tree* by knowing its fruits. And just as natural facts about the tree explain the fruit it bears, so too type-facts about a person will explain his values and actions.

Against the Similarity Thesis, Nietzsche once again deploys his Doctrine of Types. Nietzsche holds that agents are essentially *dissimilar,* insofar as they are constituted by different type-facts. Since Nietzsche also holds that these natural type-facts fix the different conditions under which particular agents will flourish, it follows that one morality cannot be good for all. "*Morality in Europe today is herd animal morality*," says Nietzsche, "in other words…merely *one* type of human morality beside which, before which, and after which many other types, above all *higher* moralities, are, or ought to be, possible" (BGE 202). Nietzsche illustrates the general point with his discussion of the case of the Italian writer Cornaro in *Twilight of the Idols* (VI:1). Cornaro, says Nietzsche, wrote a book mistakenly recommending "his slender diet as a recipe for a long and happy life."

All of Nietzsche's criticisms of the normative component of MPS are parasitic upon one basic complaint — not, as some have held, the universality of moral demands, *per se*, but rather that "the demand of one morality for all is detrimental to the higher men" (BGE 228). Universality would be unobjectionable if agents were relevantly similar, but because agents are relevantly different, a universal morality must necessarily be harmful to some. As Nietzsche writes elsewhere: "When a decadent type of man ascended to the rank of the highest type [via MPS], this could only happen at *the expense of its countertype* [emphasis added], the type of man that is strong and sure of life". In the preface to the *Genealogy*, Nietzsche sums up his basic concern particularly well:

This theme is sounded throughout Nietzsche's work. In a book of 1880, for example, he writes that, "Our weak, unmanly social concepts of good and evil and their tremendous ascendancy over body and soul have finally weakened all bodies and souls and snapped the self-reliant, independent, unprejudiced men, the pillars of a *strong* civilization". Similarly, in a posthumously published note of 1885, he remarks that "men of great creativity, the really great men according to my understanding, will be sought in vain today" because "nothing stands more malignantly in the way of their rise and evolution…than what in Europe today is called simply 'morality'". In these and many other passages, Nietzsche makes plain his fundamental objection to MPS: simply put, that MPS thwarts the development of human excellence, i.e., "the highest power and splendor possible to the type man".

But from this it should be apparent, then, that it is not anti-naturalness itself that is objectionable, but the consequences of an anti-natural MPS that are at issue:

for example, its opposition to the instincts that are "profoundly necessary for growth." This point is even more explicit in *The Antichrist*, where Nietzsche notes that Christian morality "has waged deadly war against this higher type of man; *it has placed all the basic instincts of his type under ban*" (5, emphasis added). In other words, the anti-naturalness of MPS is objectionable because the "natural" instincts MPS opposes are precisely those necessary for the growth of the "higher type of man." Thus, underlying Nietzsche's worries about the anti-naturalness of MPS — just as underlying his worries about the threat MPS poses to life — is a concern for the effect of MPS on "higher men."

So Nietzsche objects to the normative agenda of MPS because it is harmful to the highest men. In Nietzsche's various accounts of what the objectionable agenda of MPS consists, he identifies a variety of normative positions if it contains one or more of the following normative views (this is a representative, but not exhaustive, list):

Pro	**Con**
Happiness	Suffering
Altruism/Selflessness	Self-love or self-interest
Equality	Inequality
Pity/Compassion	Indifference to the suffering

The various possible normative components of MPS should, of course, be understood construed as *ideal-typical*, singling out for emphasis and criticism certain important features of larger and more complex normative views. Let us call that which morality has a "pro" attitude towards is the "Pro-Object," and that

which morality has a "con" attitude towards the "Con-Object." Keeping in mind that what seems to have *intrinsic* value for Nietzsche is human excellence or human greatness (see the next section), Nietzsche's attack on the normative component of MPS can be summarized as having two parts:

(a) With respect to the Pro-Object, Nietzsche argues either (i) that the Pro-Object has no *intrinsic* value (in the cases where MPS claims it does); or (ii) that it does not have any or not nearly as much *extrinsic* value as MPS treats it as having; and

(b) With respect to the Con-Object, Nietzsche argues *only* that the Con-Objects are *extrinsically* valuable for the cultivation of human excellence — and that this is obscured by the "con" attitude endorsed by MPS.

Thus, what unifies Nietzsche's seemingly disparate critical remarks — about altruism, happiness, pity, equality, Kantian respect for persons, utilitarianism, etc. — is that he thinks a culture in which such norms prevail as morality will be a culture which eliminates the conditions for the realization of human excellence — the latter requiring, on Nietzsche's view, concern with the self, suffering, a certain stoic indifference, a sense of hierarchy and difference, and the like. Indeed, when we turn to the details of Nietzsche's criticisms of these norms we find that, in fact, this is precisely what he argues. One detailed example will have to suffice here.

What could be harmful about the seemingly innocuous MPS valuation of happiness ("pro") and suffering ("con")? An early remark of Nietzsche's suggests his answer:

So happiness, according to Nietzsche, is not an intrinsically valuable end, and men who aim for it — directly or through cultivating the dispositions that lead to it — would be "ridiculous and contemptible." To be sure, Nietzsche allows that

he himself and the "free spirits" will be "cheerful" or "gay" [*frölich*] — they are, after all, the proponents of the "gay science." But the point is that such "happiness" is not *criterial* of being a higher person, and thus it is not something that the higher person — in contrast to the adherent of MPS — aims for.

In sum, Nietzsche's central objection to MPS is that it thwarts the development of human excellence. His argument for this, in each case, turns on identifying distinctive valuations of MPS, and showing how — as in the case of norms favoring happiness and devaluing suffering — they undermine the development of individuals who would manifest human excellence.

Nietzsche's Positive Ethical Vision

Any account of Nietzsche's "positive ethics" confronts a threshold worry, namely, that Nietzsche's naturalistic conception of persons and agency — and, in particular, his conception of persons as constituted by non-conscious type-facts that determine their actions — makes it unclear how Nietzsche could have a philosophical ethics in any conventional sense. If, as Nietzsche, says, we face "a brazen wall of fate; we *are* in prison, we can only *dream* ourselves free, not make ourselves free" if "the single human being is a piece of *fatum* from the front and from the rear, one law more, one necessity more for all that is yet to come and to be" if (as he says more hyperbolically in *Nachlass* material) "the voluntary is absolutely lacking…everything has been directed along certain lines from the beginning" if (again hyperbolically) "one will become only that which one is (in spite of all: that means education, instruction, milieu, chance, and accident)" then it is hardly surprising that Nietzsche should also say, "A man as he *ought* to be: that sounds to us as insipid as 'a tree as he ought to be'.

Yet a philosopher reluctant to talk about "man as he *ought* to be" is plainly ill-suited to the task of developing a normative ethics, understood as systematic and theoretical guidance for how to live, whether that guidance comes in the form of rules for behavior or dispositions of character to be cultivated. (There is an additional, and special difficulty, for those who think Nietzsche is a virtue ethicist, namely, that he also thinks genuine virtues are specific to individuals, meaning that there will be nothing *general* for the theorist to say about them [see, e.g., Z I:5].) This means we must approach the question of Nietzsche's "positive" ethics in terms of explicating (1) what it is Nietzsche values, (2) what his criteria of evaluation are, and (3) what evaluative *structure*, if any, is exhibited by the answers to (1) and (2). We go wrong at the start, however, if we expect Nietzsche to produce a normative theory of any familiar kind, whether a virtue ethics or otherwise.

Nietzsche's Metaethics

Nietzsche holds that moral (i.e., MPS) values are not conducive to the flourishing of human excellence, and it is by reference to *this* fact that he proposed to assess their value. The enterprise of assessing the value of certain other values (call them the 'revalued values') naturally invites the metaethical question: what status — metaphysical, epistemological — do the values used to undertake this revaluation (the 'assessing values') enjoy? we may distinguish "Privilege Readings" of Nietzsche's metaethics — which claim that Nietzsche holds that his own evaluative standpoint is either veridical or better justified than its target — from those readings which deny the claim of privilege. (Note that defenders of this latter, "skeptical" view need not read Nietzsche as a global anti-realist — i.e., as

claiming that there are no truths or facts about anything, let alone truths about value — a reading which has now been widely discredited. There is, on the skeptical view at issue here, a *special* problem about the objectivity of value. For an argument that Nietzsche is a global anti-realist about value in particular)

Realist and priveledge

Privilege Readings of Nietzsche come in two main varieties: Realist and Privilege Non-Realist (P-Non-Realist). The proponents of these views would hold the following:

(i) According to the Realist, there are normative facts.

(ii) According to the P-Non-Realist, there are no normative facts, but some normative judgments still enjoy a privilege by virtue of their interpersonal appeal or acceptance.

To say that there *are* 'normative facts' will mean, for purposes here, that norms are (in some sense) *objective*, i.e., mind- or attitude-independent features of the world. Wilcox, Schacht and Katsafanas, among many others, have defended a Realist reading, while Foot has defended a P-Non-Realist reading. We consider the difficulties afflicting these Privilege Readings in turn.

Realist readings assign a special place to power in explaining the objectivity of normative facts. On these views, Nietzsche holds, first, that only power *really* has value and, second, that power is an objective, natural property. Nietzsche's evaluative perspective is privileged, in turn, because it involves assessing (i) prudential value in terms of degree of power, and (ii) non-prudential value in terms of maximization of prudential value.

UNIT V

KARL MARX-POLITICAL THOUGHTS

Marx is certainly the greatest of all political philosophers. No other philosopher has such a influence like that of Karl Marx. Marx himself has written that "Philosophers have only interpreted the world, what matters is to change it." Marx calls his theory as Praxis. Praxis means action based on theory and theory leading to action. It means whatever we do should be based on the proper understanding and on the basis of understanding we should formulate our policies. Marx was concerned with the extreme exploitation of the poor, by the capitalist class. Hence he wanted to end the exploitation and to give a life of dignity to the poor. He was critic of capitalism. He considered capitalism as inhumane. Since Marx is a critic of capitalism, he is a believer in socialism. Thus Marx is a socialist.

Capitalism and socialism

Capitalism denotes private ownership over the means of production. In capitalism the motive of production is profit rather than need. Socialism is a modern philosophy. It emerged as a reaction against capitalism. It is based on the realization of inhumane nature of capitalism. According to the socialists, industrial society can be based on socialistic principles. It is not necessary to base it on capitalist principles.

Marx and his Socialism

Max calls his socialism as scientific. He calls his socialism scientific and socialism before his socialism as utopian. Marx was not the first person to give the socialist ideas. Socialist ideas emerged in French revolution (the ideas of equality and fraternity). During French revolution, there were socialist / left revolutionaries. Like Louis Blanc. Later on there were socialist ideas in other countries of Europe e.g. In Britain Robert Owen, who is also known as 'father of cooperative movements'. French revolutionaries proposed violent method and British socialist proposed peaceful method. They proposed appealing to the conscience of the capitalist. Marx called them as utopians because Marx believed that socialism cannot come by their methods. The revolutionaries were ready for action but lacked the understanding. Similarly those who were trying to bring socialism through peaceful means, lacked both – the understanding as well as action. Hence Marx suggests that they were utopians, Marxism is a science, Marxism is a praxis. Marx does not believe in the concept of conscience. He does not believe in God or idea. Hence there is no point appealing to God or conscience. Hence Marx suggests – "workers of the world unite, you have nothing to loose except your chains." Chains denote religion, nation etc. Aim of Marx's socialism, to establish communism.

Communism

Communism is utopia of Marx, it is Marx's ideal state – Marx's ideal state and Gandhi's ideal state both are stateless societies. Both Gandhi and Marx are

anarchists. Anarchy in literal sense means absence of state. There are two ways in which scholars have described anarchy.

1] Hobbesian View: Anarchy is a painful situation. Life of man will be in chaos. Man cannot live in peace with others, in the absence of the state.
2] Marxist view: Anarchy is the state of perfect happiness, perfect freedom. State is an instrument of exploitation. Man is social by nature, man has enough reason to live in peace with others. How life will be governed in the absence of state? The role of state will be taken up by voluntary associations or self help groups.

Communism is a classless society. It is because private ownership is abolished, property comes under common ownership. Hence there are no class divisions, all belong to one class. Since classes will end, state will become redundant and state will wither away. There is lot of similarity between Marx's communism and Gandhi's Ram Rajya. The only difference is in methods. Gandhian method gives peaceful appeal to the conscience of the capitalist class. Marxist method suggests violent overthrow of capitalism. In the words of Karl Marx "Violence is the mid-wife of change. There has been no birth without blood."

Prominent works of Marx

Communist manifests : (Theory of Revolution)

The following were the main reasons for the communist manifests.

Influences on Marx

1] French revolution. He was influenced by the ideas of equality and fraternity.
2] British school of political economy. It is a discipline where economic policies of

the state are analyzed. Adam Smith is considered as father of political economy. His book "The wealth of Nations" is called as the first text book in political economy. Adam Smith was critic of mercantile capitalism and the exponent of industrial capitalism. Marx held that Adam Smith's policies will not bring wealth to the nation, it will limit wealth to the small section. For addressing the poverty of all, the only way is common ownership over the means of production. 3] German philosophy. Marx and Hegel.
Hegel was the official philosopher of Prussia. Hegel has given very strong defense to the state. Hegel compared state with God. In the words of Hegel, "State is a march of God on earth." God is absolute idea or universal spirit. For Hegel, idea is the ultimate reality. (Hegel is idealist like Plato), God is absolute idea, or ultimate reality, state is reflection of God on this earth. For Marx idea is 'false consciousness'. Idea is not real, matter is real. God has not made man, man has made God. According to Marx, idea is false consciousness, religion is opium of masses. According to Marx, Hegel is standing on his head, he has to stand on his feet to understand what is real.

Prominent statements of Hegel.

"State is a march of God on earth."

God -> Physical World (Mountains, Land, Water) -> Trees -> Birds -> Animals -> Man -> Family -> Civil Society -> State.
According to Hegel, everything in this world is the reflection of God. The maximum amount of God is present in the state. State is nearest to God. Hence we should worship the state. How do we know that God is a creator of this world?

When we look at the things of this world, the question comes to our mind, who is creator? Our reason tells us that God is creator.

“Real is rational. Rational is real.”

Real is rational: In this part we understand Hegel’s concept of reality. Like Plato, Hegel believes that idea is real – real is rational. Thus whatever can be understood by the use of reason is real. If we apply reason we will understand idea is real, God is absolute idea, hence God is absolute reality.

Rational is real: The second part explains his political purpose. What is his political purpose? To justify state. According to him, state is a march of God on earth. How do we understand that state is march of God? When we apply our reason. Why state is equivalent to God? Like God, state takes care of all of us.

Principles of Marxism

Marxism means the political doctrine of Marx which aims at the violent overthrow of Capitalism. Marx described his principles as scientific. Marx used to consider himself as scientist. However Marx followers projected him as God. Marx is known as a ‘God, that has failed.’

Concept of Dialectics.

Dialectics is a concept given by Socrates. Dialectics is a method to understand the truth. Dialectics represent rational dialogue or rational debate. It represents argument, counter argument and synthesis or conclusion. Arguments and counter arguments continue till final synthesis emerges. Dialectics can be represented through the equation. Thesis + antithesis = synthesis.

Hegel's contribution.

Hegel has used the concept of dialectics to show 'the nature of movement of history.' History is a movement of idea.

There are three laws of dialectics

1. Unity of opposites

2. Negation of negation

3. Quantity changes into quality.

1] **Unity of opposites**: In all the things, exists its opposition. Opposition is a force of history.

2] **Negation of Negation**: As per law of history, force negativity gets negated. 3] **Quantity changes into quality**: Changes do not happen overnight, first quantitative changes takes place and it gives rise to qualitative change. It may appear new, but it is not entirely new. New has roots in the old. Once contradiction ends, movement ends, history ends.

According to Hegel, human history ends with the formation of state.

Historical Materialism. (Economic interpretation of History)

Purpose of historical materialism is to explain history, causes of history. Marx wanted to change capitalism and establish communism. He wanted to know, how history changes, which factors play the role. Marx first analyzed Hegel's theory of history. Hegel's theory of history is idealistic interpretation of history. According to Hegel, history is the result of dialectical movement of idea. Marx

suggested that Hegel's theory is not a scientific explanation of history rather political/ ideological/ teleological explanation of history. Marx claims his theory as scientific.

In order to understand history scientifically, we have to understand what was the first historical act of man. He wanted to know weather thinking or action is more important. According to Marx,

"In order to make history, man has to live. In order to live man has to eat. In order to eat, man has to work or perform action."-Karl Marx

Implication of above statement.

Between the manual labor and the intellectual labour, more important is manual labour. Society can live without the work of intellectuals, but society cannot live without the work of manual workers. It is 'false consciousness to think that the role of intellectuals more important than those of workers. He blames thinkers like Plato and Aristotle, who established that those who are men of reason are ought to be master and permanently deprive those who perform manual work. According to Marx, intellectual class is exploiter class. Worker should never listen to intellectuals, Philosophers, church father, they only generate false consciousness. For example, in Indian context, we can compare intellectuals with Brahmins, giving theories justifying the subordination of Sudras and Dalits.

Marx's concept on society.

Origin of Society.

According to Marx, society is the division of labour. People form the society for the task of production. Production is a necessity for survival. Production is a social activity. It cannot be done alone. Thus, the basic structure of society is the economic structure and all relations are 'relations of production.' Economic structure means, structure of production or the material structure. The earliest society is, the society of hunters and gatherers.

Marx's view on structure of the society.

Marx is a structuralist. He has studied the society as a structure. According to him, economic structure is the fundamental structure or basic structure.

Marx's base and superstructure model of society:

Economic structure is the basic structure whatever happens in the society, economy is the factor. State, church, family, edu institutions, media are all superstructure.

Superstructure is a reflection of base. Superstructure is not independent of base. It is grounded in the base. The nature of base will determine the nature of superstructure. e.g. If mode of production is feudal, family system will be joint family. If mode of production is capitalist, there will be nuclear families. Even the ideas or ideologies will be shaped by economic system. When economic system will become capitalist, the ideology of individualism will be promoted. Hence there is no point studying the elements of superstructure. What is needed is

to understand the features of basic structure. Thus there is no point changing the political system without changing the economic system.

Relations of Production.

When man enters into system of production, either he enters as owner of means of production (haves) or non-owners. (have-nots). Haves will have bargaining power over have-nots. One will be the exploiter and the other will be exploited. Man's relations with the mode of production explain his class. There are two classes in the society. Haves and Have-nots. What type of relationship can be there between haves and have-nots? It will be a relationship of exploiter and exploited. Hence it will be a relationship of struggle or class struggle. Hence there will always be, a conflict of interest. The real identity of a person is identity of his class and not of his religion or nation. Hence, the real politics is the politics of class. What is the message? Worker should understand that their real interest is with the members of their class. They should not develop the false consciousness that the other person belongs to his nation or religion. Hence the workers of the world have to come together, they have common interest. (Proletarian internationalist). Thus for Marx, poor Hindu and poor Muslim have common interest rather than poor Muslim and rich Muslim.

Marx on revolution.

Revolution means total change. Revolution means when the mode of production changes. Political revolution is no revolution. From Marxist point of view, there is nothing called revolution in India. It was just a transfer of power from British to India. In India, the basic structure remained intact. It remained feudal. Hence there

is no change in the situation of masses or rural poverty. In China, peasant revolution took place. It was a violent overthrow of feudalism. In China, peasantry established control over land. In China communism has been established in land.

Marx on False Consciousness..

"Religion is opium of the people."-Karl Marx

"Nation or nationalism is an ideology or a false consciousness created by the propertied class to break the solidarity of workers."-Karl Marx

Marxist scholar Benedict Anderson calls nationalism as 'Invented tradition.'

What poor should do?

They should come out of false consciousness and develop true consciousness. False consciousness emerges when we listen to the intellectuals. To develop true consciousness, one has to stand on his feet. One should look at the material conditions of your life. Understand the objective conditions of your life objectively, rather than subjectively e.g. Gandhi used the term Harijana for Dalits. It is a subjective understanding, not the objective understanding. According to Ambedkar, Harijana is a misguiding term. They are actually the depressed classes. Marx has explained consciousness at two levels. 1. Class in itself 2. Class for itself

Class in itself.

Class in itself denotes low level of consciousness. When person understands that he belongs to a particular class or when worker understands that he is from working class and the capitalist is from the other class.

Class for itself.

This is high level of consciousness. True consciousness. When worker understands his exploitation. When worker will understand his exploitation, he will become class for itself. He will take up the arm in his hand. When exploitation reaches to its extreme, class in itself changes in class for itself

"It is not our consciousness that determines our existence, it is our existence that determines our consciousness."

The above statement is from Marx's concept of historical materialism. Marx has criticized Hegel. According to Hegel, idea is real (real is rational). According to Marx, Hegel is standing on his head. It is matter and not idea that is reality. On the basis of the base superstructure model, Marx has shown that economic structure is the basic structure, idea, ideology, religion is a part of superstructure. Superstructure is never independent of base. The class which control the economic structure, also controls the superstructure. The real interest is the interest of the class. Ideology, religion, develop false consciousness. Working classes should understand their class interest, they should go for the objective understanding of their objective conditions. Once they will understand conditions of their condition, they will develop true consciousness. The class in itself will change into the class for itself. Once the true consciousness comes, it will not be possible to exploit them any more.

Marx has been criticized as reductionist – He has reduced the complex phenomenon of history to the single cause i.e. Economic cause. Hence his theory is called as 'economic determinism'. His economic reductionism has not only been

criticized by non-Marxist like Max Weber as well as Neo-Marxist like Althusser. Max Weber criticized Karl Marx for monocausal explanation of history. Max Weber in his book 'Protestant Ethics and Rise of Capitalism.' has shown how superstructure in words of Marx like religion, has given rise to capitalism Even before Althusser, Gramsci found flaws in Marx's theory of History. Marx has ignored the role of cultural and ideological factors shaping history. Althusser has given 'Law of Overdetermination'. Means economic factor is overdetermined in Marx. Althusser has given multi structural approach. Althusser has studied Russian revolution. Russian revolution emerged from political structure and not from economic structure.

Marx as a determinist.

Determinism is called as non-scientific thinking. Determinism represent fundamentalism. Determinism imply that a person believes that his view is scientific, ultimate truth and cannot be questioned. Marx claimed himself to be scientific. He rejected all earlier explanations as false consciousness. For followers of Marx, 'Marx was God'. Since Marx was projected as God, it was believed that all of his predictions are bound to happen. However time has proved that 'Marx was a God that has failed.' Karl Popper in his book 'Open Society and Its Enemies' called Plato, Hegel and Marx as enemies of open society. Karl Popper has criticized Hegel and Marx for committing the guilt of 'Historicism'. It denotes ideological interpretation of history. Or politically motivated explanation of history.

According to Karl Popper, Marx's theory cannot be considered as 'scientific'. It does not fulfill the criteria of falsification : It is a criteria to regard a particular

theory as scientific in social sciences. In social sciences we cannot have theories based on experiments, as happens in natural sciences. In social science, a theory can be regarded as scientific if it is open for 'critical evaluation or examination.' Scientific theories are possible only in open societies because of freedom of speech and expression. It cannot be produced in closed societies.

ANTONIO GRAMSCI'S PHILOSOPHY

Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) has been enormously influential as a Marxist theorist of cultural and political domination in "developed" capitalism. However, his career was that of a radical journalist and revolutionary organizer, not a professional philosopher. Gramsci was a socialist activist, cultural commentator and, later, communist party leader in Italy. Most of his writings are concerned with assessing the immediate political situation and, particularly, the prospects for revolution in interwar Italy. Nonetheless, Gramsci was conversant with philosophical currents of the time—especially Italian neo-idealism, native intellectual and political traditions dating back to Machiavelli, and the major currents of Marxist thought. It was only with his imprisonment by the Fascist authorities that he produced his most well-known and philosophically rich texts: the Prison Notebooks. The insights therein account for much of his posthumous recognition.

1. Life and Political Activity

Sardinia (1891–1911)

Antonio Francesco Gramsci was born on 22 January 1891 in Ales, Sardinia to a middle-class family of Albanian descent. Located in Italy's southern Mezzogiorno, the island of Sardinia shared the region's arid landscape, widespread poverty, and fragile social hierarchies. Gramsci was the fifth of seven children born to Giuseppina and Francesco Gramsci and spent his early childhood near Cagliari, where his family had moved in 1897. In infancy he developed Pott's Disease, a spinal form of tuberculosis that was not properly treated and, as a result,

he grew up with a "hunched" back. He suffered frequent health problems throughout the rest of his life.

His father, a local civil servant, was suspended from his job in 1898 on politically motivated charges of corruption (he had supported an opposition candidate in local elections) and subsequently sentenced to five years in prison. This brought years of terrible hardship for the family, who relocated to the town of Ghilarza. In 1903 the young Antonio—known as "Nino"—even suspended his schooling to support his family by working in a Land Registry office. On his return to education two years later, following his father's release, he progressed well. A reserved character but an avid reader with a strong will, he entered high school in Cagliari, where he lived with his elder brother, Gennaro. Gennaro introduced him to socialist literature, and he began to read Italian critics such as Gaetano Salvemini, Giuseppe Prezzolini, and Benedetto Croce, as well as Karl Marx. Gramsci shared many Sardinians' deep resentment at the shortcomings of the "liberal" state since its unification in the nineteenth century, especially its protectionist policies, which contributed to the South's cultural and economic underdevelopment.

In 1911 Gramsci won a monthly stipend to support his studies at the Carlo Alberto College at the University of Turin in the northern region of Piedmont.

Turin (1911–1922)

Turin contrasted radically with Gramsci's southern upbringing: it was an advanced industrial city, dominated by the FIAT car factories and connected to wider European cultures. For some years, Gramsci endured the precarious

existence of an impoverished student; his education was frequently interrupted by poverty, nervous exhaustion, and ill-health. At university he studied philology, or linguistics, and worked under the guidance of the socio-linguist Professor Matteo Bartoli, who was drawn to Gramsci's native familiarity with Sardinian dialect. Bartoli envisaged Gramsci becoming a linguist. Studying in the Humanities, Gramsci's own ambitions were, originally, to train as a teacher. At university, he contributed to reviews with articles on Futurism.

Gramsci did not formally complete his university studies. He abandoned education in 1915 and became a full-time journalist and socialist activist. Joining the Italian Socialist Party in 1913, he became involved in worker's education. Two years later, he was offered a position as a journalist for the Turin edition of the PSI daily newspaper, Avanti! Already a contributor to the weekly Il Grido del Popolo, he accepted the offer and began writing political commentaries and theatre reviews under a regular column, titled "Sotto la Mole". In 1917, he co-published a single issue socialist cultural review, aimed at young socialists, entitled La Città futura.

The prospect of world war deeply split the Italian public and political parties into "interventionists" and "neutralists". The firebrand revolutionary socialist, Benito Mussolini, came out for intervention against the PSI's official neutrality. Entering the war, he hoped, would initiate a wider collapse of the liberal order and ignite social revolution. Mussolini was eventually forced out of the party. The young Gramsci was also tempted by that stance and declared his preference not for intervention but for an "active neutrality" that took the war as a moment to prepare for radical transformation. For this milder resistance to the party's formal position, he was thereafter treated with some suspicion by fellow socialists.

Inspired by the Russian Revolutions of February and October 1917, Gramsci aligned himself with the "intransigent revolutionary" faction in the PSI, urging it to pursue its "maximalist" program of radical transformation. He became secretary of the executive committee of the Turin socialists and, in the same year, took up the role of editor of Il Grido del Popolo. In December 1917 he published "The Revolution Against Capital" in Avanti!, and used Il Grido to publicize news and commentary on events in Russia, including texts by Lenin and Trotsky. He made various efforts to organize a local proletarian cultural association to galvanize political and economic struggles into a general revolutionary project, although they did not take off.

After the war Gramsci joined with university and socialist friends to found and edit a new review, L'Ordine Nuovo ("The New Order"). Intended, initially, as a journal of "socialist culture" it became a medium to discuss the industrial factory struggles then underway in Turin. In Ordine Nuovo, Gramsci presented a theory of a workers' state inspired by the efforts at self-management by skilled workers. Spurred on by the workers' disputes and factory occupations across the years 1919 and 1920, he published writings by syndicalist thinkers, participated in debates, and set out his own views on the potential for the factories to become the locus of proletarian state institutions.

After the occupations ended in defeat, Gramsci aligned with the communist faction of the PSI, calling for the party to be renewed as a revolutionary organization. In January 1921 in Livorno, the communists formally split from the PSI and established the Communist Party of Italy. Led by the militant, Amadeo Bordiga, the new party required rigid discipline and had firm ideological roots in

Marxist doctrine. Gramsci was elected to its central committee and Ordine Nuovo was transformed into the party's daily paper.

The PCd'I remained too small to have any serious impact on events. Despite substantial success in the 1919 elections, the now divided left were increasingly outwitted by the maneuverings of Mussolini, and his "fascist" movement. Throughout 1921 and 1922, fascist "squads" terrorized trade unions across the north of Italy, burning down their offices and sending armed gangs to violently assault workers and peasants. In October 1922, Mussolini was invited by the King to lead a coalition government, supported by conservative politicians increasingly alarmed at the intensity of social disorder and the prospect of a workers' revolution.

Moscow (1922–1923)

In June 1922 Gramsci was dispatched to Russia as the PCd'I delegate to the Executive Committee of the Communist International (or "Comintern") to participate in its Moscow conference. Exhausted by the recent years of frenetic activity, he soon booked into a sanatorium to recover his health. During that sojourn, he met Julija Schucht who in the next year became his wife and, later, mother to his two sons.

In Moscow, Gramsci was absorbed into the bureaucratic complexities of international communist politics, negotiating with the Comintern over the PCd'I's relations to other left parties. Events in both Russia and Italy compelled Gramsci to reconsider his position on party tactics. In November, the fourth congress of the Comintern agreed that the PCd'I should fuse with the PSI. In truth, there was little

enthusiasm among Italian communists for this option and no real opportunity after Mussolini had taken power. Leading members of each party (including Bordiga) were being persecuted by the regime and detained by the police. From prison, Bordiga circulated a draft manifesto openly rejecting the policy of fusion, but Gramsci—increasingly concerned at Bordiga's open divergence from the Comintern—refused to sign it, arguing later that he had "a different conception of the Party".

Vienna and Rome (1923–1926)

Gramsci relocated to Vienna in late 1923 to open the PCd'I's Foreign Bureau and maintain closer links with events in Italy. There he began to articulate a conception of party tactics that contrasted with Bordiga's sectarian inclinations—under which, Gramsci claimed, "We detach ourselves from the masses" and began organizing a new leading group with his comrades from Turin. Gramsci sought a United Front policy with other radical organizations and parties in Italy to maintain a presence across the country—particularly in the South—rather than simply await a crisis to hand leadership to the party. This view brought him closer to the policy of the Comintern. In Vienna he initiated the publication of a new daily party paper, L'Unità ("Unity"), aimed at an inclusive audience of "workers and peasants".

Gramsci was elected in April 1924 (in his absence) to the Italian Parliament, which granted him immunity from prosecution. He returned to Italy in May and took part in the PCd'I's clandestine conference at Como. There he made clear his tactical differences with Bordiga, although the majority remained aligned to

Bordiga's position. In the summer Gramsci took over the role of party General Secretary. The political situation in Italy continued to intensify following the abduction and murder by fascist thugs of the socialist deputy Giacomo Matteotti and the subsequent withdrawal in protest of opposition parties from Parliament. Initially, public revulsion at the murder threatened to destabilize the regime but the opposition gradually crumbled, and police harassment of anti-fascists continued.

Pre-Prison Journalism and Political Writings

Gramsci's overt "philosophical" references in his writings prior to the Notebooks are sporadic and bound closely to his responses to wider events. He wrote as a committed socialist and revolutionary critic, albeit as an intellectual skeptical of prevailing orthodoxies (influenced, arguably, by his southern upbringing which made him something of an "outsider" to mainstream progressive opinion). Like many Italian commentators, he shared the view that the liberal state's fundamental shortcoming consisted in a failure to build popular and inclusive governing institutions. The task remained, therefore, "to make Italians" (fare gli italiani) as one critic put it, that is, to find a model of association to culturally integrate citizens. This general problem informs Gramsci's pre-prison writings as well as his later account of hegemony .

The period up to Gramsci's arrest was a dramatically evolving context of social and political crisis in Italy and across Europe generally. Gramsci earned local recognition during and after the war as a biting, "serious" radical journalist. He was acerbically critical of Italy's ruling elite and the bourgeoisie's shallow moral sensibilities. For example, in 1918 he denounced the widespread use of

cocaine as “an index of bourgeois progress” and bemoaned the absence, demonstrated by the Italian card game scopone, of a “concept of ‘fair play’” proper to developed capitalist societies. From the early 1920s, by contrast, his audience was primarily party members, and his writing was steeped in the technical language of revolutionary communist analysis.

These themes and influences combined in Gramsci’s criticism of the liberal political class and his promotion of socialism. Three sequential phases of his pre-prison thinking can be distinguished: his early cultural socialism; his post-war theory of the factory-based workers’ state; and his later, developing reflections on communist party strategy.

Cultural Socialism

Gramsci’s early writing was informed by the influential critical framework of the neo-Hegelian philosopher Benedetto Croce. Croce had denounced scientific positivism—prevalent among social scientists and European Marxists—for its abstract, ahistorical reasoning and emphasis on material “causes” in social change. Positivism neglected the historically particular and practically creative dimension of “spirit” (or consciousness) which, beyond any political program, motivated all social and cultural transformation. Croce invited a view of Italy’s political failings as the absence of a robust, unifying culture—a secular civic faith—rather than economic underdevelopment as such (see Croce 1914). He inspired numerous “aesthetic” critics of the liberal state to understand socio-political improvement as inseparable from free artistic self-creation, the assertion of moral will, and the cultivation of a shared “inner” sensibility.

Gramsci admitted later to having been "tendentially somewhat Crocean" in his early writing. For example, he endorsed the acquisition by workers of a "faith" based on intellectual self-discipline and independence of thought, severely castigating any tendency to passive "indifference". Echoing Sorel, whose writings Croce had championed, he presented socialism not as the outcome of historical "laws" but as "an integral vision of life", the adoption of an invigorating, moral consciousness to supplant the failed bourgeois order. In 1917 he welcomed the Russian Revolution as the "revolution against Capital", viewing it not as proof of Marx's economic theories but as evidence of the practical force of a collective will. Later, in 1918, Gramsci offered his own idealist version of Marx, imagined as "a master of moral and spiritual life" teaching the proletariat to become consciously aware of "its power and mission" in history.

This somewhat ascetic, pedagogic humanism distinguished the young Gramsci from other socialists who appealed to historical progress or invested in the slow, practical advance of trade unionism and application of scientific reason. Gramsci regarded such appeals as rooted in an elitist attitude aimed at bringing reform to the masses from on-high. Instead, he endorsed a grass-roots self-organization that underscored the integrity and moral autonomy of a uniquely proletarian worldview. This placed him closer to other radical critics of the PSI, such as anarchists and syndicalists who also looked to a libertarian politics "from below".

ippuiireippuThe Factory State

The first original initiative for which Gramsci became known was his theory of factory-based democracy, which he promoted during the so-called biennio rosso—or "two red years"—of 1919–1920.

Inspired by the industrial unrest and factory occupations in Turin and beyond, as well as by the new "soviets" in Russia, Gramsci published in Ordine Nuovo various opinions and resources on the topic of a nascent workers' state. His contributions took his earlier humanism in a more concrete, practical direction. Efforts by workers to wrest the management of production from industrialists—in part via "factory councils", formerly grievance committees—instantiated, for him, an initiative rooted in actual history, where a new moral community was "spontaneously" expressing its own independent identity beyond the limits of trade unionism. Focused on the practical planning and control of material production, he claimed, the occupying workers were not responding passively to abstract historical laws or to the directions of their leaders but, rather, acting as agents of their own self-creation.

Gramsci sketched a model of industrial democracy in which a new type of state, based inside the factories, would replace the discredited parliamentary regime. Free trade capitalism was exhausted, and trade union organization had now reached its limit, he argued. Emerging organically inside the factories were

institutions which will replace the person of the capitalist in his administrative functions and his industrial power, and so achieve the autonomy of the producer in the factory.

Rather than administer over isolated citizens by separating public authority from everyday life—as under liberalism—the factory instantiated a new type of polity formed around the collective material needs of production. Gramsci envisaged a participatory system of factory councils functioning in a hierarchical democratic system through which workers would relay and manage the practical needs of national life. Authority would be reconciled to liberty, not opposed to it, as under liberalism. The atomistic individual would give way to the "producer", an individual already psychologically and organizationally oriented to the collective through its role in the labor process.

Gramsci envisaged a system in which a communal identity had priority over individual initiative. His was an "organic" model of state in which all parts related to the primary needs of the whole. This was a potentially illiberal system that assumed substantive moral agreement among workers (see Sbarberi 1986). Some see here the influence of the neo-idealist (and soon fascist) philosopher, Giovanni Gentile. His radical philosophy of "actualism"—in which the subject's inner conscience creates its own unified world and community—supported the idea of the "ethical state" (stato etico) in which public authority and individual freedom, coercion and consent, were essentially indistinguishable. Such anti-liberal sentiments were common in the wake of the war and chimed with widespread public disenchantment with elite-led parliamentary politics.

Communist Party Strategy

By the end of the occupations in 1920, Gramsci had already begun to shift away from advocating workers' self-liberation. For him, the complete absence of

political leadership from the PSI had undermined the occupations' revolutionary potential. With the formation of the PCd'I, he committed to a hierarchical, centralized leadership and strict ideological discipline via a Bolshevik model of the revolutionary party. This new position was, arguably, less a wholesale volte face than a realization that the PSI was culturally and organizationally incapable of responding to the situation. Indeed, his understanding of the party's role continued to evolve thereafter. Nonetheless, his thinking from here onwards remained within a "Leninist" frame of reference concerning revolutionary leadership, tactics, and organization.

What is notable about Gramsci's writings on party strategy in the period 1921–26 is not that they offer a coherent or novel political theory but, rather, that they show he was developing an independent position that echoed fragments of his earlier thinking. This involved: the rejection of "formalistic" reasoning that neglected specific historical conditions; attention to the Italian social structure and the distinctive, cultural-political role of "intellectuals"; and the necessity of a mass-based party that incorporated the southern peasantry. These topics were central points of reference in Gramsci's mature thinking about hegemony in the Notebooks.

For Gramsci, the critique of formalism underscored his growing concern that the new party wasn't reading the "objective situation" but, rather, imposing a rigid view "deduced" from abstract principle. The surprising success of fascism in mobilizing part of the populace against the proletariat revealed just how intellectually and politically unprepared communists had been. Gramsci now began to underline the view that the received model of revolution—a violent seizure of

power in the midst of a catastrophic crisis—needed to be adapted to conditions that had not applied in Russia. As he noted in September 1926:

in the advanced capitalist countries, the ruling class possesses political and organizational reserves which it did not possess, for instance, in Russia.

Economic crises did not lead automatically to political instability because forces could be found to support the regime. In peripheral states like Italy's, he observed, "a broad stratum of intermediary classes"—middle classes of various kinds—influenced the proletariat and the peasantry, steering them away from revolution.

In his notes on the "Southern Question", written just prior to his arrest, Gramsci also explored the neglected problem of Italy's South, which he described as "a great social disintegration". He noted the influence of southern intellectuals, such as Benedetto Croce and Giustino Fortunato, in ideologically legitimating the liberal regime. Croce, especially, had performed a "national function" by endorsing liberalism, helping to prevent radical southern intellectuals from joining with peasants in opposition to the conservative agrarian bloc. Although he believed it unlikely in the short term, Gramsci argued the PCd'I needed to develop its own supporting intellectuals if it was to undertake an inclusive national strategy to overcome the agrarian bloc.

Even within the constrained horizons of communist politics, then, Gramsci was beginning to pose the question of revolution on a different plane than others in the movement. The unplanned interruption brought by his arrest and imprisonment permitted him to explore many of these issues in much greater depth.

Prison Writings

Gramsci's Prison Notebooks comprise around three thousand pages of thematically organized essays, observations and comments, written between 1929 and 1935. A number of his notes were revised over time, which indicates they were not written randomly but conformed, in part, to a plan. Recent research offers some clue as to the logic and chronology of their drafting. Nonetheless, the Notebooks were not written for publication and, as a whole, they remain fragmentary with no explicit guide as to how, or in even what order, the contents might be read.

In his earliest letters from detention, Gramsci indicated various themes that he hoped to explore, including Italian intellectuals, comparative linguistics, the plays of Pirandello, newspapers and other forms of "popular literature". Later he listed more topics—including historiography, the development of the Italian bourgeoisie, the southern question, common sense, and folklore.

These cultural and historical headings may appear uncontroversial. But they permitted Gramsci to develop his wider thoughts on the practical and intellectual problems that had preoccupied him prior to his arrest. That included: historical features of the Italian state; theoretical concepts for analyzing the cultural and political conditions of class domination; and the organizing principles and character of a revolutionary strategy. Freed from the immediate constraints of tactical decisions and their repercussions, Gramsci drew on his humanistic training to extend and deepen his understanding of these problems.

Hegemony

The concept often regarded as the locus of innovation in the Notebooks—and hence their philosophical linchpin—is "hegemony" (egemonia), signifying both leadership and domination.

Hegemony had been a common term in debates among Russian Marxists and usually described the leading (or "hegemonic") role of the working class over its allies in a political coalition. But it had also been employed by Italian political thinkers in the nineteenth century to imagine gradually building consent across the nation for the new state—"making Italians"—rather than relying exclusively on the exercise of force. Gramsci fused these meanings to present hegemony as the general hypothesis that a social class aims to achieve consensual domination for its rule by progressively expanding its leadership across society.

This idea—with its potential for variation in empirical focus and application—was developed across different notes and topics, sometimes as a methodological device to analyze historical situations, at other times alongside different concepts to make strategic observations. But it also functioned more broadly as a philosophical horizon highlighting the inseparability of thought and action, signaling that all intellectual enquiries were unavoidably implicated in the formation of an integral "way of life". Focusing on hegemony permits us to appreciate the Notebooks as a unified intellectual project, despite their disparate themes and contrasting accents.

The major themes of Gramsci's ideas concerning hegemony are explored below, starting with his "sociological" observations on the state, intellectuals, and

ideology and then looking at his theoretical reconstruction of Marxist philosophy and his observations concerning the revolutionary party.

State and Civil Society

Gramsci's discussion of hegemony hinged, in part, on the empirical observation that capitalist rule in developed western states, increasingly, is founded on the generation of consent across civil society, not solely on the deployment of coercion via the army, police or law courts.

Expanding on his suggestion from 1926 that the ruling class had available to it "political and organizational reserves", Gramsci now argued that modern states since the mid-nineteenth century have tended to cultivate consensual support—or hegemony—across civil society such that coercion, or its threat, was no longer the primary form of rule, except in "moments of crisis of command and direction when spontaneous consent has failed".

Gramsci drew on a distinction, common in Italian political thought, between "force" and "consent". Hegemony referred to consent, although this was understood usually to be balanced with force. Modern states aimed to absorb threats to their power by winning over potentially hostile social groups and classes, compromising the immediate interests of the dominant class to maintain general support. Such efforts may often be fragile or limited, but that basic condition fundamentally altered the terrain of political contest. States could not be reduced to mere administrative units of executive authority—that is, to a separate "political society"—but were intertwined with a "sturdy structure of civil society"—schools, churches, "private associations", newspapers, intellectuals and so on. Unlike in

Russia—where state power was strong and civil society weak—modern states utilize the "trenches" of civil society by exercising "civil hegemony". This protected them from the threats to their rule caused by economic crises or civil disruption.

The state, then, was a complex structure combining both force and consent: it was both the instrument by which a ruling class maintained its dominance over society and the medium through which it undertook a "civilising activity", functioning as an "ethical state" or "educator" by promoting "a certain way of life" for its citizens. At one point Gramsci formulated this as "State = political society + civil society", or what he also called an "integral" conception of the state.

Gramsci's remarks elaborated his earlier rejection of an exclusively insurrectionary model of revolution. In the Notebooks he was further suggesting that hegemony described a general condition applicable to both bourgeois and proletarian forms of rule. Revolutionary transformation—for any class—cannot be focused exclusively on the seizure of coercive and bureaucratic power but must engage the state's wider system of defenses. He referred to this in the military terms that had become commonplace after the First World War as a switch from a "war of manoeuvre"—a direct and violent assault on the forces of the state—to a "war of position"—the gradual winning of tactical strongholds. A revolutionary project, he suggested, must first build consent across civil society before taking formal power. That did not mean that coercion would never be necessary, only that its status was diminished in modern states.

Understanding variations in the exercise of hegemony required a political analysis attuned to the "equilibrium" of force and consent at any conjuncture. In place of the common Marxist division of economic "structure" and "superstructure", Gramsci proposed the concept of a "historical bloc". This was a composite of distinct class and social forces joined politically and culturally under a specific form of hegemony. Additionally, it was possible to gauge the extent to which a class had sacrificed its "economic corporate" interests in expanding its leadership across civil society. Empirical analysis of hegemony would assess the "relations of forces" that combined structures and superstructures in a historical situation.

Gramsci explored various historical examples and concepts of political rule in the Notebooks. In extensive notes on the Italian Risorgimento (the period of state building in the nineteenth century) he highlighted the failure of the northern bourgeoisie to develop an extensive hegemonic leadership by incorporating "subaltern" social classes in the South. He borrowed the concept of "passive revolution" to describe this situation in which a change in economic structure occurs but without a radical political transformation; this was a concept he also suggested could describe Fascism.

The Theory of Intellectuals

Intellectuals formed a major theme of the Notebooks and developed Gramsci's brief observations on the topic prior to his arrest. Intellectuals, he noted, are the dominant group's "deputies" exercising the subaltern functions of social

hegemony and political government. As such, they were key agents in the state's connection to civil society.

To understand their role in organizing consent, he argued, it was necessary to expand the concept of intellectual. Rather than refer to academics or artists, who work explicitly with ideas, the category comprised all those whose social function was to communicate with, and educate, non-specialists. Those undertaking the function of intellectuals included industrial technicians, managers, entrepreneurs, bureaucrats, and scientists. Gramsci distinguished between "organic" and "traditional" types: organic intellectuals emerged from a specific social class and functioned to elaborate that class's productive activity as a set of general principles; traditional intellectuals, such as philosophers or the clergy, were remnants of a former historical stage who retained social prestige but no longer directly served a productive class. Intellectuals were therefore rooted in material relations of production but undertook the "critical elaboration" of that activity into a "new and integral conception of the world".

The construction of hegemony, Gramsci underlined, would require both the elaboration of new organic intellectuals and the assimilation of traditional intellectuals. He noted that his work with Ordine Nuovo in Turin had already involved developing new forms of "intellectualism" among skilled workers who constituted, in his view, the organic intellectuals of a future communist society. In his notes on "Americanism and Fordism", he explored this theme in modern rationalized and mechanized production systems, still with little optimism that proletarian organic intellectuals were ready to promote a new worldview. Notably, Gramsci devoted considerable attention to an assessment of Croce, a traditional

intellectual with an unparalleled “role in Italian life”, comparable “with that of the Pope in the Catholic world”.

Ideology and Common Sense

Gramsci’s attention to intellectuals connected to his reflections on popular consciousness and its practical organization in, for example, religion, education, language, and folklore. Popular attitudes, he underlined—drawing on his linguistic training—should not be dismissed but, rather, understood as part of how ordinary people lived and experienced their world. They were also the medium through which hegemony was exercised.

The tendency among Marxists to diminish “ideology and politics”, reducing them to an immediate expression of an economic structure, was dismissed by Gramsci as “primitive infantilism”. Instead, ideology should be grasped as a conception of the world that “serves to cement and unify” human practice. It had a lived “psychological” validity that enabled people to become conscious of their practical situations, however inadequately. It was therefore important to explore and understand that practical function. Gramsci did this in his remarks on “common sense”.

Common sense—popular attitudes and beliefs, frequently accepted as “eternal” truths by ordinary people—denoted, for Gramsci, a largely uncritical and “fragmentary” mode of consciousness . Consisting of superstitions and forms of “folklore” concerning the nature of reality and ethical conduct, common sense was a “philosophy of the popular masses”, often born from religion, that differentiated “simple” folk from educated intellectuals. Its danger was that it tended to invite

resignation and passivity rather than collective action. That was a problem for what Gramsci referred to as "subaltern" groups—marginalized and subordinate classes such as the peasantry and the proletariat—who, despite periodic rebellions, never adequately challenge dominant classes. Yet, common sense thinking often had a "healthy nucleus" in "good sense", that is, in the practical and realistic attitudes that could be made "more coherent and unitary" if joined to a systematic and critical conception of the world. It was necessary not to dismiss common sense thinking (nor the struggles of subaltern groups) but to critically engage the "contradictory consciousness" of ordinary people—that is, the tendency to hold beliefs contradicted by actual conduct—and educate it.

Gramsci understood that educative task to belong to intellectuals—not merely to advance a superior and abstract philosophy but to work on common sense, thereby "renovating and making 'critical' an already existing activity". A hegemonic worldview had to connect to the "simple" to become embedded in everyday life. The past success of traditional intellectuals in this regard explained the ongoing influence of the Catholic Church in Italy.

The Philosophy of Praxis

The Notebooks present an extensive critique of what Gramsci saw as the prevailing orthodoxy in Marxist philosophy. Exemplary here was the analysis by the Russian philosopher and economist, Nikolai Bukharin, in his Theory of Historical Materialism: A Popular Manual of Marxist Sociology (published in 1921), a text Gramsci had utilized in party schools. Gramsci now rejected Bukharin's treatment of Marxism as a deterministic science of society and used his

text as a foil to present an alternative account of historical materialism that he labelled the "philosophy of praxis", following the late nineteenth century Hegelian Marxist philosopher, Antonio Labriola. Gramsci probably used Labriola's term to evade the prison censor but, undoubtedly, it captured the primacy he gave to practical, political questions in his approach to theorizing. He saw Marxism as a philosophy aimed at critically engaging popular common sense, laying the basis for a new hegemony.

The Popular Manual, as Gramsci referred to it, demonstrated the worst of what he called "vulgar materialism". It reduced Marxism to a search for the causal laws of social evolution and accepted, without reflection, the positive sciences as the sole model of knowledge. It took up a speculative "method" positioned outside of history to observe supposedly "objective" mechanical regularities and to make predictions about their development. This view was mistaken for various reasons: instead of treating Marxism as an original philosophy, it subordinated it to the natural sciences; it failed to grasp the "dialectic" in Marxism, which underscored the critical struggle against established thought; and it separated thought from action, "science and life", and therefore divided intellectuals with knowledge from the experiences of "the great popular masses".

Gramsci was not suggesting that truth was only a matter of shared agreement. The philosophy of praxis still aligned to the foundational Marxist principle that social consciousness "corresponds" to material relations of production, knowledge of which was necessary for any practical effort. Marxism therefore required "the critique of ideologies" which "tend to hide reality" and, in this, it sought to bring thought and action into rational correspondence. But the

philosophy of praxis could achieve that only if it were grasped as a form of politics, not an abstract science.

These comments are consistent with Gramsci's general line of argument in the Notebooks on the strategic importance of building consent prior to revolution. They indicate that such a strategy was not a momentary, tactical initiative. It aligned with his aspiration for a cultural transformation over the longer term. His focus on the subjective, "superstructural" element of class politics certainly put Gramsci at odds with more objectivist accounts of Marxism, but it was far from an aversion to the reality of "structural" and empirical constraints. Whatever its shortcomings as a generalizable Marxist theory, Gramsci's philosophy of praxis was in keeping with his attempt to conceive revolutionary politics as the preparation of a "total, integral civilisation".

The Modern Prince

Gramsci still considered the agent of a revolution to be, by necessity, a centralized and ideologically disciplined party. But now he presented the party as the vehicle of a "total and integral conception of the world" that, in advance of the revolution itself, would organize across civil society.

The character of the revolutionary party, for Gramsci, could be grasped by reference to Niccolò Machiavelli's treatise on political leadership, The Prince. The figure of the prince combined in one person both tactical calculation and an ambition to lead the people in building a state. That image of leadership, Gramsci continued, was later exemplified in Georges Sorel's notion of "myth", that is, a motivating ideal or "concrete phantasy which acts on a dispersed and shattered

people to arouse and organise its collective will". Elaborating and diffusing "conceptions of the world" was what modern political parties were designed to do. Gramsci's reflections on communist party strategy were therefore formulated as a treatise on what he conceived as "The Modern Prince".

Drawing from the experience of the French Revolution, a modern Prince (or revolutionary party) must present itself as the type of "Jacobin force" which then had "awakened and organised the national-popular collective will, and founded the modern States". Its strategy could not be oriented exclusively to the moment of revolutionary rupture but, moreover, "to the question of intellectual and moral reform, that is to the question of religion or world-view". The party's aim was to realize "a superior, total form of modern civilisation" rooted in economic relations. Yet the "national-popular" dimension required it to do this by transcending the corporate interests of one class alone, presenting its goals on a "universal plane": "thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental group over a series of subordinate groups". The party would lead by making itself the repository of popular common sense, gathering the support of allied intellectuals, and developing its own distinct worldview built on the philosophy of praxis. Gramsci's conception of the party's role, therefore, went beyond a temporary or mechanical alliance of separate classes; it meant mobilizing a wholly new and inclusive vision of modern society.

The modern Prince was to be organized in such a way as to maintain contact with workers, but also to ensure disciplined leadership. It would be a party of "ordinary, average men", with a leadership "endowed with great cohesive, centralising and disciplinary powers", and an "intermediate element" to keep the two in mutual contact. The party would thus be a mass-based organization under

firm direction. To ensure "organic" discipline, Gramsci endorsed the principle of "democratic centralism" whereby decisions would be open to discussion by rank-and-file members. But, once taken, those decisions would be unquestioningly obeyed. That way "bureaucratic" rigidity would be avoided and there would be a continual adaptation of the organisation to the real movement; a matching of thrusts from below with orders from above.

This hybrid of classically "Leninist" and mass-based models of the party reflected Gramsci's concern to steer a course between sectarian closure and reformist, representational politics. Gramsci was not optimistic that ordinary members could participate effectively without strong direction from a disciplined cadre, however much he thought revolution would eventually overcome the separation of leaders and led. Hegemonic strategy inevitably meant creating a new leading elite whose superior philosophy would "in the masses as such, […] only be experienced as a faith". Although some see in Gramsci's politics the basis of a radically democratic politics (Sassoon 1987), his was not a particularly liberal conception.

Reception of the Prison Writings

Gramsci's prison writings were first published in Italy after the Second World War: his letters from prison in 1947, winning the Viareggio literary prize that year; and his Notebooks in six, thematic volumes of selections between 1948 and 1951. A complete, "critical" edition of the Notebooks (in four volumes) was published in 1975.

The distance in time since their drafting, and the fragmented nature of the texts themselves, meant that the prison writings did not directly address the new environment into which they emerged. The meaning and implications of his thinking were therefore heavily mediated by national and geopolitical concerns through which, inevitably, the Notebooks were read. Over time—as his writings became available and scholarship on his thought improved—recognition of his distinctiveness as a thinker has grown around the world. Gramsci's account of hegemony, especially, has been a highly effective resource for cultural and political analysis.

Where precisely did Gramsci's philosophical innovations lie for his later readers? Over the years, different, interpretations of Gramsci have tended to emphasize competing aspects of his thought as its philosophical "core".

The initial reception of Gramsci's writings was shaped by the Italian Communist Party (Partito comunista italiano, or PCI), particularly by its leader since the mid-1920s, Palmiro Togliatti, who emphasized their significance for a renewed communist strategy. To demonstrate allegiance to Stalin and the USSR, Togliatti presented an "acceptable" version of Gramsci that suited the PCI's cautious post-war politics. Selective editing of the Notebooks downplayed overt conflict with Stalin, emphasizing Gramsci's continuity with the Soviet philosophical orthodoxy of "dialectical materialism" and a Leninist model of revolution. However, following Stalin's death in 1953 Togliatti underscored Gramsci's unique formulation of Marxism and his continuity with native Italian currents of philosophy. This endorsed Togliatti's own view of the PCI as a pragmatic, mass-based party pursuing its own "Italian road to socialism"; operating

as a “collective intellectual” to mobilize the proletariat and its allies in a uniquely national and democratic project.

I

POLITICAL THOUGHT OF RICHARD RORTY (1931—2007)

Richard Rorty was an important American philosopher of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century who blended expertise in philosophy and comparative literature into a perspective called "The New Pragmatism" or "neopragmatism." Rejecting the Platonist tradition at an early age, Rorty was initially attracted to analytic philosophy. As his views matured he came to believe that this tradition suffered in its own way from representationalism, the fatal flaw he associated with Platonism. Influenced by the writings of Darwin, Gadamer, Hegel and Heidegger, he turned towards Pragmatism.

Rorty's thinking as a historicist and anti-essentialist found its fullest expression in 1979 in his most noted book, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Abandoning all claims to a privileged mental power that allows direct access to things-in-themselves, he offered an alternative narrative which adapts Darwinian evolutionary principles to the philosophy of language. The result was an attempt to establish a thoroughly naturalistic approach to issues of science and objectivity, to the mind-body problem, and to concerns about the nature of truth and meaning. In Rorty's view, language is to be employed as an adaptive tool used to cope with the natural and social environments to achieve a desired, pragmatic end.

Motivating his entire program is Rorty's challenge to the notion of a mind-independent, language-independent reality that scientists, philosophers, and theologians appeal to when professing their understanding of the truth. This greatly influences his political views. Borrowing from Dewey's writings on democracy, especially where he promotes philosophy as the art of the politically useful leading to policies that are best, Rorty ties theoretical inventiveness to pragmatic hope. In

place of traditional concerns about whether what one believes is well-grounded, Rorty, in *Philosophy and Social Hope* (1999), advises that it is better to focus on whether one has been imaginative enough to develop interesting alternatives to one's present beliefs. His assumption is that in a foundationless world, creative, secular humanism must replace the quest for an external authority (God, Nature, Method, and so forth) to provide hope for a better future. He characterizes that future as being free from dogmatically authoritarian assertions about truth and goodness. Thus, Rorty sees his New Pragmatism as the legitimate next step in completing the Enlightenment project of demystifying human life, by ridding humanity of the constricting "ontotheological" metaphors of past traditions, and thereby replacing the power relations of control and subjugation inherent in these metaphors with descriptions of relations based on tolerance and freedom.

Life of Richard Mckay Rorty

Richard McKay Rorty was born on October 4, 1931 in New York City. He held teaching positions at Yale University from 1954 to 1956, Wellesley College from 1958 to 1961, Princeton University from 1961 to 1982, and the University of Virginia since 1982. In addition he has held many visiting positions.

As he relates in his autobiographical piece, "Trotsky and the Wild Orchids," Rorty's early and informal education began with the books in his parents' library, particularly Leon Trotsky's two books *History of the Russian Revolution* and *Literature and Revolution* as well as two volumes on the *Dewey Commission of Inquiry into the Moscow Trials*. These materials, along with his family's association with noted socialists such as John Frank and Carlo Tresca, introduced Rorty to the plight of oppressed peoples and the fight for social justice.

At the age of fifteen in 1946, Rorty entered the University of Chicago where he eventually earned B.A. and M.A. degrees. After initially embracing Platonism and its replacement of passion by reason as a method to harmonize reality with the ideals of justice, a reluctant Rorty came to hold that this rapprochement was impossible. Opting rather for the rigors of the study of the philosophy of mind and analytic philosophy, Rorty left Chicago for Yale University, where he received his Ph.D. degree in 1956. He developed the theory of eliminativism materialism in "Mind-body Identity, Privacy and Categories" (1965), *The Linguistic Turn* (1967) and "In Defense of Eliminative Materialism" (1970). Here he clarifies and adjusts his commitment to the analytic tradition, a commitment that began with his Ph.D. dissertation "The Concept of Potentiality." He eventually was to become disenchanted with analytic philosophy.

After reading Hegel's *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, Rorty began to appreciate the degree to which the incessant conflict of philosophers and their competing first principles might, with the cunning of reason, be transformed from a seemingly interminable debate into a conversation that weaves itself into a "conceptual fabric of a freer, better, more just society." This appreciation matured with Rorty's study of Heidegger's works.

During his tenure at Princeton University, Rorty was reintroduced to the works of John Dewey that he had set aside for his studies on Plato. It was this reacquaintance with Dewey, along with an acquaintance with the writings of Wilfrid Sellars and W. V. Quine that caused Rorty to redirect his interest to the study and development of the American philosophy of Pragmatism.

The publication of his first book, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* in 1979, the same year he became President of the American Philosophical Association, publicly marked Rorty's thorough break with Platonic essentialism as well as with Cartesian foundationalism. He attacked assumptions at the core of modern epistemology—the conceptions of mind, of knowledge and of the discipline of philosophy.

Calling himself "raucously secularist," Rorty rejected contemporary attempts at holding justice and reality in a single vision, declaring this to be a remnant of what Heidegger called the ontotheological tradition whose metaphors had frozen into dogmatic truisms about truth and goodness. In *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity* (1989), Rorty extended this claim by abandoning all pretenses to an analytic style. Opting for a Proust-inspired narrative approach where arguments for universal rights, common humanity, and justice are replaced with references to pain and humiliation as motivation for society to form *solidarities* (contingent groupings of like-minded individuals) in opposition to suffering, Rorty substituted hope for knowledge as the main thrust of his efforts. Tolerant conversations rather than philosophical debates and idiosyncratic re-creation rather than self-discovery have been hallmarks of his pragmatic pursuit for social hope, the pursuit of which can be characterized as a historicist quest for human happiness that abandons a search for universal truth and timeless goodness in favor of what works. Rorty's pragmatic aim was and continues to be the development of a liberal society where there is freedom from pain and humiliation and where open-mindedness is practiced.

More recently, Rorty developed his notion of the uses of philosophy by using as his template a reading of Darwinian evolution applied to Deweyan

democratic principles. This development appears most notably in *Achieving Our Country* (1998), *Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers III* (1998) and in *Philosophy and Social Hope* (1999). Rorty died on June 8, 2007.

Thoughts and Work

The failure of Rorty's youthful attempt to synthesize into one vision his identification with the downtrodden together with his search for the "Truth beyond hypothesis" was the making of his career in philosophy. As early as 1967, Rorty had moved away from an initial interest in linguistic philosophy as a way of finding a neutral standpoint from which to establish a strict science of language, and he began his shift to pragmatism. With the publication of *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1979), Rorty further elucidated his maturing anti-essentialist, historicist positions as applied to topics such as the philosophy of science and the mind-body problem, as well as the philosophy of language as it pertained to issues of truth and meaning. With *Consequences of Pragmatism* (1982), Rorty developed in greater detail the themes covered in his 1979 work.

With *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity* (1989), Rorty first implicitly linked his rejection of philosophical appeals to ahistorical universals with that of his pragmatist narrative, a narrative of free, idiosyncratic individuals who, inspired by intuitions and sensibilities captured in great works of literature, commit themselves to contingent solidarities devoted to social and political liberalism. Furthermore, these individuals, detached from the need to justify their world-view by an appeal to the way the world is, would see moral obligation as a matter of social conditioning by cultural forces, which are in turn structured by the prevalent human needs and desires of a specific era.

Pragmatist of views on polities

In Part III of *Objectivity, Relativism and Truth* (1991), Rorty continued to develop his pragmatist views on politics in a democratic society. In Parts I and II he set his sights on contemporary ideas about objectivity, using the writings of Donald Davidson and others for support in debunking the claim that the human mind is capable of discovering ahistorical truth concerning the nature and meaning of reality from a "God's-eye," ideal perspective. Supporting the entire work is Rorty's challenge to the notion of a mind-independent, language-independent reality to which scientists, philosophers, and politicians appeal when professing that they have a corner on the truth. His *Essays on Heidegger and Others* (1991) is devoted to harmonizing the works of Heidegger and Derrida with the writings of Dewey and Davidson, particularly in their anti-representational insights and stances on contingent historicism.

Later writings, such as *Truth and Progress* (1998); A*chieving our Country*: *Leftist Thoughts in Twentieth-Century America* (1998); and *Philosophy and Social Hope* (1999), clarify his anti-essentialist stance by integrating a neo-Darwinian perspective into a Dewey-inspired pragmatism.

Major Influences

Although the writing of any philosopher will have countless influences, there are generally only a handful which stand out as major inspirations. Rorty is no exception. While Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Derrida, James, Quine, and Kuhn contribute much to his worldview, of central importance to Rorty's narrative of New Pragmatism are five influential thinkers: G. W. F. Hegel, Charles Darwin, Martin Heidegger, John Dewey, and Donald Davidson, each contributing a

significant layer to Rorty's complex take on questions central to contemporary philosophy.

Hegel's Historicism as Protopragmatism

It was G. W. F. Hegel's willingness in his *Phenomenology of the Spirit* (1977) to abandon certainty and eternity as philosophical and moral goals/ideals that inspired Rorty to appreciate the irreducible temporality of everything as well as to understand philosophy as a contingent narrative readable without a moral precept existing behind the storyline. Calling Hegel's switch from the metaphor of individual salvation through contact with a transcendental reality to salvation through the achievement of the completion of an historical process "protopragmatism," Rorty asserts that this move was a critical step forward in human thinking, taking us from the notion of how things were meant to be to a perspective on how things never were but might be. The change of focus from epistemological stasis, the adequate discernment of God's Will or Nature's Way, to interpretive processes opened the way for subsequent intellectuals to envision their task as that of constructing a better future rather than the discovery and conforming to a static idea of the Good Life. The refocused purpose of philosophy, from Rorty's perspective, would be best captured by Hegel's phrase "time held in thought," that is, a narrative of a community's progress across time that can be described in terms of *its* current and parochial needs; societal growth not measured against some non-human, eternal standard. Thus, Rorty contends, Hegel helped us to begin to substitute pragmatic hope for apodictic knowledge.

Of course, Hegel saw his own philosophical efforts as elucidating the progression by which the rational becomes real. That is, he conceived history as

the process of the Absolute becoming increasingly self-manifest (the Incarnate Logos) through the development toward, and concrete realization in, the human consciousness. This Rorty rejects as a form of pantheistic fantasy that attempts to maintain a "closeness of fit" between word and world by rendering humanity as the mere manifestation of the Divine Mind, and one that is not consistent, ironically, with Hegel's own anti-representational doctrine of historicism. To address this inconsistency and for a corrective to Hegel's Absolute Idealism, Rorty turns to Charles Darwin.

Darwin's Evolution

In 1998 Rorty contended that Darwin has demonstrated how to naturalize Hegel by the former's dispensing with claims that the real is rational while allowing for a narrative of change understood as an endless series of progressive unfolding. Purpose that transcends a given organism is eliminated in favor of a particular organism's fitness for the local environment. It is an evolutionary process, one that fully involves human beings; we are no exception. What we, as creatures of the earth, do and are, Rorty maintains, "is continuous with what amoebas, spiders, and squirrels do and are." Consciousness and thought are not distinct kinds; they are inextricably linked to the use of language. Language is the practice of using long and complex strings of noises and marks to successfully adapt to one's environment. If language is at all a break in the continuity between other species and humans, it is only insofar as it is a tool that humans have at their disposal, which amoebas, squirrels, and the like do not. Nevertheless, just as other species have developed the tools of night-hunting, migration and hibernation to adapt to environmental change, we have used language as a tool for our survival.

Thus, for Rorty, language is not a mysterious add-on over and above human creaturehood, but part of our "animality," as he puts it. As a conveyer of meaning, language should be understood as the use of sentences to achieve a practical goal through a cooperative effort. It is "the ability to have and ascribe sentential attitudes" that contributes to our species' successful survival in a world of dynamic possibilities. In this way, borrowing from Darwin, Rorty naturalizes language.

Darwin also has made materialism respectable to an educated public once, according to Rorty (*Truth and Progress*, 1998), his "vitalism" is dismissed. Darwin's detailed account of the way in which both life and consciousness might have evolved from non-living, non-conscious chemical soup gave plausibility to their emergence free from teleology. Taking the new-found respectability of materialism along with the recognition of the human species' full-fledged animality, the search for a non-natural cause for the prolific display of life on earth can be dispensed with as misguided. So too can a hunt for a non-human purpose for human life. "After Darwin," Rorty asserts, "it became possible to believe that nature is not leading up to anything—that nature has nothing in mind."

Heidegger: Contingency over Certainty

Martin Heidegger influenced Rorty in the direction of process over permanence. Labeling the history of Western metaphysics "the ontotheological tradition," Heidegger postulated that an underlying assumption persisted from Plato down to the positivists: the power relation of "the stronger overcoming the weaker." Rorty (in "Heidegger, Contingency, and Pragmatism," 1991) notes that Heidegger finds that thinkers as diverse as Aristotle, St. Paul, Descartes, and Hegel assume this sort of asymmetrical power relation in the process of searching for the

truth that overcomes ignorance, tames sensual desire by reason, or defeats sin with the aid of God's grace. Each thinker in his own fashion seeks a force that overwhelms the subject as it makes *its* project evident. By doing so, the individual ceases to create and live his own projects in deference to the presence of the stronger influence. The submission to this influence would be both a concession to a power greater than oneself and identification with it. And it is in this identification, Heidegger claimed, that a subtle shift from an attitude of subservience to one of control and domination occurs within the seeker.

Rorty agrees with Heidegger that the "quest for certainty, clarity, and direction from outside can also be viewed as an attempt to escape from time, to view *Sein* as something that has little to do with *Zeit*." For the ontotheological tradition, time, in its fleeting manifestations, receives the unfavorable comparison with the reality of the eternal. Thus the unspoken goal of the metaphysically-inclined advocates of this philosophical tradition is to be free from the contingency, the uncertainty, and the fragility of the human condition by a release into and identification with the eternal. Valuing power above fragility, propositions over words, truth to metaphor, philosophy above poetry, in the hands of pre-Heideggerian philosophers the use of language becomes merely a means in the pursuit of a reality and a force which rises above the signifier.

Heidegger rejected this family of philosophical thinking along with its "quest for disinterested theoretical truth" as an over-intellectualized escape from the human condition. It is at its core inauthentic. The will to truth of the metaphysician is actually the poetic urge in disguise. Since antiquity, the ontotheological tradition is the attempt by (poetic) thinkers to deploy a series of metaphors to break away from the contingency of poetic metaphor. More than

hypocritical, in Heidegger eyes, the ontotheologian exhibits hubris in his belief that Western philosophy is capable of getting it right and be clear about what is real, rather than appreciating his attempt as just one of many practices trying to give voice to the "reality" of Being. Instead Heidegger urged that an amalgamation of beliefs and desires had to be made in order to recover and reassert the "force of words" heard as when they were first spoken—original and potent—in order to open a space for Being.

Dewey's Pragmatic Democracy

As with Hegel and Darwin, Rorty intentionally "misreads" or "redescribes" John Dewey from a late-Twentieth-century pragmatist's perspective. This "hypothetical Dewey" is shorn of what Rorty considers to be dead metaphors in the former's philosophy (that is his "scientistic" empirical rhetoric and panpsychic notion of experience). Conversely for Rorty, a continuing live option in Dewey's thought is his naturalism and pragmatism. Seen in this light, Rorty's Dewey becomes the synthesis of historicism and the expediency of evolutionary adaptation. Most notably, Dewey manifested this fusion in his rejection of the "crust of convention" born of a tradition that took language as representational of reality rather than as instrumental in satisfying a society's shared beliefs and hopes. The fading conviction originating with Plato that language can adequately represent what there is in words opens the way for a pragmatic utilization of language as a means to address current needs through practical deliberations among thoughtful people.

Rorty wishes to promote consciously a democracy of plurality and hope rather than one where either private autonomy or communal solidarity dominates. This sentiment can be found most clearly beginning with *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity* (1989), culminating in *Philosophy and Social Hope* (1999). By developing an evolutionary sense of history through Dewey's writings Rorty associates a generalized Darwinism directly with democracy. Growth, or the flourishing of ideas in a political environment that is conducive to the flowering of ideas and practices, is the hope for the future. While there is no metaphysical grounding of this hope in the essence of humanity or in the structure of the world, Rorty maintains that a future where we may continue to be astounded by the latest creative endeavors is a future where human happiness has the best chance.

This democratic trope is acceptable to Rorty because he agrees with Dewey that the essentialist-foundationalist worldview was a product of Europe's inegalitarian past. The conservative, leisure-class's desire to maintain the status quo was incorporated into a philosophy that favored eternal necessities over the temporal contingencies and the uncovering of static natures over the engagement with the dynamic processes. As such it stood in the way of growth and constructive change. By shifting attention away from traditional memes to those that focuses on the future, Dewey meant to reconstruct philosophy into the exercise of practical judgment, a dedication to the kinds of understanding that are geared to contemporary obstacles that obstruct the flow of expressive creativity. Rorty endorses Dewey's intention.

Philosophy: Neither Realism nor Antirealism

For Rorty one of the results of the merging of Dewey's naturalism with Davidson's view of truth is the dropping of the *realist-anti-realist issue*. One is always in touch with reality as a language user, thus the distinction between truth-conditions and assertibility-conditions dissolves. However, it is important to note that although we humans use language to engage the environment it does not make the process artificial, in the sense of language concealing a transcendent reality behind social constructs, or by its being in wholesale error concerning the inherent character of the natural world. Rorty writes in *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth* (1991) that "Davidson, on my interpretation, thinks that the benefit of going 'linguistic' is that getting rid of the Cartesian mind is the first step toward eliminating the *tertia* which, by seeming to intrude between us and the world, created the old metaphysical issues in the first place." He continues that once we dispense with the *tertia* that try to breach the now discredited scheme-content gap, the distinction between appearance ("useful fictions") and reality ("objective facts") disappears. What remain are one's community practices unfolding in a seamless and endless process of reweaving webs of beliefs in response to current and future conditions. From his rejection of the *realist-anti-realist* distinction springs Rorty's anti-essentialist nominalism and anti-foundationalism.

Anti-essential Nominalism

Related to Rorty's rejection of what he characterizes as the false dichotomy between realism and antirealism, is his dismissal of all ideas of essentialism. The *Neurath's Boat* thought experiment poses no problem for Rorty. Terms like "boat" or "self" are strictly linguistic in nature. That is, they do not refer to

Platonic Forms or Aristotelian essences, but to linguistically constructed, intentional objects. Boats or selves may undergo complete change piece-by-piece and still maintain their identity if and only if there is social agreement about the continuance of such notions. What is radical in Rorty's linguistic principle is that there is no ultimate difference between the human and the non-human "entities;" they are definable and redefinable "all the way down." There is nothing standing under [sub-stance] or above to anchor the ever-evolving linguistic parsing of metaphors.

Anti-foundationalist Historicism

Rorty denies the utility of all foundational philosophies (for example, Cartesian clear and distinct ideas, Kantian *a priori* truths, and so forth) on the basis that they share with representationalism a belief that the mind is the "mirror of nature." Once the metaphysical distinction between appearance and reality disappears, so too ought the need for a knowing subject with a special faculty for apodictic truth. Seen by Rorty as secular theories meant to identify the necessary grounding of knowledge previously provided by the Divine or natural order, foundationalisms of all stripes have in common the desire for the subject to escape temporality and contingency into a transcendent viewpoint capable of experiencing the power of truth (for example, "truth resists attempts to refute it"), pressing rational minds toward consensus. Thus, in Rorty's opinion, the invention of the transcendent subject is an attempt to salvage epistemologically a relation to a metaphysical realm that has been abandoned by post-Kantian thinkers. He holds that foundationalists arbitrarily raise to the level of universal the mundane linguistic practices and social norms that have dominated minds at some moment and in some locale. Rorty rejects the cultural hegemony implied in foundationalist

narratives, and by doing so asserts a historicist belief in the inescapable embeddedness of the human condition in the flux and flow of evolutionary change. There is, from his perspective, no neutral, ahistorical standpoint, no "God's-eye viewpoint" from which to gain a Parmenidean perspective on what there is. What we can assent to is a plurality of standpoints that achieve social acceptance because of their utility in and for the here and now.

Ethnocentricism

A natural order of reason is one more "relic" of the idea that truth consists of correspondence to the intrinsic nature of things. Absent an ahistorical standpoint from which to judge the intrinsic nature of reality, there is no such thing as a proposition that is justified without qualification or an argument which will better approximate the truth *per se*. For Rorty, there is no natural context-independent reason which somehow heralds and underlies all descriptive vocabulary. He considers the idea of context-independent truth a misguided effort to hypostatize the adjective "true" by repackaging it in epistemological terms of the Platonic attempt to hypostatize the adjective 'good.' Only such hypostatization causes one to believe that there is a goal of inquiry beyond justification to relevant contemporary audiences. Rorty holds: "All reasons are reasons for a particular people, restrained by spatial, temporal, and social conditions." When we have justified our beliefs to an audience considered pertinent, we need not make any further claims, universal or otherwise.

Philosophy as Metaphor

In line with Rorty's nominalism is his idea of philosophy as metaphor. Once one abandons the search for truth and for a reality that is concealed behind the everyday world, the role of a social practice in the vanguard of cultural change and

innovation (philosophical or otherwise) is, or ought to be, to liberate humanity from old metaphors that are rooted in superstition, mystification, and a religion-inspired mindset. He suggests that this can be done by offering new metaphors and reshaping vocabularies that will accommodate new, "abnormal" insights. In this function, philosophy will note the fears kindled by past practices as well as the hopes springing from the present, and reconcile them by avoiding ancient fallacies while projecting contemporary justified beliefs into the future. Key to this project is the acknowledgement that philosophical theories have tended to reify that which had been proposed in the past as useful metaphors. This cognitive "idolatry" is an outgrowth of the adoption of the correspondence theory of knowledge. Beginning with Plato's use of perception to analogize the relation of the psyche to the Forms, philosophers have mistakenly tried to make a word-world connection in order to ground reality in thought. The trouble with this approach is that it causes one to look behind the vocabulary for a non-human entity or force which grounds its meaning in our consciousness. Rorty thinks that this representational scheme is wrongheaded because it confuses use for content. He holds that it is rather in the use of words that we come to grips with our ever-changing environment. Successful adaptation of metaphors to new conditions is more likely when one drops the expectation that words are made adequate by that environment, or a creative agency of that environment. It is left to humans to consciously fashion their own metaphors to cope with the world. Freed from the tyranny of locating and adopting a non-human vocabulary, human ingenuity and creativity will craft undreamt of possibilities as surely as Galileo reinvented our understanding of the "heavens" by jettisoning of the outmoded Aristotelian crystalline celestial

metaphor, or as Thomas Kuhn reinvented our understanding of paradigms by recasting the Kantian idiom.

Anti-representational Metaphilosophy

Rorty's anti-representationalism is closely associated with his anti-essential nominalism. While Rorty does not doubt that there is a reality that is recalcitrant to some (but not all) linguistic approaches (that is to say that not all attempts at constructing language-games prove useful to our local purposes work), he rejects that there can ever be a narrative that has a privileged viewpoint and/or has the final determination on "What there is." Traditional Western Philosophy's establishment of, alternately, rationalist, empiricist or transcendental worldviews to address the problem of depicting in words and ideas what is, in fact, does not so much outline a pattern of progress in expressing more adequate illustrations of reality; rather, it presents a history of the "idea idea" which Rorty holds as a red herring. Since the time of Plato, struggles over first principles have yielded academic debates that are seemingly endless attempts to characterize the world, but that are counterproductive to conversations aimed at changing the world. Rorty suggests that philosophers change the subject. Subject-changing is possible because there can be no common framework in which all minds participate. The possibility of different language-games offers a multitude of frameworks from which to choose, given Rorty's anti-representational stance. No framework is more or less part of the fabric of the universe. Rather, dialogue ought to supersede certainty; interpretation to trump the search for truth. First-order philosophical search for a stable, final vocabulary that coherently captures the world in words or accurately corresponds to it drops out and is replaced with narrative-driven

conversation. The plurality of interpretations that follows opens the way for an ever-evolving exchange concerning the function of proposed statements relative to a context; a series of pragmatic dialogues about what course of action is best fitted to a contemporary situation.

Pragmatic Pluralism

With no neutral ground from which to establish convergent consensus, all positions are competing ideas; presumed goods struggling for their existence. Thus, each is a live option until the practice is accepted by, or it is abandoned as non-workable for, a society. Appeals beyond the social environment have been eliminated by Rorty's anti-foundational and anti-essential stances. Without a vocabulary that captures either the way the world is or a core human nature, there is never any possibility to locate a metaphysical foundation for truth. Equally unrealizable is a distinct epistemological platform from which to resolve differences between incongruent intuitions. Without transcendent or transpersonal standards, Liberal and Conservative narratives, atheist and fundamentalist ideologies, and realist and pragmatist approaches all vie equally for a cultural niche determining what works for a group at a given time. With everything unanchored and in flux, there is never a settled outcome, no final vocabulary that prevents the emergence of novel practices that threaten to eclipse the established ways of life. A plurality of metaphors thrives and in doing so upsets the settled, the canonical, the convergent consensus, keeping the conversation going. Rorty contends that it is the bruising competition among rival frameworks, including his own, that will result in a shakeout of the best framework fit for the times, around which will form a

solidarity (albeit, contingently) of similarly-minded individuals. And the bounty of ideas, project, and programs will be surprisingly novel and astoundingly different.

Solidarities, Poets, and the Jeffersonian Strategy

The idea of a convergent consensus is built around the expectation that there is a grounding metaphysical standard "beyond" the flux of time, culture and circumstance, and that this standard has been the object of search for millennia. But to locate this standard, the seekers already must be at the consensus point which is being sought; they must already know what this is in order to find the real. Rorty considers this sort of Platonist reminiscence to be a vicious circle that assumes the consequent, i.e., that an objective point of view, in fact, exists. Even the Kantian attempt to circumvent this problem by asserting that we can have *a priori* knowledge of objects that we *constitute* ignores the troubling fact, according to Rorty, that Kant never explained how we have apodictic knowledge of the "constituting activities" of a transcendental ego. This attempt at self-foundation founders in another, more threatening way. In the placing of the "outer" into the "inner, constituting space," the rational mind (seen as Reason itself) becomes the arbiter of cultural norms ("culture" being conceived as a collection of knowledge claims). Thus the discipline of philosophy becomes the keeper of the status quo, whose opinions and mode of thinking becomes the one true standard for any other discipline to measure itself against. However, Rorty emphatically denies that Philosophy as a discipline holds this crucial role. In fact, he argues that we should put aside the Kantian distinctions between disciplines as inegalitarian, and favor an open-mindedness based upon the Jeffersonian model of religious tolerance.

This Jeffersonian strategy, in line with Rorty's historicist anti-foundationalism and anti-essentialist nominalism, is designed to encourage the abandonment of any claim of the discovery of an all-encompassing system of thought that serves as the legitimizer of all other practices. Seen as a remnant of the *onto-theological* period in human thinking, systematic philosophy suffers the same ills as traditional dogmatic theologies in that they both project as universal historically embedded, cultural values. The remedy that Rorty wishes to apply to this systematizing is to split public practices from private beliefs, treating all theories as narratives on par with each other, and to shelter edifying impulses toward poetic self-creativity from all pressures to conform. This dual strategy levels the playing field in the public sector, allowing unrestricted democratic dialogue between groups holding rival narratives (solidarities), while at the same time liberating creative thought from the normalizing restraints of the alleged privileged rationality asserted by Theological, Philosophical or Scientific solidarities. What is denied in Rorty's Jeffersonian strategy is any universal commensuration in either the epistemological or metaphysical sphere, as well as the privilege of the rational in a supposed hierarchical system of reality. What is gained is the possibility for the expression of alternative, "abnormal" voices in the conversation of humankind, which, in potential, may prove to be persuasive enough to draw a growing number of adherents into its ranks, thereby creating a new solidarity better adapted to the contemporary environment, with its unique set of issues and requirements than are prior narratives. The evolution of unique narratives is progressive in the sense that each society and every era can discard encrusted customs and embrace novel practices that seem best in addressing the problems at hand. It is also contingent because there can be no final vocabulary

that gets it right about human nature or the nature of existence. All is in play "all the way down" in an essence-less world where any foundational pretence to a harmony between the human subject and the objects of knowledge is eschewed, and where justification is confined to "beliefs that cannot swing free from the nonhuman environment."

Non-reductive Materialism and the Self

Rorty sees the division between reductive materialism and subjectivism as a pseudo-problem originating with the Cartesian mind-body dualism. These incommensurate descriptions both pose as the sole truth on the subject of the nature of ontologically real objects. Wishing to "dedivinize" philosophy, science and discussions on the self, Rorty occasionally concentrates on the last of this troika in an effort to unsettle the western notion about an underlying substantial metaphysical center grounding existence. In his "Contingency of Selfhood," Rorty defends contingencies and discontinuities of the "I" against realist thought. It is plausible that most Enlightenment thinkers could not fathom how inert matter and its motion could account for the first person experience of human consciousness. Rorty suggests that fear against the association of selfhood to the dying human animal may be a motivation for philosophers since Plato to posit a central essence for individuals. To this concern Rorty resorts to non-reductive materialism to explain away the mind-body issue that has concerned thoughtful people for the last four hundred years.

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Martin Luther King Jr is known for his contributions to the American Civil rights movement in the 1960's. His most famous work is his "I have a dream" speech, delivered in 1963, in which he spoke of his dream of a united states that is void of segregation and racism. He was awarded the Nobel prize for his dynamic leadership of the civil rights movement and steal fast commitment to achieving racial justice through non violent action.

Martin Luther King, Jr., may be America's most revered political figure, commemorated in statues, celebrations, and street names around the world. On the fiftieth anniversary of King's assassination, the man and his activism are as close to public consciousness as ever. But despite his stature, the significance of King's writings and political thought remains under-appreciated. In this excerpt from the fiftieth anniversary of the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., on April 4, 1968, will undoubtedly occasion many observances of his extraordinary life and enduring political legacy. This response is only be fitting of King's profound sacrifices, as well as the sacrifices of those who traveled alongside him on what James Baldwin presciently and empathetically called his "dangerous road." But even as we honor King's memory, it is imperative that we consider what his thought still has to teach us about how to build a more just and peaceful world and, more generally, about political morality, judgment, and practice.

I have a dream

Any attempt to interpret and critically engage King's political thought, however, confronts a paradox. On one hand, there is the inescapable fact that King

may be the most globally celebrated political figure, as well as part of the most renowned social movement, to have emerged in the United States in the twentieth century. In 1983, after occasionally rancorous debate, but only fifteen years after the civil rights leader's death, President Ronald Reagan signed into law a federal holiday commemorating King's birthday. Twenty years later, at least 730 U.S. cities were home to a street bearing his name. Perhaps the greatest testament to America's reverence for King is the monument to him that stands amid the presidential statues, war memorials, and national museums on Washington, DC's National Mall. There, near where King delivered "I Have a Dream" — arguably the most famous speech in American history — a sculpture dedicated to King's memory depicts him emerging from a massive "stone of hope" meant to evoke one of the most famous lines from that address: "With this faith, we will be able to hew out of the mountain of despair a stone of hope."

To paraphrase Wittgenstein, one might say that when it comes to King, contemporary political theory, philosophy, and social criticism are held captive by a picture. It is difficult to get outside that picture because it lies deep within our cultural common sense. The very vocabularies, narratives, concepts, and paradigms we have developed, ostensibly to understand someone like King, inexorably repeat back to us an image that conceals the scope and subtlety of his thought. The part of King's thinking that remains visible gets compressed into arguments or claims that, for most political philosophers, are already considered convictions. Thus, reading Martin Luther King seriously appears incapable of repaying the effort. As scholars of black political thought and African American philosophy, we find these interpretive obstacles, perhaps particularly acute in this case, to be familiar. We

hope to demonstrate the wrongheadedness of this larger orientation while also presenting a valuable collection of original theoretical work on a historically significant but deeply under-appreciated thinker.

Study of western political thought

Though he held a doctorate in systematic theology and spent a number of years studying the history of Western political thought and philosophy, King was not an academic political philosopher. In addition to being an activist and a Christian minister, he was, however, a serious public philosopher, writing numerous books and essays and delivering countless speeches for a general audience. Given the professionalization of political philosophy, there is a strong bias against treating public philosophers, even eminent world-historical figures like King, as worthy of sustained study. Academic political philosophers write largely for each other and rely almost exclusively on a tiny canon of nonacademic political thinkers — for example, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, JeanJacques Rousseau, Karl Marx, and John Stuart Mill. There is a high bar to acceptance into this elite company, and few black public philosophers (with the exception, perhaps, of W. E. B. Du Bois and Frantz Fanon) are widely regarded as having cleared it. Public philosophers are generally seen as, at best, popularizers of the original ideas of more significant thinkers. The study of King has suffered because of this academic insularity and prejudice against political thinkers who seek a nonspecialist readership. So here, through our collective effort to critically engage King's writings, we aim to help correct this unjustified neglect — while also, we hope, appealing to nonspecialist readers ourselves.

Black political culture

It is also important to acknowledge that King is often read through one of the most enduring and entrenched features of black political culture: the celebration of, and reverence for, virtuosic oratory performance and oracular wisdom. Rooted in African American religious and artistic practice, these performances fuse style and substance and embody them in a charismatic rhetorical persona, which seems, to many, to confer authority and standing. A masterful orator and inspiring leader, King had an uncanny ability to turn a memorable and lyrical phrase, to conjure a vivid metaphor, to stir his listeners' emotions, and to move people to action across a wide range of audiences. These talents understandably continue to play a significant role in securing and shaping King's legacy.

Although poetic and prophetic performance can indeed impart vital philosophical insight, interpreting a public philosopher like King solely through this lens risks distortion and invites misuse. For instance, one can be tempted to invoke a phrase, abstracted from its context, to amplify an idea or advance a cause that King actually opposed. One might treat a quoted remark as if it were a standalone aphorism when in fact King used it as a premise in a wider argument. Or because a particular rhetorical presentation of an idea resonates powerfully, one might feel viscerally that it is grasped without, however, appreciating its full implications or philosophical grounding. We contend that King is a systematic thinker and thus it is imperative to dig beneath his soaring oratory and quotable phrases to find the complex reasons he provides to support his practical conclusions.

Black Political Thought

This vision, more broadly, calls for analyses of black political thought that attend carefully to the details and nuances of arguments advanced by black thinkers and the often subtle philosophical differences between like minded figures. This work demands the charitable reconstruction of theoretical claims to clarify and make explicit key insights and fruitful avenues for further research and reflection. To carry it out, we must avoid, or at least provisionally hold at bay, certain familiar tendencies in scholarly ac counts of black political thought: treating political ideas solely as rationalizations for class and group interests or as effects of socio-historical factors; regarding these ideas as worthy of study only because of their perceived social function; thinking of them as mere social or psychological phenomena to be empirically explained; and — particularly pernicious in the case of King — reducing these ideas to mere tactical moves to advance some agenda in a changing context.

The approach to black political thought that we favor also rejects hagiography. Black thinkers are due far more respect and attention than they typically receive from political philosophers. They should not, however, be uncritically celebrated or treated as oracles of near-divine wisdom. Criticism and disagreement are often appropriate, and necessary. Indeed, honest critical engagement (which eschews harsh polemics and ad hominem dis missals) is a way of showing genuine respect for black thinkers. This is a conception of political philosophy shared by our contributors and our subject. It embraces historical specificity and close reading, considers and defends substantive principles, values, and goals, and builds upon the very ideas and theories put forth by the thinkers we

sharply criticize. In doing so, it contributes to the rediscovery of rich and often overlooked traditions of political thought.

Martin Luther King Jr is rembered for his achievements in Civil rights and for the methods he used to get there namely nonviolence. Only non violence, he believed, had the power to break the cycle of retributive violence and create lasting peau through reconcitiation. King concludes by warning against “ego struggles and other piffalls. This automatically sets non violence against war and communism.